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Abstract
This dissertation contains three essays on household decision making in the areas of education
and health in developing countries.
The first chapter explores intra-household decision making in the context of conditional cash
transfer programs in education. This study provides an empirical test of whether the recipient
of the incentive-either the parent or the child-affects outcomes. I conduct this test through
a field experiment in Gurgaon, India where an incentive to achieve a specific reading goal was
randomly assigned to be received by either the parent or by the child. I find that incentives to
parents result in worse outcomes than incentives to children when parents are less productive in
their children's education, measured through lower initial test scores. Conversely, incentives to
parents result in better outcomes when parents are more productive, measured through higher
initial test scores.
In the second chapter, written jointly with Leigh Linden, we estimate the effects of peer
networks on the enrollment and attendance patterns of children in a community-based education
program in India. The program is open to all out-of-school children, and we randomly assign
a subset of the eligible children to be actively encouraged to participate. We find that active
encouragement increases participation among selected children by 30 percentage points. Having
a treated friend increases participation by about 20% of the main effect. The effect of treated
friends comes primarily from bilateral ties, where both the child and his friend indicate that
they spend time with each other.
The third chapter, written jointly with Nava Ashraf and Jesse Shapiro, explores how house-
holds make decisions to purchase and use health products in developing countries. This study
tests whether higher prices can increase use, either by targeting distribution to high-use house-
holds (a screening effect), or by stimulating use psychologically through a sunk-cost effect. We
develop a methodology for separating these two effects. We implement the methodology in a
field experiment in Zambia using door-to-door marketing of a home water purification solution.
We find that higher prices screen out those who use the product less. By contrast, we find no
consistent evidence of sunk-cost effects.
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Abstract
In developing countries, a common approach to encourage education is to provide cash
incentives to households conditional on their children's enrollment, attendance or achievement
in school. Little is known, however, about whether the identity of recipient-either the parent
or child-can influence the effectiveness of these interventions. This study provides an empirical
test of whether changing the recipient of the incentive affects outcomes. To structure the test,
I develop a model of household education production in which parents' ability to motivate their
children is dampened because of moral hazard. In the model, when parental inputs are more
productive, rewarding parents is more effective than rewarding children, while the opposite
is true when child inputs are more productive. A testable prediction is that the relative
effectiveness of rewarding the parent rather than the child should be positively correlated with
the part of the child's prior achievement that is predicted by parental characteristics. I test the
model with a field experiment in Gurgaon, India where an incentive to achieve a specific reading
goal was randomly assigned to be received by either the parent or by the child. I find that
incentives to parents result in worse outcomes than incentives to children when children have
less productive parents and lower initial test scores. Conversely, incentives to parents result in
better outcomes when children have more productive parents and higher initial test scores.
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1 Introduction
In developing countries, increasing enrollment and learning in primary school remains an important
policy goal. While many countries have made progress towards universal primary enrollment, 14%
of primary-aged children in the developing world are still out of school (UNESCO, 2007). In
addition, these countries still face the challenge of educating the children who are in school. A
recent survey in India, for example, found that only 50% of children in grade 3 could read at a
first-grade level (Pratham, 2008).
Interventions to improve schooling outcomes often take the form of supply-side reforms, such as
improvements in infrastructure, materials or teachers. Recently an increasing amount of attention
has been given to demand-side interventions, which either lower the costs or increase the immediate
benefits that households face when deciding to educate their children. One common demand-side
intervention offers cash rewards to households when their children enroll in, attend or achieve in
school.
While interventions that provide cash rewards condition the transfer on different behaviors (en-
rollment, attendance or achievement), those that target families in developing countries primarily
provide the rewards to parents. Implicit in the design of these interventions is the idea that re-
warding the parents, rather than the children, produces the best results. In contrast to a literature
suggesting that the recipient of a transfer matters between adults within a household (Duflo, 2003;
Lundberg et. al., 1997), to my knowledge there have been no comparisons of programs that target
parents with those that target children.
Changing the recipient of the incentive from the parent to the child may affect outcomes if child
effort is an important input into education production and if parents are unable to motivate their
children to the full extent they are themselves motivated by the incentives. If this is the case,
incentives provided to children may result in better outcomes than incentives provided to parents.
As I explore in this paper, the transfers that parents provide their children may be dampened
either by agency problems within the household or by parents' inability to commit to rewarding
their children for positive outcomes.
To my knowledge, this study is the first to test empirically whether providing an incentive to
the child or to the parent has an effect on educational outcomes. In this paper I present the results
of a field experiment in India that offered incentives targeted to either the child or the parent. By
offering incentives directly to the child, the experiment made the child the full residual claimant
of his1 efforts. I compare the resulting education outcomes with the case when an equally-valued
incentive was provided to the parent.
To motivate the experimental design, I develop a model of education production in which both
the parent and child exert costly effort, and households vary in the productivity of the parent's and
child's inputs in the production function. In the model, the productivity of parent and child inputs
determines both the child's initial learning level and the relative effectiveness of incentives given
to the parent versus incentives given to the child. The model has different implications for the
relationship between initial test scores and relative effectiveness of incentives given to the parent,
depending on whether the primary source of variation in initial test scores is parental or child
productivity. If differences in initial test scores are driven by differences in parental productivity,
there should be a positive association between the relative effectiveness of incentives given to the
parent and initial test scores. In particular, children with low-productivity parents will be initially
low achieving, and these children will perform better when they receive incentives directly compared
to the case when their parents receive the incentives. Conversely, children with high-productivity
parents will be initially high achieving, and these children will perform better when their parents
receive the incentives. If initial test scores are instead driven by differences in child productivity,
there should be a negative association between the relative effectiveness of incentives given to the
parent and initial test scores.
I also present an extension to the model in which parents cannot commit to rewarding their
children for learning. If parents cannot commit, children will not exert effort. The model implies
that offering parents a commitment device that provides external incentives to their children will
improve outcomes when the child's input is relatively more productive. Depending on whether
variation in test scores is driven by parent or child productivity, parents of initially low- or high-
performing children will be more willing to commit.
I test the model using a field experiment with primary school students in urban slums in
Gurgaon, India. The Indian context is well suited to the purposes of this study. While net primary
'Throughout the paper, I use masculine pronouns to refer to the child and feminine pronouns to refer to the
parent.
school enrollment improved from 79% in 2000 to 88% in 2005 (World Bank, 2008), attendance and
performance in school still lags. Among enrolled children, absence rates of 25-35% are common
(see, e.g., Banerjee et. al, 2005; Pratham, 2008). As noted above, many enrolled students also
suffer from poor learning outcomes.
The available data suggest that parent and child effort, not financial considerations such as
direct costs of school or opportunity costs of not working, may be an important factor in the lack
of attendance and performance in Indian primary schools. There are no school fees, and some
families receive subsidies for their children's enrollment. Children also receive free lunch at school
through the Mid-day Meal program. Of the few children who are not in school, the majority do
not work: according to the 2001 census, only 5% of children between the ages of 5 and 14 were
working. 2
The experiment offered prizes to the parent or child if the child reached a literacy goal after
two months. Each child was given a goal based on his pretest score and was tested again after
two months to determine if the goal had been reached. In order to isolate the effects of changing
control over the rewards between the parent and child, program families were randomly offered
either money given to the child's mother ("parent money"), money to the child ("child money"),
or toys to the child as a reward. The parent money treatment gave the parent full control over
the reward. In the child money treatment, the child was physically handed the reward, but the
money could easily be taken from the child to be spent at the parent's discretion. In the toys
treatment, the child was handed the reward, and he was given a good that the parent could not
use herself. Because the parent could not easily capture the toy, and because baseline survey
responses indicated that money given to the child was simply transferred to the parent, I focus on
the difference between the aggregated money treatments and toys treatment in the analysis. Since
the interaction of pretest score and the effect of parent incentives relative to child incentives is a
key interaction of interest, the randomization was stratified by pretest score, ensuring balance of
the treatment groups within each test score level.
The experiment included two additional treatments to test explicitly whether parents want to
2 Among children enrolled in school, there also does not appear to be any tension between school and work. In
the sample of in-school children used in this study, less than 1% reported participating in non-domestic work more
than one hour per day, even though the school day ends at 12:30pm.
reward their children for performing well but cannot commit to doing so. I offered the parents
a choice of money for themselves or a toy for their child, either ex ante (at the outset of the
program) or ex post (after the goal had been reached). The ex ante treatment gave the parents
the opportunity to commit, and the ex post treatment served to check that the choice itself was
not driving outcomes.
Children in the program were given the opportunity to attend free after-school classes to assist
them in improving their reading skills. These classes were held to give the children a greater chance
to achieve the goals set out by the program. In addition, attendance in these classes provides an
objective measure of effort and serves as an intermediate outcome in the analysis.
While my design did not allow for a pure control group, I present quasi-experimental evidence
that the incentives program had a substantial impact on test scores across all incentive treatments.
Turning to the differences between treatment groups, I find no significant mean differences in at-
tendance or achievement between the three main treatment groups of parent money, child money
and toys. I do, however, find substantial heterogeneity in treatment effects consistent with dif-
ferences in parental productivity in education production. Children with lower initial test scores
perform better when provided a toy as an incentive relative to money, while the reverse is true
for children with higher initial test scores. To isolate the variation in test scores attributable to
parental productivity, I construct an index of parental productivity using the predicted values from
a regression of initial test scores on parental characteristics. I find that the effectiveness of the
toys treatment is more negatively correlated with the portion of test scores related to parental
productivity than with test scores overall. These results hold for attendance in the supplemental
classes as well as for achievement of the literacy goal. Finally, I find no evidence that offering
parents the opportunity to commit to rewarding their children with toys improves outcomes. This
suggests that poor learning outcomes do not result from an inability to commit on the part of the
parents.
This paper offers several contributions to existing research. As an study of an incentives-to-
learn program, it adds to a new but growing literature evaluating these types of interventions. To
my knowledge, the only randomized evaluation of such a program in developing countries is Kremer,
Miguel and Thornton (2004). The authors evaluate a cash incentive program for primary-aged girls
in Kenya. The program was structured as a tournament, where prizes were awarded to parents of
girls who scored in the top 15% of a standardized test. The authors find a significant impact of
the program on learning outcomes.
Several studies in developed countries, involving children at upper-secondary or tertiary levels
of education, evaluate programs that rewarded students directly. In these studies the evidence on
the effectiveness of the incentives is somewhat mixed. Angrist and Lavy (2002) find a significant
impact of one of two evaluations of rewards for performance on high-school matriculation exams
in Israel. Angrist, Lang and Oreopoulos (2006) find that a program rewarding good grades in a
Canadian university raised grades for females, but not for males. In a recent study, Jackson (2008)
finds that incentives for performance on Advanced Placement exams in the United States had a
significant impact on performance on these tests. 3
This paper also relates to the literature evaluating conditional cash transfer programs that pro-
vide families in developing countries with cash if the children enroll in or attend school. These
evaluations generally find that conditional cash transfers achieve the objectives of increasing en-
rollment and attendance (Schultz, 2004; Glewwe and Olinto, 2004; Schady and Araujo, 2006; and
Barrera-Osorio et. al., 2008).
More generally, this paper contributes to the theoretical and empirical literature on how par-
ents provide incentives to their children. Becker's Rotten Kid Theorem (1974) provides an early
theoretical backbone to this line of research. The Theorem shows that under certain assumptions,
a parent can control her child's actions indirectly through transfers to her child. Through these
transfers, the parent can make the child fully internalize the parent's value of schooling. External
incentives provided to the parent will therefore produce equivalent results to incentives provided
to the child. However, it has been noted that the conditions under which the Theorem holds are
somewhat restrictive. Bergstrom (1989) points out a number of situations under which the theo-
rem does not apply, including moral hazard. The model I present in the next section includes this
feature. Gatti (2005) explores the theoretical implications of a moral hazard model for bequests
and intergenerational transfers between parents and children. Weinberg (2001) finds some empir-
ical evidence in favor of a moral hazard model by examining the relationship between household
: Note, however, that the Advanced Placement Incentive Program bundled both teacher and student incentives,
and it is unclear how each type of incentive contributed to the success of the students.
income and the use of corporal punishment.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out a model of education
production that motivates the experiment's design. Section 3 describes the design of the interven-
tion and outcome measurement. Section 4 presents my findings on the effects of the treatments
on class attendance and test scores. Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework
This section presents a simple two-period model of household education production. In the first
period, the household decides how much effort to exert in the absence of external incentives. In
the second period, an experimenter augments the household's value of education with additional
incentives to learn.
In this model, the education output produced in each period represents achievement in an
individual educational task, such as grade promotion or exam performance. The parent and child
each provide inputs, and the production process involves two-sided moral hazard similar to Eswaran
and Kotwal (1985). The parent and child cannot contract on inputs, but they can contract on a
division of the value that education produces. This value can take the form of either the parent's
own value of education or an external incentive provided by the experimenter. Each agent provides
input based on his or her share of the value generated.
In the first period the share of the value accruing to each agent is determined endogenously as
part of the parent's maximization problem. The parent places a value on success in the task, but
the child does not.4  The child derives value only from the transfers he receives from his parent.
The parent provides transfers to her child to induce effort, and the parent and child decide how
much input to provide based on the surplus that each receives.
In the second period the experimenter offers an incentive for success either to the parent or to
the child. If the incentive is given to the parent, the parent decides on a fraction of the total value
(her own value plus the additional incentive) to give to the child, and the parties decide on second-
period effort. If the incentive is given to the child, the parent keeps only her own value of success,
4I assume that the parent places a value on her child's education either directly through her utility function, or
through future transfers from the child.
while the child receives the full amount of the additional incentive. This division determines the
parties' second-period effort and the probability of success in the second period.
After describing the family's period-i decisions in Section 2.1, I show how the family reacts to
external incentives targeted to the parent or to the child in Section 2.2. In Section 2.3 I introduce
commitment problems on the part of the parent and explore the implications of offering the parent
a device that allows her to commit to giving her child full incentives.
2.1 Initial Period
The child and parent contribute ct and pt, in periods t = {1, 2}. The costs of input to the child
and parent are given by the quadratic functions 2l and "I in each period.
The parent places a normalized value of 1 on success in each period. That is, she receives 1 if
the task is successful, and 0 if it is not. 6 The probability of success in each period is given by
f(ct, Pt) = 6ct + PPt
The parameters 6 > 0 and > 0 capture the the child's and parent's productivity in education pro-
duction, respectively. Child and parental inputs reflect each agent's direct influence on education
production. Child input represents the child's direct effort, while parental input represents the
parent's own effort in assisting the child with studies or in directly managing the child's activities.
Before first-period input choices are made, the parent announces a fraction 7y of the value of
success that she will give to the child if the task is successful. I assume that the parent must
commit to this division of value until the first-period outcome has been realized.7 I further assume
that the parent cannot make negative transfers to the child. In equilibrium, this limited liability
constraint will bind. If the child is unsuccessful, he will receive no transfer, and if he is successful,
he will receive a fraction -y of the value of success.
Based on the fraction yl, the child and parent maximize their respective shares of the value of
5I assume that the cost parameters a and b are sufficiently large that the probability of success is always less than
1.
6I assume that all parents have the same value of education in the absence of external incentives. If parents
have different values, then a greater value of education implies that the restriction imposed by the child incentives
treatment is less likely to bind. Therefore, the model predicts a smaller difference between parent and child incentives
as the parent's value of education increases.
7 This assumption will be relaxed in Section 2.3.
success net of costs over their first-period inputs. The first-order conditions of these maximization
problems form two incentive-compatibility constraints that the parent faces in deciding on y1.
For simplicity I assume that both the child and parent are risk neutral and therefore make
their decisions based on the expected value of success f(cl, pl). The child's incentive-compatibility
constraint is formed by the maximization of his share of the value of success net of costs over cl,
taking the parent's choice of -yl as given:
ac2
maxy 1 (6cl + Opl) - 1c1  2
This yields the first-order condition
cl = (1)
Similarly, the parent maximizes
max(1 - yl) {6c + Opi}- bp2Pi 2
This yields the first-order condition
1 = ) (2)b
Subject to the incentive-compatibility constraints (1) and (2), the parent maximizes her ex-
pected share of the value of success over the fraction "yi she gives to the child:
max (1 - 'y) {Sci + 3pl} - bp
7i 2
Substituting the incentive-compatibility constraints, this optimization becomes
6271 02(l _ "Y1) 2(1 _ _ 1)2
max(1 - yl) 6 +
"1 a b 2b
The first-order condition for "y is given by
(1 - y1)6 2  2-y1 2 (1 - oY1)
= 0 (3)
a a b
Because 0 < y < 1, The parent's choice of 7Y will be
2 - a2 if < 6 b
2b52 -a a({1 = (4)
0 if / > 6 b
Three important relationships arise from this optimization. First, the parent never gives
the child full incentives (i.e., 7y = 1), even when her input is completely unproductive. In the
formulation above, ' 12 when 0 = . Second, over the range in which the solution is on the
interior, 7T is increasing in 6 and decreasing in P. The parent will give higher incentives to the
child as the child's input becomes more productive, and lower incentives to the child as the parent's
own input becomes more productive. Third, the first-period probability of success (i.e., Sc* + op*)
is increasing in both 6 and 3 (see Appendix A for proofs). 8
2.2 Experiment
Now suppose that after the first-period input decisions are made, an experimenter observes the
expected output, 3 c* + Op, and then offers an external incentive of value 7r to either the parent or
child conditional on success in the second period. As noted above, the parent places a value of 1
on success in addition to this incentive.
If this external incentive accrues to the parent, the parent and child make their second-period
production decisions based on the external incentive plus the parent's own value of success, i7 + 1.
Based on this value and an updated share Y2, the parent and child make their choices of c2 and p2.
The child's choice of c2 is determined by the maximization
2
max(7r + 1)Y2 (6c2 + /P2} ac2
c2 2
8 The relationship between the probability of success and / does not depend on the assumption of quadratic costs.
As 3 increases, there are three effects: 1) the probability of success increases directly, 2) the parent's incentive to
contribute inputs increases, and 3) the parent shifts more resources towards herself through decreasing y. The net
effect is always positive, since by decreasing 'y the parent is shifting resources to the more productive input. On
the other hand, the relationship between the probability of success and 6 is more dependent on the assumption of
quadratic costs. While the probability of success still increases from the direct effect and from increased incentives
for the child to contribute inputs, the parent may have an incentive to capture more of the surplus by decreasng the
child's share -y. If this is the case, then it is possible that the parent's incentive to decrease y overwhelms the direct
effect and the effect on the child's incentives to contribute.
The first-order condition is given by
c2 r + 1)2 (5)
a
Similarly, given 72 , the parent maximizes
max(r + 1)(1 - '2) {6C2 + /P2 bp
P2 2
The first-order condition is given by
2 (7r + 1)(1 - 2)
P2= (6)
The parent's optimization over '72 is now
max(1 - ' 2 ) (7 + 1) { 6c2 + p2} b
Y2 2
subject to the new incentive-compatibility constraints (5) and (6). The first-order condition is now
(7r + 1)2 (1- 2) 2 (r + 12 2 (r + 1) (1 - 2)]
-(xT + 1)62[ + P ]=0a a b
Note that this condition is equivalent to equation (3), so that -y* = '.
Based on the share allocated to the child -y* and the second-period inputs, the probability of
success in the second period is given by
62(1 + r)-Y +12(1 + 70 (1 - -2)
a b
The probability of success, as before, is increasing in 6 and in /.
Now suppose that the external incentive of 7 is given to the child and cannot be appropriated
by the parent. This restriction binds if the parent would have given the child less than ir if she
had received the incentive herself. That is, the restriction binds if
(7r + 1)-'y < r (7)
I assume throughout that 7r is large enough such that the restriction (7) binds. If this is the case,
then the parent will not offer the child any additional incentives; that is, if the task is successful she
will not share the value that accrues to her. She will receive a value of 1 if the task is successful,
and the child will receive a value of r. The probability of success in this case is given by
62+
a b
The difference in the second-period probability of success between incentives to the parent and
incentives to the child is given by
62 (it + )- /2 62 ( ) + 1) (1 - (8
a b a b
I now explore how equation (8) is affected when either 6 or / varies across households. Suppose
first that 6 varies and that 3 is fixed. At low values of 6, incentives provided to the parent will
result in a higher probability of success than incentives provided to the child. At high values of
6, incentives provided to the parent will result in a lower probability of success than incentives
provided to the child. 9
The intuition behind this result is as follows. At very low values of 6, the child's input
is unproductive, and the probability of success is maximized when the parent is allocated the
incentives. As 6 rises, the child's input becomes relatively more important in production, but
because of moral hazard, the parent is inclined to distort the rewards towards herself. Therefore,
at high values of 6, it becomes more effective to allocate 7r directly to the child.
Now suppose that / varies and that 6 is fixed. An external incentive provided to the child will
result in higher probability of success when / is low, and lower probability of success when / is
high.'" At low values of /, the probability of success is higher when the child receives high-powered
incentives, but if given the option the parent distorts the rewards towards herself in order to gain
9 Equation (8) will be negative when 6 > /vb and positive when 6 < P/ . To see this, note that when 6 = 0,
-y = 0 and equation (8) is positive and decreasing in 6. Equation (8) equals zero only when 6 = P b
, 
and at this
point it has a negative partial derivative with respect to 6, implying that it is negative at higher values of 6.
1 0Equation (8) will be negative when /3 < 6 b and positive when / > 6 . To see this, note that when / = 0,
S= and equation (8) is negative. Equation (8) equals zero when 3 = 6~ , and at this point it has a positive
partial derivative with respect to 3, implying that it is positive at higher values of /.
more surplus. For high values of /, it becomes more effective to provide incentives to the parent
because she will allocate them to the more productive input (by keeping them for herself).
If child and parental productivity are unobservable, then the child's learning level at the be-
ginning of the experiment, 3 c* + p*, will be directly related to both productivity parameters and
to the relative effectiveness of incentives given to the child. The share of the variation in initial
test scores related to child productivity will be positively related to the relative effect of incentives
given to the child. Conversely, the share of the variation in initial test scores related to parental
productivity will be negatively related to the relative effect of incentives given to the child.
If households primarily differ by child productivity, then initial test scores will reflect differences
in child productivity, and children with higher test scores will perform better in the experiment
when they are given the incentives directly. If, on the other hand, households primarily differ by
parental productivity, then children with lower test scores will perform better in the experiment
when they are given the incentives directly. The following table illustrates the relationship between
relative treatment effects and the children's initial test scores when the variation in these scores is
driven by differences in child or parental productivity.
Variation in Productivity
Child (6) Parent (f)
Initial Test Low Parent incentives > Child Incentives Child Incentives > Parent Incentives
Score High Child Incentives > Parent Incentives Parent incentives > Child Incentives
2.3 Parental Commitment
Now suppose that the parent cannot commit to rewarding her child after the outcome has been
realized. In this case, the parent will not reward the child at all, effectively setting 7 = 0. If the
child is aware that the parent cannot commit, he will not provide any input. Thus, the probability
of success in the first period will be 3P1 = o.
If an external incentive of 7r is provided to the parent and she cannot commit, the probability
of success in the second period equals 032 1 . The parent will desire a commitment device that
forces her to give the external incentive of 7 to the child if
6c2,commtt + 3 P2,commtt > (r + 1)/ 3 P2,nocomm (9)
Using the cost functions from above, this condition is equivalent to
b1
o2 < 2 b
a2 +r
Note that this condition will hold when / is low, or when 6 is high. When the parent's input is
not productive (low 0), the parent will want to commit because she does not lose much in terms of
her own contribution to success by committing. Similarly, when the child's input is very productive
(high 6), the parent will want to commit because she stands to gain more (in terms of increased
likelihood of success) by doing so.
In addition, the parent will only be willing to commit when doing so increases the probability
of success. To see this, note that equation (9) implies that the second-period probability of success
is greater when the parent decides to commit:
6C2,commt + P2,commit > /P2,nocommzt
Thus, allowing the parent to commit will increase the probability of success relative to an unre-
stricted parent incentive if commitment is indeed a problem.
3 Experimental Design
The intervention was conducted from July through September of 2007 in Gurgaon, a suburb of
Delhi. Eight government-run primary schools were selected based on proximity to the city center
and availability of public transportation nearby. In seven schools all 1st, 2nd and 3rd grade
students participated in the program. In one school administrative difficulties in obtaining 1st-
grade students' addresses prevented us from including 1st-grade children. 11
The main intervention consisted of a pretest, announcement of the child's incentive scheme, and
a post-test approximately two months later. Children were initially tested in schools to determine
baseline learning levels. Each child was given a goal competency based on his pretest score.
Children were then re-tested using a similar testing instrument after two months. If the child
1"The sample also includes 36 students from two additional schools near the city center. All of the results are
robust to the exclusion of these students.
achieved the goal, he or his parent would receive a prize. The treatments were randomly assigned
on an individual level (within schools), after stratifying by pretest score.
The prize value was set at 100 rupees (about $2.50 at the prevailing exchange rate) for all
treatments. One hundred rupees is the approximate daily wage for an unskilled laborer in these
areas. This amount is substantially less than the amount of $20 awarded in the program evaluated
by Kremer, Miguel and Thornton (2004) in Kenya. However, there are several reasons to believe
that the relatively smaller amount in the India program was sufficient to induce noticeable changes
in behavior. First, this study's time frame of 2 months was considerably shorter than the Kenya
program, which ran for 8-11 months from announcement to post-test. Second, the Kenya program
was structured as a tournament that only awarded 15% of the girls with prizes. The India program's
goals were set so that everyone in the program had approximately a 50% likelihood of winning the
prize, calibrated by a pilot experiment. Third, the individual announcement of the program at
the children's homes and the two individual reminders should have made the program more salient
to the parents and children who participated. Finally, in Section 4.1 I offer more direct evidence
that the prize value was sufficient to raise test scores. Using households that were not reached for
the program announcement as controls, I find that the program raised test scores by about 0.51
standard deviations across all incentive treatments.
The experiment exogenously changed the recipient of the reward along two dimensions: the
direct recipient of the reward (either parent or child) and type of reward (either money or toys).
The first treatment ("parent money") offered a reward of money to the parent if the child achieved
the goal. The parent was visited at home within three days of the post-test and was given 100
rupees in cash. This represents the case where the parent has complete control over the reward.
The second treatment ("child money") offered a reward of money to the child if the child achieved
the goal. The child was given 100 rupees in cash at school within three days of the post-test. If
the parent and child consider money given to the child as earmarked for child consumption and
there is no compensating behavior by the parent, this treatment would represent more control over
the reward by the child. However, if income from the child and parent are pooled in the household,
this treatment would be equivalent to the parent money treatment.
Several responses from the baseline survey suggest that in my sample money given to the child
was pooled within the household. While 51% of parents reported giving their child spending money
over the past day, the majority of the time (79%) the money was given for school supplies or food
items. This suggests that money was rarely given to the child to be spent at his own discretion.
The baseline survey also asked the child what he would do if given 100 rupees. Over 80% reported
that they would give it directly to their parent.
The third treatment offered a reward of a toy valued at 100 rupees to the child if the child
achieved the goal. There were two sub-treatments. In the first sub-treatment ("toys"), the child
was given a choice between a menu of 5 different toys, each with a retail value of 100 rupees. In
the second sub-treatment ("voucher"), the child was given a voucher worth 100 rupees that was
redeemable at a local toy store. The voucher sub-treatment was included in case the toys chosen
for the toys treatment were unpopular. This would allow some children to receive an item they
valued more. In practice, however, the limited number of toys selected for the toys treatment
proved to be very popular, and the shopkeepers reported that those redeeming the voucher often
chose toys that were available in the toys treatment. Therefore, these sub-treatments are combined
for the purposes of the analysis.
Rewarding the child with a toy gave him control over the reward in two ways. As in the case
of the child money treatment, it was given directly to the child. In contrast with the child money
treatment, it also gave the child an item that could not easily be used by the parent. While the
parent still retained the right to take away the toy from the child, it would have been difficult to
sell the toy and convert its value to other household consumption. The value of the toy was also
high enough that the parents were unlikely to be able to adjust the child's consumption of these
goods, at least in the short term. While 4% of parents reported having given their child a toy
during the week before the baseline survey, anecdotal evidence suggests that the value of these toys
was substantially less than the toys offered as part of the program.
In order to test the commitment hypothesis, I included two additional treatments that offered
the parents a choice between money for themselves and a toy for their child. In ex ante choice
treatment, the parent made her choice at the time of program announcement. In the ex post choice
treatment, the parent made her choice after the child had reached the goal.
As shown in the previous section, a parent who is unable to commit to a division of surplus
-y will desire to yield control to the child ex ante if the inequality (9) holds. These parents are
expected to choose the toy reward in the ex ante treatment. Lack of commitment also implies that
outcomes in the ex ante choice treatment will be higher than outcomes in the money treatments.
The ex post choice treatment was included to confirm that the salience or the convenience of the
choice itself does not cause a positive impact of the ex ante choice. If the choice itself drives the
results, one should expect a positive impact of either choice treatment on outcomes. On the other
hand, if the results are driven by an actual desire to commit, only the ex ante choice treatment
will positively affect outcomes. In addition, the ex ante and ex post choice treatments can serve
to check for consistency in choices. If parents desire to commit ex ante because they know they
will not reward the child ex post, they will choose money ex post.
Regardless of treatment category, all children were invited to attend free after-school classes
run as part of the program. The classes were led by teachers trained to assist the children in
achieving their literacy goals. The profile and training of the teachers followed Pratham NGO's
"balsakhi" model (see Banerjee et. al., 2007). In each school, enough teachers were provided so
that there was at least one teacher for each 20-30 students who attended the classes. 12  Classes
ran for three hours every afternoon that school was in session. 13 Children were free to attend on a
drop-in basis, and teachers were given flexibility to customize lessons based on the reading levels of
the children who attended. Tutorials held outside of school hours are common in India, and thus
the extra classes provided a learning environment familiar to the households in the study.
There were two primary reasons for including the classes. First, government schools in India
are often poor platforms for learning, and the classes provided a greater chance for the children to
reach the goals set by the program. Second, the classes present a unique opportunity to measure
effort that is not present in most studies of education interventions. Existing studies traditionally
rely on attendance in school, taken from either 1) the school's administrative records, or 2) random,
unannounced checks by outside surveyors. Administrative records are notoriously inaccurate in
India, as schools may have incentives to inflate attendance (Linden and Shastry, 2008). Random
checks are usually unable to measure attendance on a daily basis, since they disrupt the classes and
12In one school, the principal did not allow our teachers to access the school premises to conduct the class, and no
suitable alternative location was found.
"
3 Schools in Gurgaon run from 8am to 12:30pm.
are difficult to take accurately. Extra-class teachers in this study were familiar with the students
so that the attendance records could be easily matched with the survey data.
The nature of the decision to attend these classes may reflect both parent and child effort.
The parent can contribute by reminding and encouraging the child to attend, and the child can
contribute by taking the initiative to attend on his own. If this effort is a reflection of the
overall production function, then the theoretical predictions for class attendance mirror those for
achievement. In addition, because effort does not include the stochastic component inherent in
achievement of the goal, the results are expected to be stronger.
3.1 Pretest
Children were initially tested for reading ability during school time. The test used an instrument
developed by Pratham, a large India-wide NGO specializing in child literacy. The test evaluated
each child on a four-point scale: 0) the child could not recognize letters, 1) the child could recognize
letters, 2) the child could read simple words, 3) the child could read a simple paragraph, and 4)
the child could read and understand a several-paragraph story.
Based on each child's ability at the time of the pretest, the child was given a goal competency
to be reached when he was re-tested after two months. If the child achieved the goal, he or his
parent would receive the prize as per his treatment category. Children reading at levels 0, 1, and
3 were each given a goal one level above their current competency, while children at level 2 at the
pretest were given a goal of 4. Goals were selected such that approximately half of the children
would reach the goal, based on a pilot study.
Each child was then randomly assigned to one of the six treatment groups. The randomization
was conducted at the individual level and was stratified by pretest score within each school, grade
and classroom. Children at the highest reading level (4) at the pretest were excluded from the
study and were instead given an unconditional prize at the end of program.
3.2 Program Announcement / Baseline Survey
Approximately one week after the pretest, a baseline survey was conducted at the child's home,
and the incentive program was announced to the mother and child. The survey and the program
announcement were conducted with the child's mother rather than his father because pilot surveys
indicated that the mother was usually more involved in the child's education than the child's
father. The survey collected demographic information as well as information on the transfers that
the parent had made to her child over the past week.
After finishing the survey, the surveyor read a script announcing the incentives program to
the mother and child. The script was individualized based on each child's treatment group and
baseline test score. The mother and child were informed that the child would be tested again in
school after two months, and if the goal competency was reached, the child or parent would receive
the specified prize. In addition to the announcement of the incentive scheme, the mother and child
were informed that special classes would be conducted from 2 to 5pm after school in order to assist
the child in reaching the goal.
Table 1 shows the sample composition by pretest score, grade and treatment category. Out
of 1466 children who took the pretest, 331 were excluded from the study because they achieved
the highest possible test score, and 49 others were excluded because they lived too far from the
schools, making surveying impractical. 1086 children were thus available for the randomization.
85% of children out of the randomized group of 1086 were reached for the baseline survey and
program announcement. These 925 children form the sample who received the treatment. The
attrition between the randomization and program announcement was primarily due to the difficulty
in locating the children's homes and in availability of parents during the day.14 Of the 925 children
offered program, 900 (97%) took the post-test after two months. Most of the 25 students who
were not available for the post-test had moved away since the program announcement. Attrition
between the program announcement and post-test is not significantly related to either treatment
category or test score. Out of the 11 baseline variables in Table 2, attrition is significantly positively
related to total household members (p-value = 0.082), but is not significantly related to any of the
other variables (results not shown). Given the large number of variables examined and the general
lack of significance, it is reasonable to conclude that attrition does not bias the achievement results.
14 Schools in Gurgaon do not keep detailed information on the addresses of their students. It was therefore necessary
to have every child in the study show the surveyor his home at the time of the pretest, so that the surveyor could note
the child's address information. In some cases, the children were not available to show the surveyors their homes,
they could not find their homes (as in the cases where parents or older siblings brought them to school), or their
homes were prohibitively far from the school that conducting three surveys there was impractical.
The attendance results include all children offered the program regardless of whether they took the
post-test.
Table 2 confirms the effectiveness of the randomization by examining correlations between
treatment status and baseline household characteristics and behaviors. 15 In Panel A, each column
regresses the relevant characteristic or behavior on dummies indicating each treatment category,
omitting the parent money category. Panel B repeats this exercise, comparing only the two toys
categories with the two money categories.
Among the six treatment categories, several observables are significantly related to treatment
status, but this is not surprising given the large number of regression coefficients in the table. In
Panel B, the broader treatment categories are marginally related to 1 variable out of the 11 tested.
While Table 2 shows that treatment status is not systematically related to observables, I include
all of these variables as controls in my outcome specifications to confirm that the results are robust
to these controls. As I show in the next section, inclusion of these controls does not affect the
results in any meaningful way.
Table 3 contains summary statistics of household demographics and incentives that the parent
gave to the child at the time of the baseline survey. On average, parents gave their children
13 rupees per week for spending money; in the majority of cases, this was given for the child to
purchase food. As noted earlier, 4% of parents reported having given their children toys over the
past week, although it is likely that the value of these toys were small relative to those offered as
part of this program. A number of parents (9%) also reported having given their child an item
other than toys over the past week. These items usually consisted of school supplies or clothes.
3.3 Follow-up Survey/Reminder
Surveyors returned to the households approximately one month after the announcement of the
program to conduct another survey that collected information on transfers between parents and
children. At the end of the survey, a short script was read reminding the parent and child of the
program and specifying the date of the post-test. Households were given cards that contained
'
1 The mother and father education variables were mistakenly excluded from the baseline survey and had to be
measured at the second followup. Since these are objective measures, however, it is unlikely that survey responses
were biased by the treatments.
information on the child's goal, prize and test date.
3.4 Post-test
Approximately two months after the program announcement, a post-test, similar in form but not
exact content to the pretest, was conducted in the schools. Prize distribution was conducted the
day after the post-test either at school or at the child's home, according to the child's treatment
category. Prizes for the child money, toy and voucher treatments were distributed in school, in
addition to toys chosen in the ex ante treatment. Parents in the parent money treatment and
those who chose money in the ex ante treatment were given the money at home. Parents in the
ex post choice treatment were also visited at home the day after the post-test and were given their
prizes upon making the choice.
3.5 Second Follow-up Survey
Approximately one week after the post-test, a second follow-up survey was conducted to again
measure transfers given by the parent to her child. The purpose of this survey was to examine
how parents reacted after the post-test had been conducted and rewards had been distributed.
4 Results
4.1 Overall Effect of the Incentives Program
The effects of incentives programs are important from a policy perspective, and it is useful to show
that the incentives used in this study did influence test scores overall. The study design did not
include a pure control group, and therefore I cannot offer experimental evidence on the overall
effects of giving children incentives compared to not giving them incentives. 16 I can, however, offer
non-experimental evidence of these overall program effects.
As shown in Table 1, a number of children and their mothers in the randomized sample were
not reached at the time of the baseline survey. Some children were not in school when addresses
were initially collected, but they were included in the randomization in case they could be found at
16In order to gain support of the local school committee, the study was designed to treat all eligible first, second
and third graders in the program schools.
a later date. For others, the children and their mothers were not available during the surveyors'
2-3 daytime visits when the baseline was conducted. There were 161 students included in the
randomization but who were not reached for the program announcement. Out of these 161 students,
152 were in school when the post-test was administered. This group (the "no program" group)
will serve as a control group for the analysis of this section. The results in this section include
both children whose addresses were not collected and those who were not available at the time of
survey, but restricting the sample to either of these groups leaves the results largely unchanged.
One caveat is in order with respect to interpretation of the results presented in this section.
While the after-school classes were open to any child who wished to attend, children in the incentives
program were notified individually when the program was announced. In practice, children in both
the program and no-program groups were often reminded of the classes during school time by their
teachers, but this was not controlled as part of the experiment. Therefore, the program effects
estimated in this section are the combined effects of receiving an incentive treatment in addition to
individual notification of the classes. Children not in an incentive treatment did attend the classes,
however, at rates of approximately half as much as those in an incentive treatment. It is not
possible to determine if these differences are driven by the individual notifications of the classes, or
by the additional motivation provided by the incentives themselves.
Figure 1 presents the distributions of raw pretest and post-test scores of the program group
and the no-program group. As shown in the top panel, the pretest scores are remarkably similar
between the two groups. A Pearson x 2 test fails to reject the equality of the two distributions
(p-value = 0.89). The bottom panel presents the post-test scores of the two groups. The program
group now has a much lower proportion of test scores of zero and higher proportions of test scores
of 2 and 4. There is a lower proportion of scores of 3, but this result is not surprising given that
this score category was not one of the goals given to students in the program group. A Pearson
X2 test now strongly rejects equality of the two distributions (p-value < 0.01).
Table 4 presents the results of regressions of a dummy variable that indicates if the mother and
child were reached at the baseline on relative pretest score and other observable characteristics.
Column 1 indicates that being reached at the baseline is not significantly related to pretest score,
grade or the gender of the child. Columns 2 and 3 add controls for classroom and surveyor
dummies. In the specification with both sets of dummies, a one standard-deviation increase in
pretest score is related to a 2.9% lower likelihood of being reached at the baseline. Part of this
relationship may be explained by the availability of the children: if higher-performing children
attend tutorials outside of school time, they will be more difficult to reach." 7
Table 5 presents the difference-in-difference estimates of participation in the program on nor-
malized test scores. 18  In Column 1, I present the regression without controlling for observable
characteristics. The result is large and highly significant: program participation is associated
with a 0.51 standard deviation increase in test scores relative to children whose parents were not
reached for the baseline survey. The precision of the estimate increases when additional controls
are added in Columns 2 and 3, but the estimate remains unchanged because none of these controls
are time-varying.
On average, the no-program group increased by 0.15 standard deviations during the two months
between the pretest and post-test. To check whether this is a reasonable increase in test scores in
the absence of the program, I compare this increase to the cross-sectional differences in test scores
between grades 1, 2 and 3. On average, a first grader is 0.7 standard deviations below a second
grader at the pretest, and a second grader is 0.7 standard deviations below a third grader. Gurgaon
schools are in session 11 months out of the year, and if a student improves by an equal amount each
month, we would expect a student to improve 2/11 * 0.7 = 0.13 standard deviations on average.
This is very close to the 0.15 standard deviation increase observed among the no-progarm group.
4.2 Main Treatments
Although the model does not provide a prediction on the differences between incentives to parents
and incentives to children overall, it is informative to start with these differences before turning
to the interactions. 19 The first three columns of Table 6 show these differences using attendance
in the after-school classes as the outcome. The dependent variable is a dummy indicating any
17In the specification with classroom dummies only, the female dummy is associated with a 9% lower likelihood
of being reached. Because classes are often split by gender, the specification with classroom dummies removes a
significant portion of the variation in the female dummy, making the coefficient difficult to interpret.
' Test scores were normalized based on the mean and standard deviation of all pretest scores in the child's grade.
19The results of the choice treatments are reported and discussed in Section 4.3.
attendance in the after-school classes over the two-month period in which they were held.20 In all
three regressions, the differences between treatment categories are small and insignificant. Columns
4 through 6 present the results of similar regressions using achievement of the goal competency as
the outcome variable. As with the attendance results, the differences between treatment categories
are small and insignificant.
As noted earlier, survey responses indicated that most parents have discretion over money re-
ceived by their children. In order to maximize power, I pool the two money treatments and compare
them with the toys treatment (including the voucher sub-treatment) in analyzing interactions. The
money treatments therefore represent parental incentives, and the toys treatment represents child
incentives.
The model predicts that child incentives will be more effective in encouraging attendance and
achievement when the productivity of the parent's input is low, and parental incentives will be more
effective when the productivity of the parent's input is high. It also predicts that child incentives
will be more effective when the productivity of the child's input is high, and parental incentives will
be more effective when the productivity of the child's input is low. Child and parental productivity
in education production are not directly observable, but the child's initial test score may reflect
parent or child productivity, depending on the primary source of variation in test scores. If the
variation in test scores is driven by differences in parental productivity, then the model predicts a
negative relationship between the child's test score and the relative effectiveness of child incentives.
If test scores reflect differences in child productivity, then the model predicts a positive relationship
between the child's test score and the relative effectiveness of child incentives.
While parental and child productivity are not directly observable, it is possible to use parent
characteristics, as measured in the baseline survey, as proxies for parental productivity. As de-
scribed in the theory section, parental productivity represents the extent to which the parent can
either provide direct inputs into the child's education or manage a child's schooling behavior. For
example, parents can spend time helping their children with schoolwork, or they can pay for the
child to receive outside tutoring. In addition, parents with more time at home will be more able
to manage their children's study and schooling behavior directly.
2 All regressions with control variables include dummies for missing values. Restricting the sample to observations
with no missing values of these variables does not stubstantially affect the results.
I include eight variables from the baseline survey as proxies for parental productivity. These
variables fall into four broad categories. First, I include two variables that reflect household
composition. More children below age 15 in the household should take the parent's time away from
the program child and therefore are expected to negatively affect the parent's ability to contribute
to the child's education. On the other hand, the number of household members at or above age 15
are expected to positively affect productivity, since these members represent resources the child can
use for help with his studies. Second, I include three variables that reflect the work and education
status of the child's parents. The mother's employment status could affect her ability to contribute
to her child's education because employed mothers will have less time to devote to their children. 21
Mother and father's education are also included because more educated parents should increase the
parent's ability to help the child with studies. Third, I include durables ownership, a measure of
household wealth. Household wealth is expected to be positively related to parental productivity
because parents in more wealthy households spend less time meeting basic needs and can therefore
devote more time to their children. In addition, more wealthy households can contribute resources
such as school supplies to facilitate their children's education. Finally, I include two measures of
productive behavior: an indicator for whether anyone in the household has helped the child with
his studies over the past day, and the total amount of money that the parent spent on tutoring for
the child over the past month.
To capture the extent to which these variables influence child test scores, I first regress the
child's relative pretest score on these variables. I construct the student's relative pretest score as
the difference between the student's own pretest score and the grade-specific mean pretest score,
normalized by the grade-specific standard deviation in test score. 22  The results of the first-stage
regression of relative pretest score on the parental productivity variables are reported in Appendix
Table 1.23 In the main specification of Column 1, all of the estimates except for father's education
and durables ownership have the expected sign, and of the six with the expected sign four are
21 Father's employment status is not included because only 4% of fathers were reported to be unemployed. It is
also not clear ex ante whether father's unemployment represents additional parental resources, or if the father is
unemployed because he is sick, injured, or otherwise incapacitated.
22 In order for the grade-specific means to be representative of all children in the schools, I include the highest
pretest scores in constructing this variable.
23 Because households with children whose pretest scores were in the highest category were not surveyed, these
scores are not included in this regression.
significant at the 10% level. 24
I then use the predicted values of the child's relative pretest score in the following regression:
y = ao + altoys + a2zpretest, + O3toysi * zpretesti + 'X, + E~ (10)
where y, represents the outcome for child i (either attendance or achievement of the literacy goal),
toys, is an indicator for whether child i was in the toys treatment, zpretest is the child's relative
pretest score and X, is a vector of controls.
The first three columns of Table 7 present OLS estimates of equation (10) using the actual
values of zpretest. These regressions use attendance in the after-school classes as the outcome
of interest. The estimated coefficients on the interaction terms are negative and significant in all
three specifications, implying that the toys treatment resulted in higher attendance relative to the
money treatments among children with low pretest scores and lower attendance among children
with high pretest scores. The magnitude of the coefficients imply that an increase in one standard
deviation of the child's pretest score results in a 12-13% decrease in the likelihood of attending
class if the child is in the toys treatment.
Columns 4 and 5 of Table 7 present estimates of equation (10) using predicted values of zpretest,
based on the regression in Column 1 of Appendix Table 1.25 The estimated coefficients on interac-
tion terms are negative and significant at the 5% level in both specifications. The magnitudes of
these coefficients are more than three times the estimates using the actual values of zpretest, sug-
gesting that the relative effectiveness of the toys treatment is more strongly related to the portion
of pretest scores driven by parental characteristics than to pretest scores overall. The difference
in magnitudes is consistent with the theory, since the theory predicts that relative effectiveness
of the toys treatment will be directly related to the share of test scores predicted by the parent's
contribution.
Table 8 repeats the analysis of Table 7 using achievement of the literacy goal as the outcome.
The first three columns present estimates of equation (10), using the actual values of zpretest.
2 4It is somewhat surprising that durables ownership is significantly related to lower initial achievement. Note,
however, that this relationship is driven in part by tv ownership, which could lower the child's motivation to study.
2 5 Because zpretest, is generated from a first-stage regression, standard errors for these regressions are bootstrapped
based on 500 replications.
Again, there is a negative relationship between the effect of the toys treatment and the child's
pretest score, although the estimated coefficient is significant at the 10% level in only one of the
three specifications. In Columns 4 and 5, I present the estimates using the predicted values of
zpretest, similar to the corresponding columns of Table 7. As with the attendance results, the
magnitudes of the estimated coefficients on the interaction terms increase considerably, although
these estimates are not significant.
If proxies for child productivity were available, a similar analysis should yield a positive interac-
tion term between the variation in pretest scores attributable to child productivity and the relative
effectiveness of the toys treatments. Since I am not able to observe proxies for child productivity,
I supplement the results above by using the variation in test scores driven by school and classroom
characteristics. School and classroom characteristics should not be systematically related to either
parent or child productivity, which implies that the coefficients on the interaction terms should
be zero. I find that repeating the exercise of Tables 7 and 8 using the variation in test scores
predicted by classroom characteristics yields small and insignificant coefficients on the interaction
terms (results not shown).
Figures 2 and 3 present less parametric estimations of the treatment effects by initial learning
level. Figure 2 graphs the estimated differences in attendance between the toys and money treat-
ments by the student's raw baseline test score. The specification controls for classroom dummies,
assuming these effects are constant across different baseline test scores. The treatment effects are
clearly decreasing across all 4 categories of test scores. In the lowest score category, children in
the toys treatment are 16% more likely to attend the classes, a difference significant at the 5%
level. In the highest two score categories, children in the money treatments are 18% and 24% more
likely to attend the classes for baseline scores of 2 and 3, respectively. Both of these estimates are
significant at the 10% level. The F-test for the joint significance of all 4 effects definitively rejects
the null hypothesis that all effects are zero (p-value = 0.013).
Figure 3 repeats this exercise using achievement of the goal competency as the outcome of
interest. As with the effects on attendance, there is a monotonically decreasing relationship
between the relative difference and pretest score. Children with the lowest pretest scores are 7%
more likely to achieve the goal when in the toys treatment relative to the money treatments. In
the highest test score category children are 18% less likely to achieve the goal when in the toys
treatment relative to the money treatments. In this case, however, none of the individual effects
are significant, and the F-test does not reject the null that all affects are zero (p-value = 0.39).
4.3 Choice Treatments
As described in the model, the incentives that the parent gives to the child may be dampened by
both moral hazard and by an inability to commit to rewarding the child for positive outcomes. The
ex ante and ex post choice treatments were included to determine whether commitment is indeed
a problem.
Before turning to outcomes, I analyze the choices themselves. As implied by the model, if
parents cannot commit and are aware of this problem, they would be willing to reward their children
with a toy ex ante but would decide to keep the money for themselves ex post. Therefore, if the
choice of a toy is primarily driven by a desire for commitment, one would expect more parents to
choose the toy in the ex ante treatment than the ex post treatment (this behavior would constitute
a preference reversal).
Panel A of Table 9 displays the percentage of parents in each treatment who chose toys. Sub-
stantially more parents in the ex post treatment chose to reward their children with toys: 33% of
parents in the ex ante treatment and 51% of parents in the ex post treatment chose toys. Note,
however, that the ex post choice reflects the selected group of parents whose children achieved the
goal. To account for this selection effect, I compare the parents in the ex ante treatment whose
children achieved the goal with those in the ex post treatment. The percentage of parents of achiev-
ers in the ex ante choosing toy remains virtually unchanged. Still, I cannot rule out the possibility
that the differences are based on selection, so these results are merely suggestive. However, the
fact that such a high number of parents chose to reward their children with a toy ex post provides
some evidence against commitment problems. Instead, it is possible that parents initially chose
money because they were uncertain of their needs for cash at the end of the program. Once the
uncertainty was resolved, they were willing to choose the toy.
Recall that the model predicts that if commitment was a problem parents were aware of, lower
productivity parents would be more likely to choose the toy ex ante. Panel B of Table 9 shows the
results of a regression of the choice of toy on the parental productivity index, where this index is
constructed as the predicted values of zpretest, as described in the previous section. In all three
specifications, the coefficient on the productivity index is small, positive and insignificant. Thus,
there is no evidence that low-productivity parents are more likely to choose the toy.
Turning to the effects of the choice treatments on outcomes, Columns 1-3 of Table 10 show the
class attendance levels of children in each choice treatment. In the model, allowing parents to
commit ex ante will improve outcomes if they do have commitment problems. Column 1 shows
that there is no significant difference between attendance of children in the ex ante treatment
compared with the money and toys treatments. Because attendance in the ex post treatment is
also similar to that of the money treatment, the introduction of a choice itself does not appear
to influence attendance. Column 2 includes interactions of each treatment group and the child's
relative pretest score. If, as implied by the previous results, differences in test scores were driven
by differences in parental productivity, commitment would have been the most helpful to parents
of children with the lowest initial test scores. While the coefficient on the interaction term for
the ex ante choice treatment is indeed negative, it is small in magnitude and not at all significant.
Column 3 presents the interactions of the productivity index and the toys treatments. In this case,
the coefficient on the on the ex ante choice interaction is large and positve, but the estimate is not
at all significant.
Columns 4-6 of Table 10 repeat the analysis using the binary indicator for achievement of
the literacy goal as the outcome of interest. The results are broadly consistent with those for
attendance. The small and insignificant coefficient on the ex ante treatment dummy in Column
4 suggests that the option to commit to a toy at the beginning of the program does not increase
achievement. Column 5 includes an interaction of the treatment groups and the child's relative
pretest score. Again, there are no significant differences between the choice treatments and the
money treatments at different pretest scores. Column 6 interacts the ex ante treatment with the
productivity index, and the estimate is small, positive and insignificant. On balance, the results of
the choice treatments present little evidence supporting the hypothesis that parents cannot commit
to rewarding their children.
4.4 Survey Results
Throughout this paper I have assumed that parents must provide transfers to their children in order
to induce them to learn. By using self-reported transfers, I can test this assumption. If parents
do provide these transfers, then parents in the money treatments should provide more transfers
to their children than those in the toys treatments. Further, if effort is unobserved, the transfers
should occur primarily after the goal has been reached.
Table 11 shows presents differences-in-differences estimates of the effects of the toys treatment
on transfers from parents to children, controlling for the differences in transfers measured in the
baseline survey. The behaviors examined are the amount of money given to the child over the past
week, a dummy for whether the parent gave a toy to the child over the past week and a dummy for
whether the parent gave the child any other item over the past week. Panel A uses data from the
first follow-up survey, taken just before the post-test. Column 1 uses an aggregate measure of the
three types of transfers by averaging the z-scores of the measures, using the mean and standard
deviation of each variable at the baseline survey as a base. The coefficient on the interaction
term is small and insignificant, indicating that parents overall did not give more transfers in the
money treatments prior to the post-test. Columns 2-4 report the difference-in-difference estimates
for each type of transfer. The estimates are small and insignificant, except for the difference in
non-toy items, which is significant at the 10% level.
Panel B of Table 11 repeats the difference-in-differences exercise using the differences between
the second follow-up survey and the baseline survey. Using the aggregate measure of transfers in
Column 1, the coefficient on the interaction term is large and significant, indicating that parents
in the money treatment groups did provide more transfers after the outcome of the test had been
realized. The treatment effect on giving other items is large in magnitude and highly significant,
while the effects on money and toys given are small and insignificant. The estimated coefficient
in the regression using other items as the dependent variable implies that parents in the toys
groups gave their children other items 28% less often than those in the money groups. These
results suggest that parents who received money as a prize often used this money to purchase more
practical items such as clothes and books for their children. While the money was often spent on
items used by the children, it is likely that it was not spent in the manner most preferred by the
children themselves.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, I present the results of a field experiment in Gurgaon, India, designed to test the
effects of changing the recipient of incentives to learn from parent to child. The experiment offered
incentives for families of first, second and third graders in government primary schools to increase
their children's reading ability. Consistent with a two-sided moral hazard model of education
production where the variation in test scores is driven by differences in parental productivity, I find
that for children with less productive parents and lower initial test scores, offering toys to the child
as a reward results in better outcomes than offering money to the parent or child. On the other
hand, for children with more productive parents and higher initial test scores, offering money to
the parent or child results in better outcomes than offering toys to the child. These results hold
for both attendance in after-school classes run as part of the program and for achievement of the
target reading competency. By including a treatment that allowed the parent a choice between
money and toys, I am able to provide evidence that these differences are not driven by the parent's
inability to commit to providing incentives to her child.
Thus far the debate on cash transfer programs in developing countries has focused on which
adult within the household should receive the transfer rather than including the possibility of a
child receiving the transfer directly. In the case of education, outcomes depend on child effort, and
schemes that reward parents must depend on the parents to both effectively exert their own effort
and motivate their children. My results suggest that when the parent's productivity in education
production is low, providing incentives to learn directly to the child may be more effective than
providing incentives to the parent. While this paper has focused on children early in the education
process, future research should examine decision making between older children and their parents
to understand how the decision process changes as children grow older.
This paper also has implications for understanding how households respond to other external
factors such as changes in returns to education. If parents' perceived returns to education change,
households with more productive parents may respond more strongly because these households
suffer from fewer agency problems between the parents and children. Since households with more
productive parents tend to have higher-performing children to begin with, increases in returns
may exacerbate inequality in education outcomes. This paper provides a starting point for future
research examining these effects.
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A Appendix: Proof that Probability of Success Increases with 6
and B
As shown by equation (4), when the chosen y is at an interior solution where 0 < y 1,
b62 - a/ 2
2b62 - a/
2
where I omit the time subscript for ease of exposition.
To prove that the probability of success is increasing in 0 or 6, it is sufficient to show that
(1-)62 is also increasing in 0 or 6. This follows because on the interior, the first-order conditiona
(3) is equivalent to
(1 - y*)62
= (6cl + p1) (11)
a
To prove that (1*)2 is increasing in 6, differentiate with respect to 6 :a
0y* 62 26+ (1- y*)- (12)
16 a a
where
__* 2ab6 2
06 (2b6 2 - a2) 2
After substituting -* and a* into (12) and simplifying, we have
a (1 - 7*) 62  4b2 65 - 4ab32 63
a6 a (2b62 _ a2) 2
Then, since on the interior we know that 32 < 62b, it follows that
4b265 - 4abO2 63 > 0
since 4ab 2 63 < 4ab ( 6 2b) 63
Because (1-*)62 is decreasing in -*, we only need to show that -* is decreasing in 3 to showa
that the probability of success is increasing in /. We can do this by differentiating the solution for
y* with respect to 3:
* 2a 2a a/ (b6 2 - ap 2)
<0
S 2b62 - a/ 2  (2b 2 - a2) 2
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Figure 1: Distributions of Raw Test Scores, Program and No-Program Groups
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Figure 2: Treatment Effects of Toys by Pretest Score
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Table 1: Sample Composition
Reached for
Reached at Randomized Program Reached at
Pretest Sample Announcement Post-test
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total 1466 1086 925 900
Pretest Score
0 349 331 283 276
1 528 502 427 414
2 151 146 125 124
3 107 107 90 86
4 331 0 0 0
Grade
1 410 384 331 319
2 552 431 363 353
3 504 271 231 228
Treatment
Parent Money 179 156 150
Child Money 181 156 152
Voucher 182 156 151
Child Toy 180 149 145
Ex Ante Choice 183 153 151
Ex Post Choice 181 155 151
Notes:
The randomized sample is slightly imbalanced across treatments because
several schools were randomized individually, and the remainders were
not balanced across these schools.
Table 2: Balance of Observables Across Treatment Groups
Dependent Variable
Total
Pretest Mother Father Household Money Gave Other Helped with Tutoring
Score Female Education Education Durables Members Given Gave Toys Item Studies Fees Paid
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Panel A: Full Sample
Child Money
Voucher
Child Toy
Ex Ante Choice
Ex Post Choice
Constant
Observations
R-squared
F
P-value
-0.071 -0.032
(0.103) (0.056)
-0.103 0.006
(0.103) (0.056)
-0.024 0.013
(0.105) (0.057)
-0.28
(0.386)
0.226
(0.382)
0.298
(0.386)
-0.038 0.011 -0.177
(0.104) (0.056) (0.383)
-0.006 0.004 0.122
(0.104) (0.056) (0.382)
0.12 0.003 -0.02 -0.564 -0.025 0.096+
(0.432) (0.018) (0.151) (2.14) (0.021) (0.054)
0.595 -0.007 -0.141 -2.686 -0.025 0.077
(0.427) (0.018) (0.151) (2.136) (0.021) (0.054)
0.633 -0.007 -0.141 -3.117 -0.011 0.021
(0.430) (0.018) (0.152) (2.161) (0.022) (0.055)
0.268 0.019 -0.047 -3.491 -0.045* 0.078
(0.428) (0.018) (0.151) (2.15) (0.021) (0.055)
0.573 -0.023
(0.428) (0.018)
-0.053 -5.196* -0.019 0.105+
(0.150) (2.140) (0.021) (0.054)
1.064** 0.571** 3.144** 6.054** 0.268** 5.432** 15.577** 0.058**
(0.073) (0.040) (0.270) (0.303) (0.012) (0.107) (1.511) (0.015)
925
0.002
0.294
0.917
925
0.001
0.174
0.972
907
0 004
0.69
0.631
889
0.005
0.804
0.547
913
0.007
1.225
0.295
892
0.002
0.317
0.903
924
0.009
1.628
0.15
923
0.005
0.995
0.42
0.295**
(0.038)
925
0.007
1.216
0.299
0.007 -0.332
(0.032) (5.856)
-0.012 2.7
(0.032) (5.856)
0.044 -2.692
(0.032) (5.935)
0.002 7.261
(0.032) (5.894)
0.026 -1.79
(0.032) (5.866)
0.077** 25.719**
(0.023) (4.154)
922
0.004
0.782
0.563
915
0.004
0.756
0.582
Money Treatments
-0.029 0.026 0.399 0.555+ -0.009 -0.131 -2.615 -0.006 0.001
(0.073) (0.040) (0.273) (0.306) (0.013) (0.104) (1.771) (0.016) (0.038)
1.029** 0.554** 3.007** 6.113** 0.270** 5.422** 15.295** 0.045**
(0.051) (0.028) (0.193) (0.218) (0.009) (0.073) (1.245) (0.011)
617 617
0 0.001
0.156 0.418
0.693 0.518
601
0 004
2 129
0.145
590
0.006
3.28
0 071
609
0.001
0.461
0.497
591
0.003
1.595
0.207
617
0.004
2.18
0.14
615
0
0.116
0733
0.343**
(0.027)
617
0
0.001
0.973
0.012 0.243
(0.023) (4.051)
0.080** 25.552**
(0.016) -2.851
614
0
0.281
0 597
610
0
0.004
n0 09
Notes:
Each column represents a linear regression of the dependent variable on dummies for each treatment category.
In Panel A, the omitted category is parent money In Panel B, the omitted categories are parent and child money.
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
ments vs.Panel B: Toys Treat
Voucher + Toys
Constant
Observations
R-squared
P-value
Table 3: Means of Selected Demographics and Baseline Behaviors
Variable
Demographics
Female
Mother's Education (years)
Father's Education (years)
Pct Durables Owned
Household Members 0-5
Household Members 6-14
Household Members over 14
Behaviors Towards Program Child
Helped with studies (past day)
Money given (past week, in Rs)
Gave toys (past week)
Gave other item (past week)
Tutoring fees paid (past month)
Notes:
Standard deviations in parentheses.
Durables include: bicycle, motorcycle, dvd player, radio, tv,
refrigerator, gas stove, cooler, landline and mobile phone.
Mean
0.571
(0.495)
3.18
(3.34)
6.42
(3.69)
0.266
(0.154)
0.729
(0.894)
2.19
(0.94)
2.44
(0.82)
0.358
(0.480)
13.08
(18.90)
0.037
(0.188)
0.088
(0.283)
26.58
(51.35)
Table 4: Determinants of
Being Reached At Baseline
Dependent Variable:
Reached At Baseline (Dummy)
(1) (2) (3)
Zpretest -0.005 -0.017 -0.029*
(0.015) (0.015) (0.013)
Grade 2 -0.007
(0.026)
Grade 3 -0.002 -
(0.030)
Female 0.028 0.094* 0.017
(0.022) (0.042) (0.037)
Classroom Dummies NO YES YES
Surveyor Dummies NO NO YES
Observations 1052 1052 1052
R-squared 0.002 0.103 0.39
Notes:
"Zpretest" represents the difference between the child's score and
the grade specific average, divided by the grade-specific standard
deviation.
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 5: Difference-in-Differences Estimates
Overall Effect of the Incentive Program
Dependent Variable:
Normalized Test Score
(1) (2) (3)
Any Incentive -0.031 -0.024 -0.05
(0.088) (0.083) (0.081)
Posttest
Incentive *Po sttest
Standard 2
Standard 3
Female
0.151 0.151 0.151
(0.115) (0.109) (0.103)
0.511** 0.511** 0.511**
(0.124) (0.118) (0.112)
-0.505**
(0.048)
-0.808**
(0.054)
-0.142** -0.116
(0.042) (0.078)
Classroom Dummies
Surveyor Dummies
Observations 2104
R-squared 0.091
Notes:
+ significant at 10%; * significant at
NO
NO
2104
0.187
YES
YES
2104
0.284
5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 6: Differences Between Treatments
Dependent Variable:
Attendance in
Dependent Variable:
Achievement
After-School Class, 1/0 of Literacy Goal
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0.038 0.046 0.069
(0.053) (0.052) (0.053)
0.023 0.026 0.04
(0.046) (0.045) (0.046)
0.034 0.013
(0.048) (0.049)
-0.016 -0.051
(0.069) (0.072)
0.103 0.053
(0.085) (0.091)
Classroom Dummies
Controls
Observations
R-squared
NO
NO
502
0.001
YES
NO
502
0.155
-0.04
(0.058)
-0.02
-0.055
-0.013 -0.002
(0.050) (0.048)
-0.016
-0.057
-0.005
(0.050)
-0.253** -0.262**
(0.052) (0.054)
-0.241** -0.248**
(0.072) (0.076)
-0.092 -0.124
(0.088) (0.094)
YES
YES
502
0.239
NO
NO
598
0.001
YES
NO
598
0.190
YES
YES
598
0.248
Notes:
In the first three columns, the dependent variable is a dummy which equals 1 if the child attended the after-school
class on at least 1 day. In Columns 4-6, the dependent variable is a dummy which equals 1 if the child reached the
literacy goal.
The sample used in this table includes parent money, child money, voucher and toys treatments.
The "Toys" category includes both child toy and voucher groups. The omitted treatment category is parent money.
Controls include all variables in Table 2.
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Child Money
Toys
Pretest = 1
Pretest = 2
Pretest = 3
Table 7: Interactions of Toy Treatments and Pretest Scores
Outcome: Attendance in After-School Classes
Using Actual Values of Zpretest
(1) (2) (3)
Zpretest Predicted by
Parental Characteristics
(4) (5)
Toys -0.033
(0.040)
Zpretest
Toys * Zpretest
Pretest = 1
Pretest = 2
Pretest = 3
-0.034
(0.039)
-0.034
(0.040)
-0.012 0.011 -0.014
(0.037) (0.100) (0.100)
-0.126** -0.121** -0.134**
(0.046) (0.045) (0.046)
0.156** 0.095 0.118
(0.049) (0.128) (0.129)
0.148*
(0.071)
0.202*
(0.081)
NO
NO
Classroom Dummies
Addt'l Controls
Observations
R-squared
502
0.037
0.089 0.135
(0.212) (0.214)
0.225 0.247
(0.270) (0.272)
YES
NO
502
0.167
YES
YES
502
0.204
-0.134+ -0.160*
(0.077) (0.078)
0.187 0.258+
(0.137) (0.145)
-0.406* -0.470*
(0.202) (0.202)
0.098* 0.040
(0.040) (0.045)
0.059 -0.008
(0.060) (0.069)
0.103 0.091
(0.074) (0.094)
NO
NO
502
0.03
YES
NO
502
0.192
Notes:
The dependent variable is a dummy which equals 1 if the child attended the after-school classes on at
least one day.
"Zpretest" represents the difference between the child's score and the grade specific average, divided by
the grade-specific standard deviation.
In Columns 4 and 5, Zpretest represents the predicted values of the regression in Column 1
of Appendix Table 1. Standard errors in these columns are constructed based on 500 bootstrap draws.
The sample used in this table includes parent money, child money, voucher and toys treatments.
The "Toys" category includes both toy and voucher groups. The omitted treatment categories
are parent and child money.
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 8: Interactions of Toy Treatments and Child's Initial Test Score
Outcome: Achievement of the Literacy Goal
Using Actual Values of Zpretest
(1) (2) (3)
Zpretest Predicted by
Parental Characteristics
(4) (5)
Toys
Zpretest
Toys * Zpretest
Pretest = 1
Pretest = 2
Pretest = 3
-0.023 -0.02 -0.015
(0.044) (0.043) (0.044)
-0.065 0.120 0.095
(0.040) (0.107) (0.108)
-0.086+ -0.079 -0.060
(0.051) (0.050) (0.050)
-0.057 -0.345** -0.335**
(0.053) (0.129) (0.129)
0.054
(0.077)
-0.399+ -0.374+
(0.215) (0.217)
0.266** -0.299 -0.272
(0.088) (0.279) (0.282)
-0.060 -0.103
(0.095) (0.096)
0.047 0.134
(0.161) (0.168)
-0.189 -0.304
(0.243) (0.238)
-0.139** -0.251**
(0.049) (0.053)
-0.080 -0.238**
(0.065) (0.074)
0.122 -0.092
(0.076) (0.085)
Classroom Dummies
Addt'l Controls
YES
NO
598
0.194
YES
YES
598
0.221
598 598
0.017 0.163
Notes:
The dependent variable is a dummy which equals 1 if the child achieved the literacy goal.
"Zpretest" represents the difference between the child's score and the grade specific average, divided by
the grade-specific standard deviation.
In Columns 4 and 5, Zpretest represents the predicted values of the regression in Column 1
of Appendix Table 1. Standard errors in these columns are constructed based on 500 bootstrap draws.
The sample used in this table includes parent money, child money, voucher and toys treatments.
The "Toys" category includes both toy and voucher groups. The omitted treatment categories
are parent and child money.
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Observations
R-squared
NO
NO
598
0.05
NO
NO
YES
NO
Table 9: Choice Between Toy and Money
Panel A: Choice Frequencies
Sample
Achievers Only
Ex Ante Ex Post
Treatment Treatment
(2) (3)
0.316 0.506
0.684 0.494
Panel B: Determinants of Choice
Productivity Index
Classroom Dummies
Surveyor Dummies
Observations
R-squared
of Toy-Ex Ante Treatment
Dependent Variable: Parent Chose Toy
(1) (2) (3)
0.019
(0.211)
NO
NO
151
0.0001
0.120
(0.262)
YES
NO
151
0.291
0.029
(0.249)
YES
YES
151
0.52
Notes:
The dependent variable in Panel B is a dummy which equals 1 if the parent
chose the toy.
In Panel B, the Productivity Index is constructed as the predicted values
of the regression in Column 1 of Appendix Table 1.
The sample used in Panel B includes children in the ex ante choice treatment.
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
All
Ex Ante
Treatment
(1)
0.327
0.673
Chose Toy
Chose Money
Observations 153
Table 10: Interactions of Choices Treatments and Baseline Achievement
Dependent Variable
Class Attendance, 1/0 Achieve Goal
Zpretest Zpretest
Actual Predicted Actual Predicted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Toys 0 -0.035 -0.145+ 0.014 -0.02 -0.066
(0.037) (0.039) (0.076) (0.040) (0.043) (0.094)
Ex Ante Choice 0.058 0.048 0.137 -0.024 -0.037 -0.015
(0.045) (0.047) (0.099) (0.049) (0.052) (0.120)
Ex Post Choice -0.024 -0.03 -0.155 0.034 0.022 0.189
(0.045) (0.048) (0.099) (0.049) (0.052) (0.121)
Zpretest 0.075 0.212 0.082 0.118
(0.083) (0.138) (0.088) (0.160)
Toys * Zpretest -0.116* -0.423* -0.085+ -0.212
(0.046) (0.199) (0.049) (0.233)
Ex Ante Choice * Zpretest -0.022 0.232 -0.016 0.044
(0.056) (0.247) (0.060) (0.283)
Ex Post Choice * Zpretest -0.011 -0.381 -0.033 0.461
(0.054) (0.267) (0.058) (0.305)
Classroom Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 755 755 755 900 900 900
R-squared 0.129 0.142 0.143 0.12 0.175 0.178
Notes:
"Zpretest" represents the difference between the child's score and the grade specific average,
divided by the grade-specific standard deviation.
In Columns 2 and 4, the actual values of Zpretest are used.
In Columns 3 and 6, Zpretest represents the predicted values from the regression in
Column lof Appendix Table 1. Standard errors in these columns are constructed based on
500 bootstrap draws.
The "Toys" category includes both child toy and voucher groups. The omitted treatment
categories are parent and child money.
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 11: Difference-in-differences Estimates of Effect of
Toys Treatments vs. Money Treatments
Any Money Gave Other
Incentive given Gave Toys Item
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. First Follow-up vs. Baseline
Toys
Post
Toys*Post
Pretest Dummies
Classroom Dummies
Observations
R-squared
-0.035 -3.071* -0.002 0.015
(0.043) (1.417) (0.020) (0.028)
0.128** -1.606 0.027 0.128**
(0.043) (1.393) (0.019) (0.027)
-0.012 2.594 0.018 -0.080*
(0.060) (1.984) (0.027) (0.039)
YES
YES
1178
0.093
YES
YES
1192
0.086
YES
YES
1178
0.063
YES
YES
1176
0.083
Panel B. Post-test Follow-up vs. Baseline
Toys
Post
Toys*Post
Pretest Dummies
Classroom Dummies
Observations
R-squared
-0.035 -3.278* -0.004 0.016
(0.048) (1.521) (0.024) (0.031)
0.520** -0.08 0.135** 0.367**
(0.049) (1.576) (0.023) (0.031)
-0.310** 2.297 -0.053 -0.275**
(0.070) (2.239) (0.033) (0.043)
YES
YES
1086
0.202
YES
YES
1095
0.092
YES
YES
1182
0.11
YES
YES
1180
0.186
Notes:
The "Toys" category includes both child toy and voucher groups. The omitted treatment categories
are parent and child money.
"Post" is a dummy variable for the later survey (either the first or post-test followup)
Variables were based on a one-week recall.
Money given was the total amount in Rs. given to the child over the past week.
The sample used in this table includes parent money, child money, voucher and toys treatments.
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Appendix Table 1: Relationship Between Relative
Pretest Score and Parental Productivity Measures
Dependent Variable:
Zpretest
(1) (2) (3)
# Children under 15 -0.051* -0.039+ -0.038+
(0.023) (0.022) (0.022)
# Adults 15+ 0.017 0.059+ 0.064*
(0.033) (0.031) (0.031)
Pct durables owned -0.613** -0.383* -0.391*
(0.171) (0.161) (0.165)
Mother employed -0.111* -0.101+ -0.092+
(0.055) (0.052) (0.054)
Mother education 0.016+ 0.008 0.008
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
Father education -0.004 0 0
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Helped with studies 0.064 0.029 0.004
(0.055) (0.052) (0.056)
Tutoring fees paid/10 0.018** 0.015** 0.015**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
School-Grade Dummies NO YES YES
Surveyor Dummies NO NO YES
Observations 925 925 925
R-squared 0.047 0.251 0.274
Notes:
"Zpretest" represents the difference between the child's score and the
grade-specific average, divided by the grade-specific standard deviation.
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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Abstract
We estimate the effects of peer networks on the enrollment and attendance patterns of
children in a community-based education program in India. The program is open to all out-of-
school children, and we randomly assign a subset of the eligible children to be actively encouraged
to participate. This active encouragement increases participation among selected children by 30
percentage points, allowing us to measure the indirect effects of their treatment on their peers'
and siblings' participation. Using a detailed questionnaire to measure the various ties between
children, we are able to contrast the degree to which participation is casually transmitted through
different types of peer relationships. Having a treated friend increases participation by about
20% of the main effect. The effect of treated friends comes primarily from bilateral ties, where
both the child and his friend indicate that they spend time with each other.
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Rukmini Banerjee, Bharat Patni, Brij Kaul and Manu Pawar. We also thank Camilo Dominguez and Swati Gaur
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1 Introduction
Enrollment levels in most developing countries are much lower than those of their more developed
counterparts. The millennium development goals call for universal primary enrollment by 2015
(UN, 2008a). While, significant gains have been made towards achieving this goal, many children
are still out of school. Between 1999 and 2006, for example, the United Nations estimates that the
number of un-enrolled primary-aged children fell by 30 million. However, 73 million children still
do not attend a formal educational program (UN, 2008b).
There are many potential reasons why children do not attend school. In many areas of the
world, educational resources are simply scarce, and children must travel significant distances to take
advantage of them. Some localities still charge user fees that create financial barriers to enrollment
for low-income families. Even in areas with similar accesses to schools, enrollment rates vary by
household. To better understand the causes of low enrollment, more research is needed on the
family and individual decision processes surrounding the choice to engage in academic activities.
We focus on estimating the causal effect of peer relationships on participation in a specially
designed program targeted at out-of-school children in India. The program provides community-
based classes designed to provide educational inputs to children not attending school. Using a
randomized controlled trial, we randomly assign a fraction of out-of-school students in a suburban
area to be actively recruited to participate in the program. All out-of-school children in the sample
are allowed to participate in the program, but instructors of the program make a particular point
of recruiting and encouraging the enrollment and attendance of children selected for treatment.
This includes discussing the program with parents, visiting children prior to the start of each day's
activities to bring the child to class, and making an active effort to retain the children if they stop
participating.
In the our context, peer effects could operate through several channels. First, there may be
complementarities between friends in the effort it takes to attend or achieve in school. Children
who attend classes (or their parents) could also provide information to their non-attending peers
about the value of attending. Finally, children whose friends attend classes may be more likely to
attend because they want to spend time with their friends.
Our active encouragement design is intended to increase participation among treated children,
and it does. We find that actively recruited children are 30 percentage points more likely to attend
one of the classes at any point in time than non-treated children. On average, these children
have daily attendance rates that are 13 percentage points higher than non-treated children. The
child-level randomization provides variation in the density of treatment within children's networks,
allowing us to measure the indirect effects of treatment through the children's peer networks. This
is paired with a detailed friendship survey conducted prior to the randomization. The friendship
survey allows us to compare the effects of treating different types of peers and to compare the
different mechanisms for peer interaction.
We find that treating the peers of children does have a causal effect on participation levels.
Children with a treated friend were about 6% more likely to attend the classes, but there is little
evidence that treating additional friends has an additional impact on attendance. We also find
that only certain types of relationships mediate this causal effect. Bilateral ties (where both the
child and the child's friend report each other as friends), have much higher impacts than unilateral
ties. Having a treated sibling has a similar impact to having a treated friend.
Using the effects of peers' treatment status as an instrument for peer participation, we also
provide instrumental-variables estimates of the effects of peer attendance on the child's own atten-
dance. We find large and significant effects: a 10 percentage-point increase in the mean attendance
of treated friends results in a 2.7 percentage point increase in the child's own attendance. We find
that the instrumental-variables estimates are similar to OLS estimates which simply regress own
attendance on friend's attendance.
Our study relates to the growing literature that seeks to identify the effects of peer networks
on individuals' behavior. The empirical challenge of this research is to isolate the effects of an
individual's peers from the confounding factors associated with endogenous social interaction (Man-
ski, 1993 and Glaeser and Scheinkman, 2000). Papers that explicitly deal with these endogeneity
issues do so in two ways. One group exploits the random assignment of individuals into shared
environments (Sacerdote, 2001; Zimmerman, 1999; Bayer, Pintoff, and Pozen, 2004), and the other
strand exploits random variation in the treatment of individuals within an existing peer network to
determine how the intervention affects treated individuals' peers (Miguel and Kremer, 2003; Duflo
and Saez, 2003).
A growing literature measures peer effects among primary-aged children in developing countries.
These studies generally fall into two categories. One set of studies looks at the effects of financial
incentives on siblings of treated children. Filmer and Schady (2008) generally find no effect on
siblings, while Barrera-Osorio et al (2008b) find that the absence of an effect is limited to siblings
that are not engaged in academic activities. They find negative effects on academically engaged
siblings suggesting that transfers cause families to consolidate resources behind treated children.
A second set of studies focuses on attendance decisions and grades of peers of children receiving
financial incentives (Bobonis and Finan, 2008, Lalive and Cattaneo, 2004; Kremer, Miguel and
Thornton, 2004) . By estimating how a child's attendance decisions are affected the decisions
of his or her peers, our study is most closely related to that of Bobonis and Finan (2008) and
Lalive and Cattaneo (2004). Both studies use the Progresa intervention in Mexico to identify how
children ineligible for the program were affected by the attendance decisions of those eligible for
the program. These studies find that a 10-percent increase in the attendance of eligible children
resulted in around 5-percent higher attendance of ineligible children.
Unlike the these other studies of peer effects, our study defines the peer group through surveys
rather than through the other individuals in one's age cohort in school or in a village. We do so
for several reasons. First, because we focus on out-of-school children, the cohort-based measure
of a peer group is not enforced by the formal school system.' Second, the survey-based design
allows us to identify different types of networks chosen by the child. On the other hand, since our
intervention was randomized at the child level, we do not study community-wide network effects
estimated in these other studies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the setting and the
intervention. Section 3 outlines the research design and data collection procedures. Section 4
describes the empirical specifications we use. Section 5 provides our tests for the internal validity of
the social network effects. Section 6 presents estimates of the social network effects of the program
on attendance in the classes. Section 7 concludes.
10ne possiblility would be to define the cohort based on the child's age group within a community. This
measure would mirror studies of in-school children that define the peer group as the children within a school and
grade. However, it is unclear how to determine the age range of the relevant peer group when children do not have
structured interactions with other children of their exact age.
2 Background
The intervention was run by Pratham, a large, India-wide NGO specializing in basic literacy and
numeracy skills for both in-school and out-of-school children. Pratham's Bridge Course program
has been implemented for a number of years in various areas in India.
Pratham's approach centers around the involvement of specially-trained teachers who are re-
cruited directly from the same communities as the program children. Unlike teachers in the formal
schooling system who do not share a common background with the children they teach, Pratham's
model is designed so that the teachers can relate to the situations of the children (Banerjee et.
al., 2007). These teachers are normally educated through 10th or 12th grade and are predomi-
nantly women. After they are recruited, selected teachers attend an intensive two-week program
of training in Pratham's teaching methodologies. The teachers are paid the equivalent of $20 per
month.
Pratham's Bridge Course program is designed to give out-of-school children the opportunity take
informal classes for one year as a bridge to the formal school system. First, out-of-school children
are identified in a community through a community census. Identified out-of-school children are
then recruited for enrollment in the classes. Children are taught in groups of 20-25 students for
three hours per day, six days per week. When children in the program are not regularly attending
class, the teacher visits the child's home. At the end of one year, children and their families are
assisted with enrollment in the local public schools.
Gurgaon is a small city just outside of Delhi. It was selected as a location for the expansion
of the program because of its large population of out-of-school children. As part of Delhi's urban
sprawl, there has been an explosion in the population of Gurgaon over the past 10 years, both
among wealthy and poor households.
3 Research Design
The research strategy comprised four main components. First, eligible out-of-school children within
Gurgaon were identified through a child census of localities selected for treatment. This was then
followed by a detailed survey of the children's friendship networks. Third, based on the information
collected in the census, 25 out-of-school children per area were selected to be actively recruited into
the program. Finally, we collected detailed participation data on all of the children until the classes
closed.
3.1 Household Census
The initial survey work began in July of 2006. Through initial community visits, 17 communities
("bastis") with large numbers of out-of-school children were identified. Surveyors then visited these
communities to conduct a household census. The census was conducted to map the community,
to identify individual out-of-school children, and to collect basic demographic information on all
of the children in the bastis. In addition, simple oral reading and math tests were administered
to all children between 6 and 14 years old. These tests were identical to those commonly used in
Pratham during its large-scale testing activities (e.g., ASER, 2008). The reading test evaluated
children on a 0-4 scale, while the math test evaluated children on a 0-3 scale. During the census,
supervisors also identified potential teachers from these bastis to teach the bridge classes.
Summary statistics from the household census are calculated in Column (1) of Table 1. Almost
half of the children were reported to be out of school, and the vast majority expressed interest
attending the bridge classes. Very few children were reported to be working outside of the household
(1.4%). The majority of the children surveyed were migrants.
Column (2) restricts the sample to out-of-school children whose parents expressed interest in
the bridge course. While these children were similar in age and gender as those in the overall
population of the bastis, substantially more were migrants (97% vs. 68%). Not surprisingly,
out-of-school children also had much lower test scores than the overall population.
The main purpose of the census was to identify all children eligible for attending the Bridge
Course classes and who could then constitute the sample of children for the purposes of the ex-
periment. In order to be eligible, children had to meet two criteria: 1) they had to be currently
out-of-school, either having dropped out or never attended, and 2) their parents had to indicate
an interest in sending their children to participate in the classes. Overall, 47 percent of children
were identified as being out-of-school, and of these children 96 percent had parents that indicated
a willingness to send them to the classes. Finally, to be included in the sample, children also had
to complete the friendship survey.
3.2 Friendship Survey
After the household census had been conducted, surveyors returned to conduct a social networks
survey of the out-of-school children whom families identified as interested in the program. The
purpose of this survey was to provide a detailed description of the types of relationships formed
by children in our sample. We sought to elicit variation along several dimensions. First, we
measure the degree of emotional connection to provided peers. Second, we identify familial/sibling
relationships between peers. And finally, we measure the reciprocal nature of these relationships.
The friendship survey consisted of two sections: 1) an open-ended section in which the children
could identify their own friends, and 2) a closed-ended section in which children were asked if they
were friends with a group of 10 pre-selected out-of-school children. The point of the different
sections is to vary the immediacy with which a child recalls a friend's name. Child are rarely able
to provide a immediate list of their friends. Instead, some friends are usually easily identified while
other friends are identified only through subsequent discussion. Since most friendship network
questions only ask for a single list of peers, we sought to identify whether these first remembered
peers were more likely to causally mediate participation than friends who were only identified with
varying levels of prompting.
The open-ended section consisted of four prompts for the children to identify their friends:
1. Who do you play with?
2. Who do you talk with?
3. Who do you roam around with?
These descriptions of activities were created through informal focus groups with children in the
communities designed to elicit their descriptions of how they spent their time with their peers. The
questions were also piloted extensively to ensure that the children were understanding the questions
as intended. For each of the questions, the surveyor also asked how much time per day and days
per week the child spent doing the activity with the identified friend. Ninety-four percent of the
children's friends were identified through this first identification request.
For the second level of prompting, children were given a list of popular games played in these
communities (e.g., hopscotch, stick-ball), and asked if they played these games with any children
not already listed. These games were again identified through the informal focus groups and were
designed to act as a more concrete version of the previous activity questions. Six percent of the
total peers identified in the open-ended section were given after this additional prompting.
Finally, to measure emotional attachment, the children were asked to identify their best friend,
and a friend they would talk to about a problem. Children were allowed to chose more than one
friend that fit either category, but in practice very few did. In total, children identified 32 percent
of their friends to be "best friends," 32 percent to be friends with whom they discussed problems,
and 26 to be "best friends" with whom they discuss their problems.
The closed-ended section contained a list of 10 out-of-school children living near the surveyed
child.2 The child was asked if he knew each potential friend, as well as whether he played with,
talked with or roamed around with this potential friend. The hours per day and days per week
spent in each activity was also recorded. If a child appeared on the closed-ended section and had
already been given as part of the open-ended section, that child was skipped.
Out of the 1889 children identified as out of school and interested in the program as of the
household census, 1303 (69%) were successfully interviewed during the friendship survey. Attrition
between the household survey and the census was largely due to out-migration during the period
between the two surveys, as well as difficulty in locating the children during the day when the
surveyors visited. Column (3) of Table 1 displays the summary statistics for those children who
completed the friendship survey. As per these observable characteristics, the children were broadly
similar to the larger population of out-of-school children who completed the census.
More detailed information from the friendship survey is summarized in Table 2. Column (1)
summarizes information from friends identified in either the open- or closed-ended section. 3  On
average, the children identified 4.5 friends. Out of these friends, two were also out of school and
completed the friendship survey. Because about 40% of children in the randomized sample were
2 As part of the census, each household was assigned a number. Numbers were assigned in the order the households
were visited, in increasing order as the surveyors moved along one side of the street or lane. Thus, a household was
geographically close to other houses with similar numbers. The children for the closed-ended questions were selected
based on the nearest 10 children to the surveyed child, by house number.
3 1In the closed-ended section, a friend is identified as someone the child indicates spending time with.
assigned to the treatment group, on average each child completing the friendship survey had 0.9
friends from the treatment group. Columns (2) and (3) summarize information from the open-
and closed-ended sections, respectively.
In addition to identifying the child's friends through their descriptions, we also construct a
measures of bilateral friendship. Children are considered to be bilateral friends if both children
listed the other as a friend in response to one of the survey questions. On average 1.1 friends were
in the sample and fell into this category.
3.3 Randomization
The randomization included only children from the research sample. All children identified in
the baseline survey whose parents expressed a willingness to participate and who completed a
friendship survey were included. One class (each class comprised one teacher) was assigned to the
17 localities for every 60 children in the sample. For every 60 children, 25 children were selected
for active recruitment. The normal Pratham class includes 25 children and based on the projected
participation rates from actively recruited and non-actively recruited children, we anticipated that
this should yield about 25 attending children per class. In practice, the actual number of children
assigned to a class ranged from 43 to 90 students since the number of children was rarely divisible
by 60. The resulting fraction of students chosen for treatment per basti therefore ranged from
about 25% to 58%, with 42% of children overall assigned to the treatment.
The treatment consisted of actively recruiting children to attend the classes. Before the classes
began, treated children were notified when and where the class would be held. In addition, class
teachers periodically re-visited the homes of treated children who were not attending to remind
them of class and to walk with them to class when necessary. Children not assigned to the
treatment group were free to attend the classes as they wished. These children simply did not
have the benefit of active recruitment.
Once classes began, they were run following the standard Pratham bridge class model, using
the same teaching methods and materials used elsewhere. Because of the time taken by extra data
collection activities, classes began at the end of November and were scheduled to run until the next
school year began in April. Children were thus exposed to a shorter cycle than was customary.
3.4 Participation Measures
Our main outcome of interest is the degree to which students participated in the bridge classes. The
participation data is taken directly from the attendance rosters of the class instructors. However,
we were very concerned with the quality of this data. As a result, we employed a team of monitors
charged with directly overseeing that these records were kept and kept accurately. The monitors
visited each class twice per week. They checked that the class was running, ensured that the
teachers were actively recruiting the students selected for recruitment, and double checked the
attendance rosters.
For the analysis, we focus on two measures of attendance. First, we measure whether or not a
child ever attended a bridge course class for even a single day. Second, we measure the days a child
attended as a fraction of the number of total days the bridge class in that location was open. The
former measure captures whether or not the child ever chose to experience the class or considered
participating regularly while the latter metric measures intensity of participation.
4 Statistical Models
We primarily use three models in the following analysis. First, we use a simple difference estimator
to measure the comparability of the treatment and control groups and the direct treatment effect.
Second, we use a simple linear regression model to estimate the relationship between the treatment
of a child's friends and the child's participation rate. Third, we use instrumental variables to
estimate the causal effects of peer attendance on the child's own attendance.
We estimate the simple difference estimator by estimating the following linear model using
ordinary least squares:
Yzb = + 3Tb + - Z b + Xzb & b (1)
The variable Yb is the characteristic of interest (participation rates or demographic character-
istics) for child i in basti b. The variable Tb is an indicator variable for whether or not a child was
selected for active recruitment, and the coefficient 0 is the estimated difference between children
selected for active recruitment and those not selected for treatment. The variables Zb are local-
ity fixed effects which must be included to account for the differential probabilities of selection in
each locality. The variable Xzb is a vector containing demographic characteristics of each student
at baseline. This includes the child's age, number of siblings in the household, the child's work
status, the child's baseline reading score, and the child's math score. This model is primarily used
in column (4) of Table 3 and in Table 4.
The friendship model is similar to the simple difference estimator in equation (1) but is used
to measure the correlation of Yb with treatment status of friends. The following linear equation is
estimated using ordinary least squares:
Ytb = a + 0T b + 6Fb + ASb + yZb + -Xb + Ezb (2)
As in equation (1), Yb is the variable of interest (demographic characteristics or participation
measures). The new variable Fib is the number of treated friends a child has. This term enters
either as dummy variables or linearly. The other new variable, Sb, is the number of out-of-school
friends a child has. This variable must be included in the specification because children with
more out-of-school friends will mechanically have more treated friends. If the propensity to have
out-of-school friends is correlated with the outcome of interest, then the resulting coefficient on the
fraction of treated friend will be biased. This specification is the primary model used to estimate
the treatment effects and is used in Tables 5 through 8.
Finally, we use a third model to directly estimate the affect of children's peers' participation
on their own participation. This model uses equation (2) as a first-stage specification for an
instrumental-variable regression of the child's participation level on the average participation level
of his or her peers. The first stage takes the following form:
pb = a + 5Fb + ASzb + -Zb + nXXb + Eb (3)
The variable Pib is the average participation level of the child's peers. The independent variables
are similar to those in equation (2) and include a indicator variable for whether or not a child has
a treated friend and the number of treated friends as well as a indicator variable for whether a
child has a friend in the sample and the number of in-sample friends a child has. The equation also
includes demographic characteristics and locality indicator variables. The second-stage regression
is specified as follows:
Yzb = + Tb + PPzb + ASb + Zb + NXib + zb (4)
The variable yb is the child's average participation level, and the variables measuring the degree
of treatment of the child's peers Fb are excluded and used as instruments. This model is used in
Tables 9 and 10.
5 Internal Validity
In order to provide a valid measure of the effects of peer networks, the research design must satisfy
two criteria. First, the treatment assignment must have created a balanced sample-those children
assigned to receive the active recruitment must be similar to those not assigned to receive the active
recruitment, and the fraction of a child's treated friends must not be correlated with observable
characteristics. Second, those children chosen to receive active recruitment must attend at a higher
rate than those children not chosen to attend. The difference in participation rates then generates
an increase in participation whose causal effects we can trace through the children's various peer
networks.
5.1 Baseline Composition
Table 3 explores the balance of observable characteristics across treatment categories. The first
four columns illustrate the differences between children assigned to the treatment group and those
assigned to the control group. As shown in Column (4), only work status is marginally significantly
related to treatment status, but this result is not surprising given the 11 coefficients in this column.
Because the treatment status of the child's friends is a key dependent variable, Columns (5)-(7)
of Table 3 check the balance of obserbables by the number of treated friends. Each column reports
the results of the regression of the characteristic on the number of treated open-ended friends,
best friends, or closed-ended friends, controlling for the total number of friends in each category in
the study. As with the basic treatment-control categories, observable characteristics are generally
balanced between the number of treated friends. Among all three columns, two coefficients are
significant at the 10 percent level, but again this is to be expected given the 30 coefficients in these
columns.
5.2 Effect of the Treatment
Table 4 shows the results of linear regressions of class attendance on assignment to the treatment
group. We use two outcome measures: 1) whether the child attended the class on any day, and 2)
the percentage of days the child attended the classes. Overall, 24% of children in the randomized
sample attended the classes, and average attendance was 10% over the course of the program. The
effect of treatment on attendance is large and highly significant: treated children were around 31%
more likely to attend the classes at all, and 13% more likely to attend the classes on a given day.
Addition of controls and basti dummies changes these estimates little.
Aside from the treatment-control attendance patterns, several observations are worth noting.
While boys and girls attended the classes in equal numbers, younger children were significantly
more likely to attend. In addition, there were no differences in attendance by initial test score.
Finally, no children who were reported to be working at the baseline attended the classes, although
some parents of working children initially expressed interest. Because the bridge classes are held
during the day, a working child would likely have to alter his work behavior in order to attend. It
is possible that this change would have been too costly for families with working children.
6 Results
6.1 Combined Unilateral and Bilateral Ties
As a first look at the causal effects of treated friends, we estimate equation (3) using a set of dummy
variables indicating the number of treated friends in both the open- and closed-ended sections. We
flexibly control for the number of friends in the study using dummy variables, and for the child's
location using a set of basti dummies. Using the binary indicator for any class attendance as the
outcome, Figure 1 plots the coefficients on the dummy variables for the number of treated friends,
where the omitted category is no treated friends. Because of the small number of children with 4
or more treated friends, the forth category combines children with four or more friends.
As shown by the figure, having a single treated friend has a small and statistically insignificant
impact on attendance, and each additional friend does not substantially change the coefficients.
Figure 2 repeats this exercise using percentage attendance as the outcome. The general pattern of
the coefficients is similar: having any treated friends has a small impact on attendance, but there
is little evidence of a monotonic relationship as the number of treated friends increases.
Table 5 presents more parametric estimates of the effect of treated friends. Each column
presents the results of a regression of attendance on different functions of treated friends, controlling
for the same function of the number of friends in the study. As noted above, the number of friends in
the study must be controlled for because the number of treated friends is only random conditional
on the number of friends in the study. Columns (1) and (4) use an indicator for any friends
treated as the independent variable, combining both friends identified in the open- and closed-
ended portions of the survey. In column (1) estimated coefficient on the treated friend is 0.063,
indicating that having a treated friend makes the child 6.3 percentage points more likely to attend
the class. This coefficient is significant at the 5% level. Note that this coefficient is approximately
20% of the magnitude of the direct effect. In column (4), where the percent of classes attended
is the outcome of interest, the estimated coefficient is 0.041, approximately one-third of the direct
effect.
Columns (2) and (4) of Table 5 add linear terms for the number of treated friends and the
number of friends identified in the study. In these specifications, the coefficients on the treated
friend dummies change slightly and are no longer significant. The coefficients on the linear terms
are very small, negative and not at all significant. These results suggest that there is little effect
of treated friends on attendance beyond the first treated friend.
While the number of treated friends may be related to a child's attendance behavior, it may
be the percentage of the child's network that it treated which is more directly to behavior. If the
child has a large number of friends, for example, having a small number of treated friends may
not affect attendance, because he can simply substitute his time away from the treated friends.
Columns (3) and (6) of Table (5) include the percentage of the child's friends that are treated as a
dependent variable. Note that in order to ensure proper identification, the independent variable is
the percentage of friends in the study who are treated. In addition, because the denominator only
includes the number of friends in the study, only children with friends in the study are included in
these regressions The regressions show that there is no incremental effect of the percentage of the
child's network treated on the child's own attendance, conditional on any friends treated.
Table 6 breaks out the social network effects by whether the friend was identified in the open-
or closed-ended section of the friendship survey. Because the friends identified in the open-ended
section were volunteered by the child, these ties are more salient to the child and could therefore
have stronger effects on the child's attendance. Our results show that this was not the case. We
regress attendance on a dummy for whether the child had a friend identified in the open-ended
section, whether the child had a friend identified in the closed-ended section, and the interaction
of the two variables, where the child had a friend identified in both sections. Thus, if a child had
a friend identified in both sections, the overall effect of treated friends equals the sum of the three
coefficients. We control for the corresponding variables indicating whether these friends were in
the study. The difference between the open-ended and closed-ended dummies equals the relative
effect of having either an open-ended or closed-ended friend treated. As shown by columns (1) and
(4), the difference between the two effects is small and switches signs between the regression with
a binary outcome and the one with a continuous measure of attendance.
We also test whether having a treated best friend increases the likelihood that the child attends
the classes. We do so by including a dummy for the treatment status of the best friend, and the
corresponding indicator for whether the best friend was in the study. Note that best friends were
selected form a subset of open-ended friends, so the coefficient on the binary indicator represents
the incremental effect of a treated best friend relative to a treated open-ended friend. The results
of this regression are presented in columns (2) and (4). In both cases the estimated coefficients
are positive but insignificant. While the estimated coefficient is large in the case of the binary
attendance outcome, we cannot conclude that having a treated best friend has a significant impact
on attendance relative to a treated open-ended friend.
6.2 Bilateral Ties
Table 7 presents the effects of bilateral ties-children who listed each other as friends in the friendship
survey. We first examine this relationship using binary variables for any bilateral friend treated.
For reference, columns (1) and (5) show the overall effects of any friend treated reported columns
(1) and (4) of Table 5. Columns (2) and (6) add dummies for whether there was a bilateral
friend treated.4 The coefficient on this variable therefore represents the difference between having
a unilateral friend treated and having a bilateral friend treated. In the regression using the
binary outcome, the estimated coefficient on the bilateral friend dummy is 0.107 and is significantly
different from the unilateral friend treatment category at the 1% level. Similarly, the corresponding
coefficient in the regression using percent attendance is large and highly significant. The small
and insignificant coefficients on the friend treated dummies suggests that unilateral friends have no
impact on attendance.
Turning to the incremental effects of additional treated bilateral friends, columns (3) and (7)
repeat columns (2) and (5) of Table 5 for reference. Columns (4) and (8) add variables for the
number of treated bilateral friends to show the differences between additional treated unilateral
and additional treated bilateral friends. The regressions show that additional treated bilateral
friends have strong effects on attendance relative to treated unilateral friends: an additional treated
bilateral friend results in a 9.5% increase in the likelihood of any attendance, and a 6.6% increase
in the percent of classes attended. Surprisingly, the inclusion of the number of treated bilateral
friends results in a negatve coefficient on the overall number of friends, which becomes significant
at the 5% level in the specification using percent attendance as an outcome.
6.3 Siblings
Table 8 examines whether having treated siblings impacts attendance in the classes. Column (1)
regresses the binary attendance measure on an indicator for any treated sibling. The estimated
coefficient is very similar to the effect of having a treated friend, and suggests that having a treated
sibling increases participation by 6.8%. Column (3) repeats the estimation using the continuous
measure of attendance as the outcome. The estimated coefficient is 0.042, almost identical to the
coefficient on any friend treated from column (4) of Table 5.
Columns (2) and (4) estimate attendance as a function of the number of siblings treated. In
4 The category of "any bilateral friend" includes friends who were listed in either section (open- or closed-ended)
by both children. For example, a friend could have been listed in the open-ended section by the first child, and the
first child could have been identified in the closed-ended section by the second child.
both specifications, the coefficient on the number of treated friends variable is relatively large but
not significant. Although the point estimates are substantially larger than the incremental effects
of friends estimated in Table 5, we cannot reject the null that additional treated siblings have no
effect on attendance.
6.4 Effects of Peer Attendance
One of the main purposes of this experiment is to identify the effect of children's peers'participation
levels on the participation levels of the children. In our experiment, we manipulate the degree to
which children are actively encouraged to participate, allowing us to use the variation in peer
attendance attributable to peer treatment in order to estimate this effect. As shown in Table 4,
active recruitment does change children's participation levels. We can therefore use the model
specified in equations (3) and (4) to estimate the effect of children's peers' participation on the
participation levels of the children themselves.
Table 9 estimates this model using the children's bilateral friends. Column (1) estimates the
first-stage equation (3). Consistent with Table 4, the average participation levels of the bilateral
friends is highly correlated with the number of bilateral friends receiving the treatment. Column
(2) contains the reduced-form regression within this specification. This estimation is similar to the
one in Table 5, column (4) but includes only bilateral friends. Although the coefficients are not
individually significant, they are jointly significant at the 5% level (p-value = 0.023).
Column (3) contains the two-stage least-squares estimates using the equation in column (1) for
the first-stage regression. The results demonstrate that the participation of a child's peers has a
large impact on the child's own participation. The magnitude shows that a ten percentage point
increase in the average participation of a child's bilateral friends increases the child's participation
level by 4.2 percentage points. Effectively, an increase in participation by a child's peers increases
the child's participation by 42 percent as much.
We estimate the same specification for different measures of the child's peer network in Table
10. In each case, we use the model specified in equations (3) and (4), but change the measures
of the number of treated peers and the number of in sample peers to match the type of peer
relationship under consideration. We estimate the model for all friends (column 1), bilateral friends
(column 2), unilateral friends (column 3), and siblings (column 4). Turning first to column (1), the
estimated effect of a 10 percentage point increase in the peers' participation levels results in a 2.7
percent increase in the child's participation level. In columns (2) and (3), the estimates show a
sharp difference in the effects of bilateral and unilateral friends. As shown in the previous table,
bilateral friends increase a child's participation by 4.2 percentage points for every 10 percentage
point increase in average peer participation. However, unilateral friends have almost no effect on
children's participation levels. In a combined regression, this difference is statistically significant
at the 1% level (p-value = 0.0095).
Finally, column (4) estimates the effect of siblings. As described before, this mechanism is likely
very different than the treatment through friends alone because siblings share parents that could
reinforce similar behavior or insist on different participation patterns. As show in Column (4) this
effect is, in fact, very large. A child's participation level increases by 6.1 percentage points for every
ten percent increase in participation among his or her siblings.
This experiment was designed to identify the effects of peers' participation and to avoid the
possible selection effects that would occur if we simply estimate the correlation patterns between a
child and his or her friends' participation. An obvious question is whether or not these estimates
differ dramatically from what we would estimate had we not used the experiment. To construct
these estimates, we use a subsample of our data including only children that were not treated and
who had no treated peers. Just as in the estimates of equation (2), conditional on the number
of in-sample peers the identification of this sample should be random. As a result, we estimate
equation (4) using an OLS regression and not instrumenting for the participation levels of the
peers. These estimates are displayed in Table 11. Quite surprisingly, all of the estimates are quite
close to the instrumental variables estimates with the exception of the sibling effects which seem
to be underestimated by about two-thirds. The inconsistency in the estimated sibling effects is a
concern, but the other estimates do suggest that in this sample and context the OLS estimates
do not suffer from a significant positive bias due to the endogenous factors associated with peer
network formation.
7 Conclusion
This paper examines the peer effects of the decisions of out-of-school children to attend classes
designed to teach basic literacy and numeracy skills. We study the child's attendance decision as
a function of his own invitation to attend the class and invitations for members of his friendship
network to attend. Through a within-community randomization of the invitation, we are able
to generate exogenous variation in the fraction of a child's peer network that attends the classes.
We measure peer effects through a broad survey which seeks to identify both the salience of the
ties (through open-ended and closed-ended questions), the type of network (through unilateral and
bilateral ties), and the effects of siblings.
We find that active recruitment increases participation by about 30 percentage points. Having
a treated friend (either from the open-ended or closed-ended section of the survey) has an effect
approximately equal to 6 percentage points, but there is no evidence that having more than one
treated friend increases the likelihood of attending. There is some evidence that the strength of the
ties does matter, in that unilateral ties have either a negligible or negative impact, while bilateral
ties have large positive impacts. Having a treated sibling has an impact approximately equal to
having a treated friend.
Using the peers' treatment status as an instrument for peer attendance, we find that friends'
attendance has a large impact on the child's own attendance: an increase in the percentage of
classes attended by a child's peers increases the child's attendance by 27 percent as much. The
effects are strikingly similar to naive OLS estimates of this effect.
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Table 1. Sample Composition / Summary Statistics
Out of Friendship
Census School Survey
(1) (2) (3)
Out of School 0.470
(0.499)
Out of school, not interested 0.021
(0.145)
Female 0.463 0.489 0.492
(0.499) (0.500) (0.500)
Age 9.100 8.692 8.554
(2.439) (2.390) (2.321)
Children 6-14 per household 2.222 2.083 2.009
(1.110) (1.064) (1.021)
Migrant 0.683 0.966 0.971
(0.465) (0.182) (0.168)
Working 0.014 0.010 0.008
(0.116) (0.097) (0.087)
Reading 1.287 0.256 0.222
(1.628) (0.781) (0.728)
Math 0.780 0.140 0.121
(1.167) (0.542) (0.505)
Total Children 4213 1889 1303
Table 2. Summary of Friends
Combined
(1)
Number Listed 4.534
(2.563)
Number in Study
Number Treated
Number of Bilateral Friends
Number of Treated Bilateral Friends
Number of Best Friends
Number of Best Friends in Study
Number of Treated Best Friends
Number of Bilateral Best Friends
Number of Treated Bilateral Best Friends
Number of Siblings in Study
Number of Treated Siblings
Open Ended
(2)
2.878
(1.674)
2.164 0.850
(1.920) (1.031)
0.904 0.346
(1.098) (0.620)
1.120 0.299
(1.313) (0.590)
0.484 0.130
(0.752) (0.370)
0.934
(0.382)
0.306
(0.464)
0.137
(0.346)
0.128
(0.334)
0.063
(0.244)
0.731
(0.832)
0.303
(0.547)
Closed-Ended
(3)
1.617
(1.748)
1.313
(1.540)
0.556
(0.850)
0.504
(0.851)
0.220
(0.504)
Sample includes all children who completed the friendship survey.
Cells represent the mean and standard deviation of the variables listed.
Friends represent both unilateral and bilateral ties unless otherwise indicated.
Bilateral friends are friends who indicated a tie with the child in the same
category.
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Table 3. Treatment-Control Differences
Difference
Total Treatment Control (treat.-cont.)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of Number of Number of
Treated Open Treated Treated Closed
Ended Friends Best Friends Ended Friends
(5) (6) (7)
Female
Age
Number of siblings, age 6-14
Working
Reading
Maths
Number of Open-ended Friends Listed
Number of Friends in Study
Number of Matched Best Friends in Study
Number of Closed-ended Friends Listed
Number of Closed-ended Friends in Study
Observations
0.492
(0.500)
8.554
(2.321)
2.009
(1.021)
0.008
(0.087)
0.206
(0.706)
0.111
(0.483)
2.898
(1.662)
0.855
(1.033)
0.308
(0.465)
1.629
(1.749)
1.322
(1.542)
1303
0.482
(0.500)
8.647
(2.367)
2.002
(1.056)
0.013
(0.113)
0.222
(0.791)
0.134
(0.541)
2.933
(1.609)
0.869
(1.022)
0.316
(0.466)
1.713
(1.794)
1.399
(1.593)
544
0.499
(0.500)
8.487
(2.287)
2.014
(0.997)
0.004
(0.063)
0.194
(0.638)
0.094
(0.436)
2.874
(1.700)
0.846
(1.040)
0.301
(0.465)
1.568
(1.715)
1.267
(1.503)
759
0.018
(0.028)
-0.160
(0.130)
0.013
(0.057)
-0.009+
(0.005)
-0.029
(0.040)
-0.041
(0.027)
-0.059
(0.094)
-0.023
(0.058)
-0.015
(0.026)
-0.145
(0.099)
-0.132
(0.087)
1303
-0.039
(0.032)
-0.253+
(0.147)
0.030
(0.065)
-0.009
(0.006)
-0.010
(0.045)
0.016
(0.031)
-0.084
(0.098)
0.034
(0.023)
0.089
(0.111)
0.098
(0.098)
1303
-0.09+
(0.050)
-0.143
(0.233)
-0.059
(0.103)
-0.014
(0.009)
0.024
(0.072)
0.003
(0.049)
-0.191
(0.168)
-0.057
(0.082)
0.127
(0.177)
0.162
(0.156)
1303
-0.025
(0.026)
0.014
(0.118)
-0.028
(0.051)
-0.003
(0.004)
-0.004
(0.036)
0.026
(0.025)
0.090
(0.084)
0.097
(0.053)
0.031
(0.024)
0.014
(0.034)
1303
Columns (1), (2) and (3) represent the sample means and standard deviations of the variables listed. Columns (4) through (7) represent the
estimated coefficients and standard errors of regressions of the characteristic listed on the treatment variable indicated for each column.
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 4. Class Attendance
Dependent Variable
Attendance 1/0 Percent Attendance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment 0.312** 0.313** 0.321** 0.125** 0.125** 0.128**
(0.027) (0.026) (0.025) (0.012) (0.018) (0.018)
Female 0.001 0.007
(0.030) (0.018)
Age -0.024** -0.008**
(0.004) (0.002)
Children 6-14 in Household 0.011 0.005
(0.016) (0.010)
Working -0.187* -0.074*
(0.071) (0.029)
Read -0.011 -0.012
(0.028) (0.009)
Maths -0.007 0.009
(0.030) (0.015)
Constant 0.107** 0.107** 0.286** 0.050** 0.050** 0.100"*
(0.016) (0.011) (0.036) (0.008) (0.007) (0.023)
Basti Fixed Effects? NO YES YES NO YES YES
Observations 1303 1303 1303 1303 1303 1303
R-squared 0.131 0.161 0.184 0.119 0.119 0.129
Standard errors clustered by basti.
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 5. Friends Regressions
Dependent Variable
Attendance 1/0 Percent Attendance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Friend Treated 0.063* 0.048 0.087 0.041" 0.038 0.054
(0.025) (0.038) (0.070) (0.019) (0.023) (0.041)
Number of Friends Treated -0.007 -0.003
(0.027) -0.013
Percent of Friends Treated -0.075 -0.028
(0.083) (0.049)
Friend in Study 0.091 0.077 0.068* 0.063*
(0.084) (0.079) (0.027) (0.029)
Number of Friends in Study 0.012 0.004
(0.012) (0.007)
Treatment 0.319** 0.317** 0.328** 0.129** 0.128** 0.128**
(0.024) (0.025) (0.031) (0.019) (0.019) (0.022)
F-Stat: Treated Friends Have No Effect 6.166 1.152 0.984 4.931 1.921 1.917
P-Value 0.024 0.341 0.395 0.041 0.179 0.179
Observations 1296 1296 1027 1296 1296 1027
R-squared 0.188 0.189 0.194 0.138 0.138 0.141
Standard errors clustered by basti.
Regressions include all variables in Table 4 and basti dummies as controls.
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 6. Friends Regressions
by Type of Friend
Dependent Variable
Attendance 1/0 Percent Attendance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Open-ended Treated
Closed-Ended Treated
Open and Closed-Ended Treated
0.057 0.022
(0.036) (0.043)
0.05 0.047
(0.043) (0.044)
-0.02 -0.015
(0.066) (0.066)
Best Friend Treated 0.066
(0.045)
Open-ended in Study
Closed-ended in Study
Open and Closed-ended in Study
Best Friend in Study
Treatment
F-Stat: Treated Friends have no effect
P-Value
Observations
R-squared
-0.177 -0.180+
(0.103) (0.102)
0.031 -0.058
(0.047) (0.058)
0.192+ 0.192+
(0.099) (0.099)
0.096+
(0.049)
0.318** 0.316**
(0.024) (0.024)
4.335 3.504
0.020 0.031
1296 1296
0.191 0.195
0.028 0.022
(0.022) (0.026)
0.044 0.042
(0.025) (0.026)
-0.014 -0.012
(0.036) (0.036)
0.008
(0.020)
-0.142+ -0.143+
(0.070) (0.070)
0.044+ -0.011
(0.023) (0.026)
0.140* 0.141*
(0.065) (0.065)
0.059**
(0.016)
0.128** 0.127**
(0.019) (0.019)
2.516
0.095
1.738
0.191
1296 1296
0.144 0.146
Standard errors clustered by basti.
Regressions include all variables in Table 4 and basti dummies as controls.
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 7. Bilateral Ties
Dependent Variable
Attendance 1/0 Percent Attendance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Friend Treated
Bilateral Friend Treated
Number of Treated Friends
Number of Treated Bilateral Friends
Friend in Study
Bilateral Friend in Study
Number of Friends in Study
0.063* -0.012 0.048
(0.025) (0.027) (0.038)
0.107**
(0.033)
0.036
(0.037)
0.008
(0.049)
-0.007 -0.051
(0.027) (0.030)
0.095*
(0.036)
0.091 0.078 0.077 0.07
(0.084) (0.085) (0.079) (0.079)
0.021
(0.019)
Number of Bilateral Friends in Study
0.011
(0.033)
0.012 0.011
(0.012) (0.017)
-0.003
(0.026)
0.041* 0.004 0.038 0.032+
(0.019) (0.011) (0.023) (0.018)
0.056**
(0.016)
-0.002
(0.030)
-0.003 -0.032*
(0.013) (0.012)
0.066**
(0.023)
0.068* 0.063* 0.063* 0.059+
(0.027) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028)
0.005
(0.012)
0.013
(0.016)
0.004 0.009
(0.007) (0.006)
-0.015
(0.013)
0.319** 0.314** 0.317*'
(0.024) (0.023) (0.025)
0.315**
(0.024)
0.129** 0.126** 0.128** 0.127**
(0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018)
F-Stat: Treated Friends have no effect
P-Value
Observations
R-squared
6.166 6.358 1.152 5.614
0.024 0.009 0.341 0.005
1296 1296 1296 1296
0.188 0.198 0.189 0.203
Standard errors clustered by basti.
Regressions include all variables in Table 4 and basti dummies as controls.
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
4.931
0.041
1296
0.138
6.173
0.01
1296
0.146
1.921
0.179
1296
0.138
4.627
0.011
1296
0.152
Treatment
Table 8. Siblings Regressions
Dependent Variable
Attendance 1/0 Percent Attendance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Any Treated Sibling 0.068+ 0.013 0.042+ -0.016
(0.035) (0.084) (0.022) (0.046)
Number of Treated Siblings 0.042 0.054
(0.063) (0.039)
Any Sibling in Study 0.021 -0.001 0.002 0.018
(0.031) (0.060) (0.021) (0.033)
Number of Siblings in Study 0.028 -0.013
(0.048) (0.026)
Treatment 0.319** 0.319** 0.128** 0.130**
(0.023) (0.023) (0.018) (0.018)
F-Stat: Treated Sibs have no effect 3.751 1.794 3.689 2.214
P-Value 0.071 0.198 0.073 0.142
Observations 1296 1296 1296 1296
R-squared 0.187 0.188 0.134 0.136
Standard errors clustered by basti.
Regressions include all variables in Table 4 and basti dummies as controls.
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 9. Effect of Friend's Participation on Own Participation
Bilateral Friends
Dependent Variable
Avg Friend Percent
Attendance Attendance
FS RF
(1) (2)
Avg Friend Attendance
Any Friend Treated
Number of Treated Friends
0.076*
(0.030)
0.061**
(0.012)
Child Treated
Any Friend in Sample
Number of Sample Friends
Observations
R-squared
-0.036** -0.004
(0.010) (0.014)
1296
0.27
1296
0.15
Percent
Attendance
IV
(3)
0.424**
(0.114)
0.036
(0.039)
0.023
(0.028)
-0.029+
(0.015)
0.009
(0.007)
0.119**
(0.018)
1296
0.22
Standard errors clustered by basti.
Regressions include all variables in Table 4 and basti dummies as controls.
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 10. IV Estimates
Effect of Peers' Participation on Own Participation
by Peer Type
Type of Peer
All
Friends Bilateral Unilateral Siblings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Avg Friend Attendance 0.273* 0.424*1 -0.067 0.616*
(0.125) (0.114) (0.182) (0.221)
Any Friend in Sample 0.058* -0.029+ 0.018 -0.026
(0.026) (0.015) (0.019) (0.025)
Number of Sample Friends 0.005 0.009 0.003 0.009
(0.003) (0.007) (0.006) (0.016)
Child Treated 0.126** 0.119* 0.127** 0.124**
(0.020) (0.018) (0.019) (0.016)
Observations 1296 1296 1296 1296
R-squared 0.2 0.22 0.12 0.25
Standard errors clustered by basti.
Regressions include all variables in Table 4 and basti dummies as controls.
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 11. OLS Estimates
Effect of Friend's Participation on Own Participation
by Peer Type
Type of Peer
All Friends Bilateral Unilateral Siblings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Avg Friend Attendance 0.204* 0.402* 0.044 0.224*
(0.093) (0.179) (0.099) (0.105)
Any Friend in Sample 0.005 0.024 -0.006 0.004
(0.011) (0.016) (0.021) (0.040)
Number of Sample Friends 0.006 -0.032** 0.021 0.01
(0.008) (0.011) (0.013) (0.030)
Observations 342 342 342 342
R-squared 0.11 0.15 0.08 0.12
Standard errors clustered by basti.
Regressions include all variables in Table 4 and basti dummies as controls.
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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The controversy over whether and how much to charge for health products in the developing
world rests, in part, on whether higher prices can increase use, either by targeting distribution
to high-use households (a screening effect), or by stimulating use psychologically through a
sunk-cost effect. We develop a methodology for separating these two effects. We implement
the methodology in a field experiment in Zambia using door-to-door marketing of a home water
purification solution. We find that higher prices screen out those who use the product less. By
contrast, we find no consistent evidence of sunk-cost effects.
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1 Introduction
Non-profit approaches to the distribution of health products in developing countries are often
grouped into "social marketing" and "public health" categories, with the former emphasizing retail
sales and the latter emphasizing free distribution through health clinics. Advocates of the public
health approach often object to the use of prices to mediate distribution. Critics of pricing argue
that "charging people for basic health care... [is] unfair" (Benn, 2006), and that fees ensure that
goods only reach "the richest of the poor" (McNeil, 2005). Advocates of pricing counter that "when
products are given away free, the recipient often does not value them or even use them" (PSI, 2006).
The latter argument is commonly interpreted to mean that higher prices cause greater product
use through a sunk-cost effect (Thaler, 1980; Eyster, 2002). An equally plausible interpretation,
however, is a screening effect: that higher prices skew the composition of buyers towards households
with a greater propensity to use the product (Roy, 1951; Oster, 1995).
Each of these effects is of broader economic interest-the former as a central prediction of
psychology and economics, and the latter as an implication of the allocative role of prices. Isolating
them may also help to clarify the terms of the ongoing policy debate over product pricing. However,
the two effects are intrinsically unidentified in standard observational data: both imply that as
prices rise, buyers use more. Evidence on the sunk-cost hypothesis has therefore been confined
largely to hypothetical choices and a single, small-scale field experiment (Arkes and Blumer, 1985).
Clean evidence that higher product prices select households with a greater likelihood of using the
product is similarly limited.
In this paper, we present evidence on the effect of prices on product use from a large-scale
field experiment in Zambia involving Clorin, an inexpensive, socially marketed disinfectant. Our
experimental design allows us to separately identify screening and sunk-cost effects, and our setting
allows us to measure product use objectively, without relying solely on household self-reports. We
find strong evidence for screening effects: households with a greater willingness to pay for Clorin
are also those most likely to use Clorin in their drinking water. By contrast, we find no evidence
for sunk-cost effects, and only weak evidence for a modified version of the sunk-cost hypothesis
suggested by practitioners.
Clorin is well-suited to the goals of our study. It is a chlorine bleach solution used to kill
pathogens in household drinking water, and thus reduce the incidence of water-borne illnesses
(Quick et al, 2002). Its chemical composition makes it detectable by test strips similar to those used
in backyard pools, which permits us to avoid the pitfalls of relying solely on household self-reports
of use. Moreover, in Zambia, Clorin is a well-known, widely used product with an established retail
market, which serves to limit the informational role of prices, a potential confound to the effects of
interest. Finally, it is inexpensive, so that income effects (another potential confound) are relatively
unlikely.
Our main experimental intervention was a door-to-door sale of Clorin to about 1,000 households
in Lusaka. Each participating household was offered a single bottle of Clorin for a one-time only,
randomly chosen offer price, which was at or below the prevailing retail price. Households that
agreed to purchase at the offer price received an unanticipated, randomly chosen discount, thus
allowing us to vary the transaction price separately from the offer price. About two weeks after
the marketing intervention, we conducted a follow-up survey in which we asked about Clorin use
and measured the chemical presence of Clorin in the household's stored water.
In the paper, we lay out a simple model of Clorin use. Households differ in the costs and
benefits of using Clorin in their drinking water, about which they are partially informed at the
time of purchase. Households base their purchase decisions on the expected value (benefits net of
costs) of using Clorin and on the offer price, and agree to buy when the expected value of using
Clorin in drinking water is high. The model therefore predicts a screening effect: the higher is the
offer price, the more the set of buyers is selected on their expected value from using Clorin, and
hence the more likely are buyers to use Clorin in their drinking water.
We allow for psychological effects of prices by adopting Eyster's (2002) framework, which as-
sumes a desire for consistency. In this framework, households pay a psychological cost if they
purchase Clorin and do not use it in their drinking water. The magnitude of the psychological cost
depends on how much better off the household would have been had it not bought Clorin; i.e., on
the amount paid for Clorin. Households can avoid that cost by using Clorin in their drinking water,
thus validating their decision to purchase Clorin in the first place. The model therefore predicts
a sunk-cost effect: for a given offer price, greater transaction prices result in a stronger desire to
rationalize one's purchase decision, and hence greater use in drinking water.
Under the assumptions of the model, then, our two-stage pricing design solves the core identifi-
cation problem, allowing us to test separately for screening and sunk-cost effects. Varying the offer
price for a given transaction price allows us to test for a screening effect of prices on the mix of
buyers, holding constant the psychic cost of a failure to use Clorin in drinking water. Varying the
transaction price for a given offer price then tests for a sunk-cost effect of prices on drinking-water
use, holding constant the selection of buyers.
We find strong evidence for screening effects: holding constant the transaction price, the house-
holds who agree to a higher offer price are (statistically and economically) more likely to use Clorin
in their drinking water at follow-up. That is, higher willingness-to-pay for Clorin is associated
with a greater propensity to use. This holds true even when we condition on a range of house-
hold characteristics, suggesting that the component of willingness-to-pay that is uncorrelated with
observables is nevertheless highly predictive of Clorin use. In addition, some simple calculations
suggest that willingness-to-pay is more predictive of use than an optimal linear combination of
household characteristics observable as of the baseline survey. These findings indicate that house-
holds have substantial information about their use propensities that is not available directly to the
econometrician, and that this information plays an important role in their purchase decisions.
Turning to sunk-cost effects, we find no evidence that households paying a higher transaction
price are more likely to use Clorin in their drinking water, and some of our point estimates even
suggest the opposite. This is true even among households displaying the sunk-cost effect in hypo-
thetical choice scenarios. Our confidence intervals are tight enough to rule out effects of roughly
the same order of magnitude as the point estimates of the screening effect that we estimate. More-
over, although Clorin is a relatively inexpensive product, the variation in prices we induce in our
experiment is sufficient to generate a substantial effect on purchase probabilities, suggesting that
our failure to find sunk-cost effects may not be due to small stakes. Hence, our findings do not
support the model's prediction of a sunk-cost effect. In response to practitioner suggestions, we
also test the hypothesis that paying something results in more use than paying nothing. Again, we
cannot rule out the null of no effect, although in this case the sign, magnitude, and cross-household
variation in point estimates are at least consistent with the hypothesized relationship.
On the whole, then, our results imply, at best, a limited role for sunk-cost effects in the domain
of health product use, while providing strong support for the hypothesis that households have
private information about their use propensities that is reflected in willingness-to-pay.
Our theoretical discussion suggests two caveats regarding the interpretation of these results.
First, we test for sunk-cost effects operating through the mechanism proposed in Eyster (2002).
Though Eyster's model is the most fully articulated single-agent theory of sunk-cost effects of which
we are aware, reasonable alternatives exist with possibly different empirical implications. We discuss
the robustness of our conclusions to alternative theories of sunk costs when we present the model.
Second, the interpretation of our results depends on assumptions about what happens to Clorin
that is purchased but not used in drinking water. The weight of the evidence indicates that Clorin
not used in drinking water is used for household cleaning (in place of bleach or detergent), but
our data are not definitive. The model clarifies how our results would be affected given alternative
assumptions about how Clorin is used when it is not used in drinking water.
Our paper makes several contributions to the existing literature. Methodologically, we imple-
ment the first field experiment to identify both screening and sunk-cost effects.' Our two-stage
pricing design is a close cousin both to Arkes and Blumer's (1985) study of the sunk-cost effect in
the use of theater tickets, and to Karlan and Zinman's (2006) study of adverse selection and moral
hazard in the South African loan market. However, Arkes and Blumer's (1985) design does not
attempt to identify the screening effect, and Karlan and Zinman's (2006) design does not attempt
to identify sunk-cost effects. 2
Substantively, we show that households base a health product purchase decision on private
information about their propensity to use the product. In addition to its more direct relevance to
the pricing of health products in developing countries, this finding contributes to ongoing efforts to
study the role of private information in health care (e.g., Finkelstein and McGarry, 2006) and other
domains (Karlan and Zinman, 2006). We also fail to find consistent evidence for sunk-cost effects
in only the second, and by far the largest, field experiment on sunk-cost effects to date. 3 Ours is
1See Harrison and List (2004) for a review of field experiments in economics more generally.
2In Karlan and Zinman's (2006) design, the discounted interest rate (analogous to our transaction price) directly
affects households' marginal incentives to default (through moral hazard or repayment burden), whereas in our context
the transaction price is purely sunk.
3 Eyster's (2002) review identifies Arkes and Blumer's (1985) as the only field study of sunk-cost effects to date
While evidence from hypothetical choices supports the sunk-cost premise (Thaler, 1980; Arkes and Blumer, 1985),
evidence from incentivized laboratory behaviors is more mixed (Friedman et al, 2007).
the first field study of sunk costs to include a treatment in which participants paid nothing for the
product,4 and the first to explicitly connect hypothetical choice responses and other measures of
psychological propensity to objectively measured field behaviors. 5
Beyond its implications for social science, our study informs an important set of public policy
issues, from the pricing of health products in developing countries in particular (Kremer and Miguel,
2007)6 to non-profit pricing strategy more generally.7  Clorin and related "point-of-use" water
purification systems hold promise as tools for addressing the lack of clean water facing over one
billion people (USAID, 2006; Thevos et al, 2002-2003; Kremer et al, 2006). As with many health
inputs, these tools rely on household behavior to produce desirable health outcomes (Grossman,
1972), implying that models of product use are likely to play an important role in the design and
implementation of policies relating to water purification.8
Several hurdles remain, however, in deriving firm policy conclusions from our findings. First,
our data have the power to test the effects of pricing on drinking-water use of Clorin, not on the
incidence of water-borne illness, the ultimate outcome of interest. However, strong extant evidence
shows that home water purification solutions like Clorin can reduce the incidence of water-borne
illnesses (Quick et al, 2002), even in populations in which the use of alternative methods (such
as boiling) is reasonably common (Quick et al, 1999). Second, Clorin is a relatively inexpensive
health product, whereas much of the controversy surrounding social marketing has centered on more
expensive products such as insecticide-treated mosquito nets. Using an inexpensive product serves
to minimize income effects and hence to permit cleaner tests of the effects of interest. However,
4 A number of existing papers explore the special role of zero prices, but none focuses on the effects on post-
purchase use. See, for example, Shampanier, Mazar and Ariely (2007), Thornton (forthcoming), and Karlan and List
(2007). More generally, our evidence contributes to existing research on the psychology of product pricing (see, e.g.,
Gourville and Soman, 2002; Shiv, Carmon and Ariely, 2005).
5 In this sense, our study also contributes to a growing literature connecting laboratory and survey responses to
incentivized choices in markets (Fehr and Goette, 2007; Karlan, 2005; Ashraf, Karlan, and Yin, 2006).
6Though there have been some studies of the effectiveness of prices in encouraging product use in social marketing
contexts, existing research typically takes a non-experimental approach (Meekers, 1997; Maxwell et al, 2006). An
exception is Litvack and Bodart (1993), who study a natural experiment in which public health facilities in Cameroon
adopted both user fees and improved quality of care. Because of the simultaneous adoption of these two policies,
Litvack and Bodart's (1993) research design does not permit separate identification of the effect of fees on utilization.
7In this sense, our paper relates to the economics of pricing in non-profit industries in general (Newhouse, 1970;
Casper, 1979; Oster, 1995; Steinberg and Weisbrod, 1998; Oster, Gray, and Weinberg, 2003), and in social marketing
organizations in particular (Kotler and Roberto, 1989; Behrman, 1989).
8 The determinants of product use also play an important role in many industrial organization contexts. For exam-
ple, utilization is of intrinsic public policy interest in the market for energy-intensive consumer durables (Hausman,
1979) and advertiser-supported media (Kalita and Ducoffe, 1995; Petrin, 2003). Our methods may be useful in
identifying the relationship between pricing and utilization in such markets.
we must leave to future work the question of how our conclusions generalize to more expensive
products. Indeed, since our original writing, Cohen and Dupas (2007) have applied a version of
our experimental design in the context of insecticide-treated mosquito nets, with some substantive
differences in conclusions. Finally, and most broadly, we focus here on two effects of pricing on use,
but others, such as quality signalling (Milgrom and Roberts, 1986) and access to retail distribution
networks, may also play a role in determining optimal pricing policy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background information
on our experimental setting. Section 3 lays out a formal model of Clorin use and discusses the
conditions needed for identification. Section 4 describes the design of our surveys and door-to-door
marketing experiment. Sections 5 and 6 present our findings on the effect of price changes on
product purchase and use. Section 7 describes a series of robustness checks on our key conditions.
Section 8 concludes.
2 Experimental Setting: Zambia, Safe Water, and Clorin
Clorin is a water purification solution that is marketed in Zambia by the Society for Family Health
(SFH), a local affiliate of Population Services International (PSI), an international non-profit or-
ganization. 9 Chemically, Clorin is sodium hypochlorite bleach, which can be mixed with water
stored in the household in order to kill water-borne pathogens, and thus prevent the contraction
of water-borne illnesses that are especially dangerous to young children. Because many households
in Zambia obtain their water from sources that are not properly chlorinated, and because Clorin is
less expensive than boiling water or other alternative methods of disinfection, it has been a popular
product since its launch in 1998 (Olembo et al, 2004).
Clorin is marketed by the bottle (see figure 1), and a single bottle is sufficient to disinfect up
to 1,000 liters of water (about one month's water supply for a family of six). Clorin is sold widely
in both retail outlets (for about 800-1,000 Kw) and health clinics (for about 500 Kw). These prices
are modest by Zambian standards; for comparison, in Lusaka, a week's supply of cooking oil for a
family of six costs about 4,800 Kw. 10 The fact that Clorin is a relatively inexpensive product limits
'See <http://www.psi.org/resources/pubs/clorin.html> for additional information.
10As of June 1, 2006, 800 Kw was equivalent to about $0.25 US. Average monthly urban household income in
Zambia in 2002-2003 was 790,652 Kw (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2006).
the possibility that wealth effects contaminate our estimates (see also section 7).
In addition to the inherent importance of clean water for health in the developing world, we
chose to use Clorin in our study for two practical reasons. First, Clorin use can be measured not only
by household self-reports, but also by chemical tests for the presence of chlorine in stored drinking
water. These tests are themselves imperfect, because households' source water (i.e., water from
taps) sometimes contain chlorine, and the levels of chlorination in source water vary considerably
across space and over time. Despite these drawbacks, the objectivity of chemical tests creates the
possibility of cross-validating households' subjective reports.
Second, because Clorin has been widely marketed for several years, most households are familiar
with the product and with its prevailing retail price. In our baseline survey (described below), nearly
80 percent of respondents report having used Clorin at some point, and over 99 percent mention
Clorin when asked which water purification solutions they have heard of. Informal interviews and
focus groups further suggest high levels of awareness of Clorin prices. These facts, combined with
additional precautions described below, serve to minimize the information participants could have
gleaned from the prices we charged in our experiment. (We provide additional tests for informational
effects in section 7).
3 Conceptual Framework
In this section, we present a simple model of Clorin purchase and use, allowing for sunk-cost
effects using Eyster's (2002) framework, in which households have a taste for rationalizing their
past actions. The model clarifies the interpretation of our results and its dependence on our key
assumptions. At the end of the section, we discuss how our results would generalize to alternative
models of sunk-cost psychology.
3.1 Material Payoffs
We will consider household behavior in some number of periods indexed by t. In each period t,
each household i must decide whether to purchase Clorin and, if so, whether to use it in their
drinking water. In period t, each household i can decide to purchase Clorin for an exogenous,
possibly household-specific offer price pit E (0, R] , where R > 0 is the retail price of Clorin. If the
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household decides to buy Clorin, it may receive an exogenous discount, so that it will only have to
pay the transaction price Pit E [O,pt]. We assume that households do not anticipate the possibility
of a discount, or, equivalently, that they consider the probability of a discount after purchase to be
negligible.
We experimentally manipulate the prices faced by households in a particular period t'. For
simplicity, we will assume that in all previous and subsequent periods, Clorin retails at R, and
there are no discounts. That is, we assume that, in any period t $ t', pt = Pt = R. In period
t', however, prices pit' and pt, are randomly assigned across households in a manner specified in
section 4 below. We will also assume for simplicity that the utility from using Clorin in a given
period is independent of its use in previous or future periods. 11
We will think of a period as approximately one month, about the time it takes to use up a
bottle of Clorin in drinking water for a family of six. We assume that Clorin cannot be stored
across periods. Chemically, Clorin is storable, but in practice the vast majority of households in
our sample appear to have exhausted the Clorin we sold them within the six weeks of our follow-
up period. This suggests that it is reasonable to focus on within-period use. Implicitly, we are
thereby assuming that if a household buys Clorin in some period and does not use it in drinking
water, it is exhausted in some other way. Field interviews we conducted after our study suggest
a plausible account is that households use Clorin to undertake household chores such as bleaching
sheets, washing vegetables, and cleaning toilets (see section 4.5).12
In each period, each household makes two decisions. First, the household must decide whether
to buy Clorin. Then, if the household has purchased Clorin, it must decide whether to use Clorin
in its drinking water. We let bt E {0, 1} be an indicator for whether household i buys Clorin
in period t. We let dit E {0, 1} denote whether household i puts Clorin in its drinking water in
1 1 Together, these assumptions mean that when we consider the effect of an increase in the offer price pt,, we ignore
cross-channel substitution (households buying from our door-to-door marketers who would otherwise have bought
in a store) and intertemporal substitution (households buying from us who would otherwise have bought at a later
time). The demand elasticities we estimate in our experiment are therefore unlikely to generalize (quantitatively) to
a permanent, market-wide change in the retail price R.
12 If our data are misleading, and in fact many households store and defer use of Clorin in drinking water, this force
would reduce the power of our experimental tests to detect sunk-cost effects. In the model below, sunk-cost effects
arise because households view it as a mistake to have purchased Clorin when they do not use it in their drinking
water. In a model with storability, sunk-cost effects of the sort we test for would instead require that households view
it as a mistake to have purchased Clorin when they do not use it in their drinking water in the period immediately
following purchase.
period t, with dst = 0 whenever b2t = 0. We assume these decisions are made sequentially, so that
the decision to purchase is fixed when the household chooses whether to use Clorin in its drinking
water. Consistent with the discussion above, we can think of dt = 0 as performing household
chores (other than purifying drinking water), which, as seems reasonable, we assume is possible
with or without Clorin.
To apply Eyster's (2002) framework, we need to specify both material payoffs and utility, the
latter incorporating the psychological desire to rationalize past choices. We begin by specifying the
material payoff function, which we normalize so that the payoff from not buying Clorin is 0.
Households differ in the benefits and costs of using Clorin in their drinking water. We will write
the net material payoff (in Kwacha) to household i from buying Clorin and using it in its drinking
water in period t as v' + EZt - % t. Here, v, captures factors that are constant over time for a given
household and are known at the time of purchase, and Et captures time-varying shocks unknown
at the time of purchase.
Formally, we assume that v, is distributed i.i.d. across households, that Eit is distributed i.i.d
across households and time periods, and that v, and Et are independent of one another and of
offer and transaction prices Pt and pt (the last condition being maintained by experimental ran-
domization). Consistent with the interpretation of Et as an unanticipated shock, we will normalize
E (CEt) = 0. To simplify exposition, we assume that both v, and cEt are distributed according to
(possibly different) differentiable CDFs with full support on the real line, and that v, has finite
mean.
The terms v, and Et are general enough to accommodate a range of factors. For example, Clorin
is used when the household obtains water from its local source, and hence its use requires attention
from the female head of household at that time. In some households, the female head may have
many other chores to complete when obtaining water, making it hard to put Clorin in at the right
time (low v,), whereas in others the female head may have few other responsibilities coincident
with obtaining water (high v,). In addition, for a given household, variation in the household's
day-to-day needs may lead to higher (low eat) or lower (high eit) demands on the female head's
attention when she obtains water, affecting the incentive to use Clorin.13
13 Many other interpretations are possible. For example, households may differ in their general level of concern
about water-borne illness, inducing variation in v,. After purchase, some households may hear about an especially
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To complete the specification of payoffs we must specify the payoff to buying Clorin and then
not using it in drinking water, using it instead for household cleaning. In that case, the benefit
of Clorin is the market value of the standard household cleaners whose use is offset by Clorin.
That interpretation suggests a small return from using Clorin for non-drinking-water purposes. For
example, data from a 2006 survey of retail prices show that the sodium hypochlorite in a bottle
of Clorin can be obtained from Jik, a more concentrated household bleach, for about 300 Kw. 14
Moreover, our field experience suggests that households find products like Jik to be more effective
cleaners, suggesting that 300 Kw of Jik may deliver even more than one Clorin bottle's worth
of cleaning power. Given the small benefit to Clorin not used in drinking water, we assume for
simplicity that the material payoff to buying Clorin and not using it in drinking water is -Pit,
implying that no household would buy Clorin if it were not possible to use it in drinking water.
Although that assumption is extreme and unlikely to hold exactly for all households, it seems likely
to be a reasonable approximation on average, based both on the calculations above and on our
conversations with female heads of household. 15
To summarize, we can specify an (ex-post) material payoff function u (bt, dt; t, v%, et) that
relates choices to payoffs as a function of household characteristics and the transaction price:
U (0, 0; At, V2 , e2 t) = 0
u(1, 0; t, ,=Et) -Pit
u(1,1; 3 2t,v , Ett) = i+ Ezt - t
(Recall that dt = 0 whenever bt = 0, so u (0, 1; Pt, va, e~t) is undefined.)
bad local incident of child diarrhea, leading to a high Et. Or they may hear that diarrhea episodes have been rare
recently, leading to a low et.
'
4 As of the 2006 retailer survey, a 750ml container of Jik, consisting of 3.5% sodium hypochlorite, retailed for a
median of 7,000 Kw. A 250ml bottle of Clorin, consisting of 0.5% sodium hypochlorite, retailed for a median of 800
Kw. The amount of sodium hypochlorite in a container of Jik is therefore equivalent to the amount found in about
21 bottles of Clorin, so 333 Kw of Jik buys as much sodium hypochlorite as one bottle (800 Kw) of Clorin. Note
that this calculation ignores the convenience of Clorin's smaller size (and hence lower price per sales unit). Recall,
however, that a week's supply of cooking oil for a household costs about 4,800 Kw, suggesting that 7,000 Kw is not
a prohibitive outlay.
1 5If the assumption were to fail, then the sunk-cost effects we derive below would operate only over the range of
transaction prices Pt above the cost savings from using Clorin as a household cleaner.
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3.2 Utility and Regret
To allow for psychological effects of prices, we will suppose that households have a taste for con-
sistency, i.e. for taking actions in the present that rationalize their past choices. Following Eyster
(2002), we implement this assumption by positing that realized household utility U (bit, d,t; P,t, v,, Et)
depends both on ex-post material payoff and on a regret function:
U (bit, dtt; APt, v,, eit) u- (bit, dit; Pt, vt, eit) - pr (btt, dtt; Pt, ve, E t) (1)
where r () denotes regret and p > 0 indexes the importance of regret in the household's utility
function.
We refer the reader to Eyster (2002) for a more careful exposition of the regret function. For-
mally, it is defined as follows
r (bt, d7t; P, v, t) u (b (dit; ,, v., E), dt; At VI, t) - u (bt, dt; ?t v, it) (2)
where
b (dt; kPt, v , et) = arg max {u (b, d,t; Pt, v, Ezt) } .b
Informally, given an action pair, regret is how much better the household's material payoff would
be if it could re-choose its first stage action taking its second stage action, and the realization of
et, as given. 16 Households prefer to avoid regret, i.e. to choose actions that limit the harm done
by their past choices given their current ones.
The definition in (2) implies that
r(0,0;Pt, v,, t) = 0 (3)
r (1, 0; Pt, v, Eit) = 0t
r (1,1; Pt, v, , Et) = 0.
16Note that, as we have defined it, regret depends on the realized transaction price 5,t, which is technically not
observed by non-purchasing households. However, because non-purchasing households do not make a use decision,
and because households are unaware of the possibility of a discount at the time of purchase, this is purely a notational
simplification, with no implications for behavior.
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That is, regret is experienced only when the household buys Clorin but does not use it in its
drinking water, and is felt in proportion to the amount spent on Clorin.
In the model, then, if a household knew for sure that it would not use Clorin to purify its drinking
water, it would not buy Clorin. Households buy Clorin because they may use it in drinking water,
but if circumstances are such that Clorin is not used in drinking water, the household regrets its
purchase, and the regret experienced is greater the more the household paid for Clorin. Households
may therefore be willing to use Clorin in drinking water to avoid regret, i.e. to rationalize the past
decision to buy.
3.3 Choice and Identification
We can now specify how the household chooses whether to purchase Clorin and, if so, whether to
use it in drinking water. Beginning with the use decision, if the household has purchased Clorin,
the use decision is given by d*t (nt, ve, E.t), where
d*t (pit, v , Eit) - arg max U (1, d; pt, vi, Et)d
This, in turn, implies that
d* (P3t,, t) =
V
, 
+ Ezt > -PPzt.
That is, the household will use Clorin in its drinking water if the net benefit of doing so exceeds
the regret associated with not doing so. (Note that we have assumed for simplicity that ties are
broken in favor of use.)
When households are deciding whether to purchase Clorin in the first place, they do not an-
ticipate the discount, and do not know the realization of the time-varying shock ezt. Therefore we
write the expected-utility-maximizing purchase decision as b* (Pet, vi), with
b* (Pzt, v,) - arg max EU (b, dt (pt, v , ext) ; pet, v., _Et)
b
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where the expectation is taken over the distribution of the shocks Et. It follows that
b* (Pt, v,) 1
E [max (v, + Et, -P 2 t) I v,Pit] > Pit
where we adopt the arbitrary rule that ties are broken in favor of purchasing.
Note that the household conditions its decision on the (known) household-specific benefit para-
meter v, and on the offer price pt. In particular, there exists a real-valued cutoff v* (pt), strictly
increasing in p,t, such that the household purchases if and only if v, > v* (pt). The proof of this
result is straightforward; economically, it follows from the fact that a higher v increases the antic-
ipated benefit from buying Clorin and a higher pi increases the anticipated cost (both financially
and psychologically).
Empirically, we do not observe the choice functions b* (pit, v,) and d* (P t, v2 , eit), but rather
the empirical frequencies of different choices as a function of the prices pt and ,t. To develop the
model's empirical predictions, then, it will be helpful to write out these probabilities:
Pr (b (p,t, v,) = 1 I pt, Pzt) = Pr (vi > v* (Pzt))
Pr (d *t (t, v, Et) = 1 I pit, 3t) = Pr (v + E6 t 2 -PPt | vi > v' (Pit))
where the second probability conditions on the decision to purchase Clorin.
In a non-experimental period t / t', p,t = lt = R, so there is no price variation and hence no
comparative statics to test. (The model does imply restrictions on the relationship between prices
in the experimental period and use in non-experimental period, which we explore in appendix A.)
In the experimental period t', by contrast, the above equations have two important empirical
implications about the relationship between prices and use. 17
* The first, which we call the screening effect, is that, conditional on purchase, the probability
17A third, more obvious, implication is that the greater is the price of Clorin, the fewer households will purchase
it. Note that this result comes both from the traditional substitution effect, and from the fact that a higher price
implies greater anticipated regret in the case in which Clorin is not used in drinking water.
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of use is higher the greater is pit'. This is because a higher pit, imposes a stricter (higher)
cutoff v* (pt') on anticipated benefits for buyers.
* The second, which we call the sunk-cost effect, is that, conditional on purchase, the probability
of use is increasing in the transaction price pzt, whenever p > 0. This is because a greater
transaction price implies a greater desire to rationalize the purchase decision (or, equivalently,
greater regret from not using Clorin in drinking water).
Observe that these two effects cannot be distinguished if transaction prices cannot vary indepen-
dently of offer prices. If pt, = &Pt' for all i in some period t, then a finding that higher prices causes
more drinking water use conditional on purchase would be consistent with the presence of either
the sunk-cost effect (p > 0) or the screening effect (heterogeneity in v,), or both.' 8 Hence, the
two-stage pricing design solves an identification problem that would be present in data with only
a single price, even if that price were suitably exogenous.
It is worth noting that, although Eyster's model is the most fully articulated single-agent theory
of sunk-cost effects of which we are aware, reasonable alternatives exist with possibly different
empirical implications. For example, if sunk-cost effects were driven by a desire to justify the ex
ante wisdom of one's decision, rather than ex post wisdom of one's decision as in Eyster's framework,
it is possible that the offer price, rather than the transaction price, would influence use behavior. 19
Such effects would confound our tests. 20 On the other hand, Thaler's (1980) prospect-theoretic
justification for sunk-cost effects hinges on a desire to avoid a feeling of loss experienced when one
18 Note that the psychology of regret is also relevant for the magnitude of the screening effect, as the parameter p
partially determines the degree of price sensitivity in the purchase decision.
19 Sunk-cost effects could also operate through a desire to justify the purchase to another member of the household,
rather than to oneself (Prendergast and Stole, 1996). In that case, whether the offer or transaction price would influ-
ence use behavior through the sunk-cost mechanism would depend on the informational conditions in the household.
Because only the offer price is known to the buyer at the time of the purchase decision, a fully informed household
member would judge the intelligence of the decision based on the offer price. However, because only the transaction
price is actually implemented, it may be more observable to other members of the household than the offer price. In
that case, higher transaction prices would lead to greater use due to a desire to justify the purchase decision to other
household members, so our tests for sunk-cost effects would be valid.
2 0Another possible confound arises if use depends not on the transaction price itself but on the discount, i.e. the
difference between the offer and transaction prices. We find no evidence in our data of a relationship between use
and the relative size of the discount-that is, the difference between offer and transaction prices, divided by the offer
price. If instead psychological effects operate through the absolute (as opposed to relative) size of the discount (offer
price minus transaction price), the resulting model is collinear with those we estimate, and is therefore not identified.
If the effect of a greater discount is to increase use, then our estimates will tend to overstate the screening effect
and to understate the sunk-cost effect. If greater discounts tend to decrease use, our estimates will understate the
screening effect and overstate the sunk-cost effect.
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does not realize consumption gains from a past purchase. In such a model transaction prices likely
would mediate the effect, suggesting that our tests may be valid under mechanisms other than the
one we model explicitly.
4 Experimental and Survey Design
Our main study consisted of a baseline survey, a randomized door-to-door marketing intervention
approximately two weeks later, and a follow-up survey approximately two weeks after the interven-
tion. We also conducted a second, longer-term follow-up survey, and a small-scale interview study
(on a different sample) to assess non-drinking-water uses of Clorin. 21
4.1 Baseline Survey Procedures and Sample Selection
We fielded our baseline survey to 1, 260 households in Lusaka, Zambia in May, 2006. To select house-
holds, we first selected five low-income peri-urban areas ("compounds").22 Because we wanted to
sample a population whose water source had limited chlorination (to maximize the health benefits
of Clorin), we avoided compounds close to the main water line in Lusaka. We also avoided com-
pounds where we knew that NGOs were (or had recently been) distributing Clorin for free from
door to door. Our interviews focused on female heads of household, because prior experience (later
confirmed by our baseline data) suggested that they play a central role in decision-making about
purchases of Clorin, and are typically the household members responsible for putting Clorin in
the water. 23 To minimize our influence on participants' behavior, our baseline survey instrument
informed participants that we might return for a follow-up interview, but it did not specify the
time or nature of that interview, nor did it state that such an interview was certain to occur.
The survey interview was divided into several sections. First, we asked for a variety of basic
demographic information, such as age, marital status, schooling levels, fertility history, household
composition, and ownership of various durable goods (as a proxy for wealth or income). We then
21 Our three survey instruments, and our marketing script, are available as a supplemental appendix to this paper.
22Within the five compounds we chose, we sampled 10 randomly chosen standard enumeration areas (SEAs) for
surveying. Within each SEA, we sampled one out of every five households until the target of 252 households was
reached for the compound.
23At each household, the surveyor asked to speak with the female head of household, and if there was no one home
or the female head was unavailable, the surveyor returned later that day to complete the survey. If the female head
of household could not be reached on that day, the house was skipped.
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asked a range of questions about media exposure, malaria knowledge, and behaviors related to
malaria prevention. These questions served to make the purpose of our study less transparent to
the interviewee. Finally, we asked several sets of questions related to water use practices, diarrhea,
soap use, attitudes toward and use of water purification techniques, access to water sources, and
detailed questions on the use of Clorin.
Appendix table 1 compares average demographic characteristics of the households in our baseline
sample to Lusaka residents sampled in the 2001 Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) of Zambia
(<http://www.measuredhs.com/>). The characteristics are broadly comparable between the two
samples. Because we interviewed the female head of household, our respondents tend to be slightly
older and more likely to be married than the DHS respondents. The households in our baseline
sample also have slightly lower levels of durables ownership than those in the DHS data, probably
because of our insistence on sampling low-income compounds without access to the main Lusaka
water line.
4.2 Measuring Clorin Use and Water Chlorination
Our primary survey measure of Clorin use is the household's (yes or no) response to whether its
stored drinking water is currently treated with Clorin. We complement this subjective measure
with an objective estimate of the chemical concentration of chlorine in the household's drinking
water. In the last part of the interview, the surveyor put a small amount of household drinking
water (usually stored in a large plastic jug) into a Styrofoam cup, and inserted a chemical test
strip into the cup. After exposure to water, areas of the test strip change color based on chlorine
concentrations in the water. We used the Sensafe Waterworks 2 test strip,24 which tests for both
free chlorine radicals (chlorine available to kill pathogens) and total chlorine (free chlorine plus
chloramines, a by-product of chlorine combining with organic compounds).25 We focus on free
chlorine, because our own experimentation, as well as conversations with the manufacturer, suggest
that the free chlorine measurement is more reliable and less sensitive to variation in test conditions
24The Sensafe Waterworks 2 test strip is Industrial Test Systems part number 480655. See
<http://www.sensafe.com/> for corporate information and <http://www.sensafe.com/480655.php> for additional
information about the test strip.
25See chapters 13 and 14 of Hauser (2002) for more information on chlorine chemistry and chlorine testing.
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(such as light and heat) than measurement of total chlorine. 26 The test strip identifies seven possible
concentrations of free chlorine: 0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.5, 1, 2.5, and 5 parts per million. 27
It is worth noting that chlorination and Clorin use in drinking water are not identical concepts,
even though they are closely related. A household could have chlorine in its water without using
Clorin: water from some taps is (often inconsistently) chlorinated. And, if a household's drinking
water is highly contaminated to start out, then it is possible to use a low dose of Clorin without
leaving any detectable free chlorine residual in the water. Nevertheless, as expected, measured
chlorination is highly related to self-reported use of Clorin, and a Pearson X2 test definitively
rejects the independence of the two distributions (p - value < 0.001). Among the 21 percent of
households that report that their water is currently treated with Clorin, more than 60 percent
have at least some free chlorine, whereas this figure is below 40 percent for the households that
report that their water is not currently treated with Clorin. Indeed, levels of free chlorine of 2.5
and 5 parts per million are only found in households that report that their water is treated with
Clorin. In order to limit sensitivity to these rare outliers, we follow Parker et al. (2006) in using in
our analysis a binary measure of the presence of free chlorine (free chlorine levels of 0.1 parts per
million or greater).28 In the baseline survey, 41 percent of the households have at least 0.1 parts
per million of free chlorine in their water.
4.3 Door-to-Door Marketing Experiment
For our marketing experiment, we sent a team of six marketers out in May and June of 2006 to
the 1, 260 households from the baseline survey. 29 The marketing was designed to occur about two
weeks after the household was surveyed for the baseline, but actual lag times varied due to variation
in logistical factors such as the difficulty of contacting the original survey respondents. 30
26 Using total chlorine in place of free chlorine in our analysis results in stronger evidence of a screening effect and
no evidence of a sunk-cost effect.
27For reference, U.S. drinking water guidelines typically call for a minimum free chlorine residual
of 0.2 parts per million and a maxzzmum total chlorine concentration of 4 parts per million. (See
<http://www.epa.gov/safewater/mcl.html>, <http://www.nps.gov/public_health/inter/faqs/faq_dw.htm#3>.)
Note, however, that smaller amounts of free chlorine residual still afford some protection against contamination.
28 Our substantive conclusions are unchanged (estimates are identical in direction and statistical significance) when
we instead estimate ordered probit models using the level of free chlorine as the dependent variable. See appendix B
for details
29 Marketers were paid on a fixed rate per day worked.
3
"If the marketers found a house but there was no one home, they returned at least three times on two different
days to try to contact the original respondent. If someone was home but it was not the female head of household
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After making contact with the female head of household, the marketers followed a written
script. 31 The marketer offered to sell a single bottle of Clorin for a one-time-only price. This
initial offer price was chosen randomly, with 10 percent of households receiving an offer price of
800 Zambian Kwacha (Kw), and the remaining 90 percent split as evenly as possible among offer
prices of 300, 400, 500, 600, and 700 Kw. (See table I for exact proportions.) The marketing
script for each household specified the initial offer price to be charged, allowing us to control the
randomization directly, and ensuring that the marketers had no discretion in setting this price.
If the respondent agreed to buy at the initial offer price, the marketer informed her that she
might be eligible for an additional discount.32 The respondent was given a sealed envelope, which
contained a coupon offering a one-time discounted price on the bottle of Clorin.33 Using a sealed
envelope allowed us to control the amount of the discount, and to prevent the marketer from
signaling the discount using body language or other cues. 34  After the respondent opened the
envelope, the respondent paid for the bottle of Clorin, wrote the amount of the transaction price
on a receipt, and signed it. 35 After that, the marketing session ended.
To make the transaction price as psychologically salient as possible, marketers were trained to
offer the discount before the respondents went to retrieve the cash payment, so that the respondents
would count out only the amount of money needed to pay the transaction price. Showing the amount
of the transaction price on the face of the coupon (see appendix figure 1) and requiring participants
to write the transaction price on a receipt also served this purpose. We expected these measures
named in the baseline survey, they made an appointment to return when the female head would be home.
3 1 In principle, marketers' tone or body language could have differed with the offer price, confounding our estimates
of treatment effects. During training exercises, and during a small number of supervised transactions, we observed
no indications of variation in body language or tone related to offer prices. Marketers commonly did not look at the
offer price before beginning the script. All our key results are robust to marketer fixed effects, and our data show no
evidence of differential treatment effects by marketer (see appendix B).
32 If the respondent agreed to buy at the initial offer price, but did not have the necessary cash on hand, the
marketer offered to reschedule, and returned to complete the script at the arranged date and time. Our findings are
robust to excluding households that requested a return visit due to a lack of cash on hand.
33 None of the participants who were prepared to pay the initial offer price subsequently refused to buy at the
discounted transaction price.
34 As we report in section 7, conditional on the offer price we find no evidence that household purchase decisions
were related to the transaction price, consistent with the intent of our design.
35 Use of a receipt allowed us to check that the marketers had complied with the instructions, and provided an
additional incentive for them to do so. Hand-checking of these receipts confirmed that different receipts from the
same marketer were in different handwriting, providing further evidence of the integrity of the marketing process. In
four cases, the marketer transacted at a price other than the one we specified due to human error, and in one case the
offer price was incorrect. In these cases, we will use the intended prices rather than the actual prices for the purposes
of our analysis, to ensure that these errors do not contaminate our findings. We note, however, that this choice does
not meaningfully affect our results.
to maximize the power of our tests for sunk-cost effects. 36
To minimize inference about the market price of Clorin based the offer and transaction prices,
the marketing script explicitly told respondents that Clorin was available in retail outlets for around
800 Kw.37 To minimize inference about the quality of the Clorin bottles on offer, marketers intro-
duced themselves as official representatives of SFH, the highly credible organization that produces,
distributes, and markets Clorin throughout Zambia.38
We also took steps to make the two-price structure seem as natural as possible. When asked
why they were offering Clorin at lower-than-normal prices, marketers explained that the price was
part of a special promotion. They used the same explanation to account for the additional discount
after the asking price was agreed upon. Door-to-door sales (and giveaways) are not unheard of
for products like Clorin, and participants seemed to accept this explanation. After we explained
that the initial offer price was a promotional price, participants rarely questioned the reason for
the discounted transaction price.
The size of the discount was chosen randomly, but every household received a discount of at
least 100 Kw. We offered a discount to every household to avoid disappointing the respondents,
and to ensure that every household was exposed to the coupon (in case of any advertising effects
of the coupon itself). 39 Because we hypothesized that paying even a small amount might be very
different psychologically than paying nothing, we randomized the discounts so that, regardless of
the offer price, 40 percent of households received a 100% discount, and thus had a transaction price
of zero. For each offer price, we split the remaining 60 percent of households evenly among the set
of transaction prices that were above zero but at least 100 Kw below the offer price. (See table 1
for details.) So, for example, among households that were offered Clorin for 700 Kw, 40 percent
3 6 Some evidence indicates that we succeeded in making the transaction price salient. In the follow-up survey,
respondents were asked whether anyone had offered them Clorin for free in the last month. Among households that,
according to our records, received a free bottle (zero transaction price), some 60 percent report having received a
bottle for free, as against only 16 percent among those who did not receive a free bottle (transaction price above 0).
The difference between these two groups is highly statistically significant, and the presence of some positive responses
among those paying for Clorin seems plausibly attributable to recall error. We did not ask respondents to recall the
amount of the transaction price if they paid a positive price.
3 7Early pilot interviews suggested that most people in Lusaka are well aware of these prices.
"
38 Because surveyors introduced themselves as carrying out a health survey for a researcher at Harvard University,
having marketers identify themselves as representatives of SFH also provides greater confidence that behavior in
response to the marketing intervention is not driven by the belief that the experimental participants are "being
watched" (Levitt and List, 2007).
"This design choice represents a potentially important departure from Arkes and Blumer's (1985) design, in which
identification of sunk-cost effects relies in part on comparing those who received a discount to those who did not.
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were assigned a transaction price of 0 (a discount of 700 Kw), and 10 percent were assigned to a
transaction price of 100, 200, 300, 400, 500, and 600 Kw (discounts of 600, 500, 400, 300, 200, and
100 Kw, respectively).
We assigned the offer and transaction prices randomly prior to the marketing outings, so that
every household was assigned an offer price and a transaction price, even if we were unable to
reach the household during marketing. The randomization was fully stratified by compound, with
every compound receiving (up to integer constraints) the exact same mix of offer and transaction
prices. 40 At the time of randomization we used an F-test to verify that observable characteristics
were balanced across treatments, and, in a few cases, re-randomized when this was not the case. 4 1
Appendix table 2 presents regressions of treatment conditions on a range of household char-
acteristics measured in the baseline survey, with specifications that parallel our analysis of price
effects. In all cases, an F-test of the restriction that all covariates enter with a coefficient of zero
fails to reject at any conventional significance level, and the coefficients are generally individu-
ally statistically insignificant. Two exceptions are worth noting. First, among households reached
during marketing, baseline self-reported Clorin use is almost marginally statistically significantly
related to the offer price (p = 0.103). Second, among those who purchased Clorin in the marketing
phase, there is a statistically significant relationship between the transaction price and the chemical
presence of free chlorine in the baseline (p = 0.020), although the relationship with self-reported use
is insignificant and has the opposite sign. 42 (A dummy for whether the household paid a positive
transaction price is positively but not statistically significantly related to either self-reported Clorin
use or measured chlorination.) Our key results are fully robust to controls for baseline use.
40We made an effort to reach all sampled households in a given compound within a short period, so as to minimize
communication between households about the price randomization. Debriefing interviews after a pilot experiment
suggest that communication about the discounts was rare. As a further check on possible social effects of our price
manipulations, we have verified that a household's purchase and use decisions are uncorrelated with the offer and
transaction prices assigned to the closest neighboring household (results not shown).
41We conducted these balancing tests, separately by compound, on the sample of households surveyed in the
baseline. We could not conduct analogous tests for the balance of transaction prices on the sample of households
buying Clorin from us in the marketing phase, because we could not predict which households would be reached for
our marketing intervention, or which households would purchase Clorin.
42In the full sample, using soap after using the toilet (self-reported) is marginally statistically significantly negatively
related to the offer price (p = 0.054). Among buyers, an indicator for the female head of household having attended
school is marginally statistically significantly positively related to the positive price condition (p = 0.083), though our
measure of years of schooling is marginally significantly negatively related to the positive price condition (p = 0.087),
suggesting no consistently signed relationship with schooling levels.
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4.4 Follow-up Survey
For our follow-up survey, we sent the original survey teams to find and re-interview the households
that we successfully reached for the marketing intervention. 43 We re-interviewed households ap-
proximately two weeks after the marketing intervention, but actual lags varied due to logistical
factors. 44 We chose the timing of this survey to fall in the middle of the period during which
households would be using the bottle of Clorin we sold them.
The follow-up interview consisted of several sections. First, we repeated a handful of demo-
graphic questions from the baseline survey, as a check on the identity of the respondents.45 Next,
we asked a variety of questions about health knowledge and attitudes, and hygiene practices. We
then asked a detailed set of questions about the household's use of Clorin, followed by questions
about whether the household had been visited by marketers at any point in the past. This question
served as an additional check on whether we had reached the correct household. After concluding
the questions on Clorin use, we tested the household's water, following the same procedure as in
the baseline survey. Finally, once we had concluded measurement of Clorin use and chlorination,
we asked several questions relating to sunk-cost psychology. We asked these questions at the end of
the survey because we did not want households' answers to these questions to affect their responses
about Clorin use.
We reached 890 households in the follow-up survey (out of the 1, 004 households that were
successfully reached during the marketing phase). Appendix table 3 presents some evidence on the
determinants of attrition. In the marketing phase, we were more successful in reaching households
that owned a larger share of the set of durables goods (car, radio, television) that we asked about,
4 3Because they were not exposed to our marketing experiment, we did not attempt to interview the households
that we did not reach during the door-to-door marketing. Note, however, that we interviewed households reached in
our marketing intervention whether or not they purchased Clorin from our marketing team.
44 If the surveyors found a house but there was no one home, they returned at least three times to contact the
original respondent. If someone was home but it was not the female head of household named in the baseline survey,
they made an appointment to return when the female head would be home. In cases where it proved exceedingly
difficult to reach the female head of household, the surveyor accepted another female adult household member as
an interviewee, and noted this adjustment in the questionnaire. This occurred in 58 cases, and our findings are not
substantively different when we restrict attention to the cases in which we successfully reinterviewed the original
respondent.
45Among the cases in which our records indicate that we successfully reinterviewed the original respondent, these
demographic characteristics are strongly correlated between the baseline and follow-up surveys, with (highly statis-
tically significant) correlation coefficients of 0.94 - 0.97. (The demographic characteristics are inconsistent between
the baseline and follow-up surveys in 8 percent of cases.)
114
most likely because wealthier households tended to be in more developed sections of the compounds
and were therefore easier to locate. 4 6 In the follow-up survey, attrition was still related to observ-
ables, though less so than in the marketing phase. Most importantly, at neither stage is the offer
or transaction price related to the likelihood of attrition. This provides some reason to believe
that our experimental results are not confounded by differential sample selection across treatment
conditions.
4.5 Additional Survey Data
We will test for screening and sunk-cost effects by relating use measured at follow-up to offer and
transaction prices. In order for this to constitute a valid test of the model, the follow-up period must
correspond to the experimental period t'. This means that the Clorin we sold during the marketing
intervention was in use at the time of the follow-up. To check this, we asked our surveyors at
follow-up to identify the bottles of Clorin we had sold, which we had marked on the bottom with
an "X." In nearly 80 percent of the cases in which our records indicate that the household purchased
Clorin, the surveyors were able to identify the marked bottle among the household's inventory of
Clorin bottles. Among households in which the surveyors identified the bottle we sold, in the vast
majority of cases (nearly 80 percent) the bottle was partly, but not completely, full. In addition
to confirming our expectations regarding the rate of exhaustion of Clorin, this evidence serves to
mitigate concerns about inter-household transfer or resale of bottles.47
The model also assumes that Clorin not used in drinking water is used in some other way, rather
than being stored for later use. We can bring some evidence to bear on this issue. We fielded a
second follow-up survey so that, if we did find evidence of sunk-cost effects, we would be able to
study whether they persisted after households had exhausted the bottle we sold them. Interviews
occurred approximately six weeks after the marketing intervention, although actual lags varied due
to logistical factors.4 8 Consistent with the model's assumptions, surveyor inventories conducted at
4 6Wealthier households were also more likely to have address plates on their homes (rather than having their
address written on the door or outside walls), which helped the survey team to locate the address. Households in the
fifth locality we surveyed were also significantly more likely to be reached, probably because that compound had a
more organized system of household addresses than the other compounds.
4 7In the short survey we describe below, only 6 percent of households report ever giving Clorin away.
4 8We used a survey instrument similar to that from the first follow-up. We successfully contacted approximately
80 percent of households for the second follow-up, significantly lower than the 89 percent recontact rate from the
first follow-up. (As in the first follow-up, we attempted to contact only those households that had been successfully
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second follow-up showed that in over 80 percent of households the bottle we sold was either absent
(76 percent of households) or empty (6 percent).
In our discussion of the model, we interpret a household that buys Clorin and does not use
Clorin in its drinking water as having used Clorin for household chores. For additional evidence
on the plausibility of this assumption, we turn to evidence from a series of in-depth interviews
we conducted on a convenience sample of 49 Clorin-using female heads of household from four
compounds in Lusaka, over six days in January and February 2008.4 9 From pilot interviews we
identified a set of chores in which Clorin was sometimes used. For each chore, an interviewer
discussed with the respondent how she did the chore and whether she used Clorin at any point.
If the respondent indicated that she used Clorin in doing the chore, the interviewer asked her to
demonstrate how much Clorin she used (with a Clorin bottle filled with water). The interviewer then
measured the amount with a measuring cup. Interviewees report substantial non-drinking water use
of Clorin. Some 61 percent of households report using Clorin for purposes other than drinking water
purification (96 percent report using it in drinking water). The most common reported alternative
use was washing clothes, followed by cleaning toilets. According to our measurement exercise, these
uses often involve substantial amounts of Clorin. Accounting for the relative frequency of different
types of uses, we estimate that, among the respondents we interviewed, the average household
devotes 38 percent of Clorin by volume to non-drinking-water uses. 50 This finding suggests that
our interpretation of non-drinking-water use as use in household chores is at least quantitatively
plausible.
5 Evidence on Screening Effects
In this section, we test for a screening effect: namely, that the higher is the offer price, the greater
is the propensity to use Clorin in drinking water among those who buy. The model predicts such
effects because households have information about their likelihood of using Clorin in drinking water,
contacted during the marketing intervention.)49Interviewers collected data on age and years of schooling to test comparability with ever-users of Clorin in our
baseline survey. Means of the two variables are broadly comparable between the two samples, with the interview
survey sample somewhat more educated than the baseline sample.
50 In our original follow-up survey, about one-fifth of households report using Clorin for non-drinking-water purposes,
substantially below the figure we found in our interviews. A plausible account of the discrepancy is that we took
greater care in the in-depth interviews to list comprehensively the chores in which Clorin might be used.
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and they use this information in making their purchase decisions. Hence, households that are less
likely to use Clorin in drinking water are willing to pay less to buy it, and are therefore less common
in the pool of buyers the greater is the offer price.
A prerequisite for such an effect is that offer prices affect purchasing behavior. Figure 2 shows
the effect of offer price on the propensity to buy Clorin during our door-to-door intervention. The
figure shows a downward-sloping relationship between offer price and the share purchasing Clorin,
with nearly 80 percent of respondents buying Clorin at 300 Kw and only about 50 percent buying
at 800 Kw. Column (1) of table 2 presents an estimate of a linear probability model of demand
as a function of the offer price. 5 1 The model implies that an increase of 100 Kw in the offer price
would result in a (highly statistically significant) 7 percentage point reduction in the probability
of purchase, corresponding to an economically nontrivial price elasticity (evaluated at the mean
offer price and purchase probability) of about -0.6.52 Columns (2) and (3) of table 2 show that
the results in column (1) are robust to adding baseline controls, and to restricting to households
reached in the follow-up survey, respectively.
As a first test for the screening effect, figure 3 shows coefficients from a regression of self-
reported use among buyers on dummies for offer price, controlling for transaction price fixed effects
to hold constant any psychological effects. Consistent with a screening effect, the figure shows an
upward-sloping relationship between offer price and the likelihood of use among buyers.
Table 3 presents more parametric estimates of the effect of raising the offer prices on the
propensity to use Clorin in drinking water among buyers. We estimate linear probability models
relating the probability of use (both self-reported and measured) to offer prices, with transaction
price fixed effects in all specifications to control for any sunk-cost effects. 5 3 The regressions in
panel A of the table show that, conditional on transaction price, an increase of 100 Kw in the offer
price leads to a statistically significant 3 to 4 percentage point increase in Clorin use among buyers,
corresponding to an economically nontrivial usage elasticity (at the mean price and usage) of 0.3
51Adding a quadratic term in offer price does not improve the model's fit, suggesting that, within the range of
experimental variation, there are no detectable nonlinearities in demand. Estimated marginal effects from probit
models are virtually identical to those reported in table 2 (see appendix B).
52The regression has a constant of about 0.96, indicating that the model predicts that 96 percent of households
would accept a free Clorin giveaway delivered to their door. This estimate is statistically indistinguishable from unity,
which is consistent with our a priori intuition that few households would turn down a free bottle of Clorin.
53Probit models of use yield nearly identical estimates. Our results are also robust to allowing for interactions
between offer and transaction prices in affecting Clorin use. See appendix B for details.
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to 0.4.
In principle, there are two possible reasons for our finding that higher offer prices lead to
greater use among buyers. The first is that higher offer prices select buyers whose observable
characteristics-education, wealth, etc.-are predictive of Clorin use. The second is that higher
prices select buyers with a greater unobservable (to the econometrician) propensity to use. In
addition to its intrinsic relevance to the economics of private information, separating these two
mechanisms is potentially important for policy, because if the screening effect is driven largely by
selection on observables, the targeting effects of pricing may be largely achievable through programs
that target distribution of Clorin based on observable demographics.
In panel B of table 3, we test between these explanations, by re-estimating the specifications of
panel B, but including as covariates a vector of household demographic characteristics measured as
of our baseline survey.54 These demographics are of the sort that might be available in a detailed
household census. The coefficients on offer price in panel B are only about 10 percent smaller than
those in panel A, indicating that the vast majority of the screening effect we estimate is driven by
higher prices selecting buyers with a relatively high unobservable propensity to use Clorin.
Note that, in contrast to a typical randomization-based regression, asking how including observ-
ables affects the coefficient of interest in table 3 is not a test of the validity of our randomization.
This is because the regressions in table 3 are run condstonal on purchase, rather than uncondi-
tionally, so that we are asking how correlated are observables with offer prices conditional on the
decision to buy. Recall, however, that a nearly marginally significant relationship between offer
price and baseline use is visible in the balancing tests in appendix table 2. We have therefore
confirmed (results not shown) that screening effects are comparable in magnitude and statistical
significance to those in panel A of table 3 when we include the entire range of baseline character-
istics in the model, including baseline use. We use the more restricted set of characteristics in the
table to more accurately represent the types of household data that might plausibly be available
to marketers of Clorin. (We have also re-estimated our screening model dropping households that
had Clorin at home as of the baseline, and find, if anything, stronger evidence of screening effects
4
"Note that 9 respondents refused to answer one or more demographic survey questions. To verify that the slight
difference in sample composition between panels A and B does not explain the difference in coefficients, we have
re-estimated the specifications in panel A of table 3, excluding the 9 observations with missing values of one or more
demographic characteristics, and find virtually identical results, as expected.
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on the restricted sample. See appendix A for details.)
The findings in table 3 imply that a household's willingness-to-pay is informative about its
propensity to use Clorin, over and above what is available in a vector of household demographics.
A related (but different) question is whether demographics are more or less predictive of use than
willingness-to-pay. This is similar to asking whether a model relating use to demographics has a
higher or lower R 2 than a model relating use to willingness-to-pay. In practice, however, because
we do not observe willingness-to-pay directly, comparing the fit of these two models using R 2 is not
possible. An alternative approach, which we adopt, is to ask whether a hypothetical distribution of
Clorin in which it is given to the households with the highest predicted use (based on demographics)
achieves more or less use among recipients than an equivalently selective pricing scheme (i.e., a
pricing scheme that distributes Clorin to an equal number of households).
To implement this comparison, we first estimate a linear probability model relating use among
buyers to our set of household demographics. From this model, we obtain a predicted use se
for each household i. Let x (7) be the percent of households buying at offer price r predicted by
the demand model in column (1) of table 2. After ranking households by predicted use u'se, we
calculate, for each offer price qj, the share of buyers reporting use at follow-up among the house-
holds in the top x (7r) percent by predicted use. This allows us to compare the top households by
willingness-to-pay and the top households by predicted use at the same percentiles of the respective
distributions. For example, at an offer price of 300 Kw, our demand model predicts that 76 percent
of households will buy. We therefore compute reported Clorin use among the top 76 percent of
buyers, ranked according to predicted use. Appendix figure 2 shows the resulting usage rates by
offer price, normalized relative to the rate at 300 Kw. As the figure shows, the data exhibit signifi-
cantly more slope with respect to willingness-to-pay than with respect to household demographics.
The difference in observed use between buyers at 800 Kw and buyers at 300 Kw is more than four
times larger than the analogous difference between households categorized by predicted use.
Our data also allow us to study directly how the observable characteristics of buyers change with
the offer price (results not shown). In contrast to concerns that pricing leads to distribution to the
"richest of the poor," we do not find that buyers at higher prices are wealthier or more educated.
This result may of course be sensitive to our choice of a relatively inexpensive product. Using two
119
crude proxies for a household's potential for health gains from drinking water use-the number of
children below age 5 and a dummy for whether the female head of household is pregnant-we find
no evidence that those with greater potential for health gains have a greater willingness-to-pay for
Clorin. Again, this result must be taken with caution, as our survey was not designed optimally to
measure the propensity for health gains from drinking water use.
6 Evidence on Sunk-Cost Effects
In this section, we use variation in the transaction price to test for a sunk-cost effect. Sunk-
cost effects arise in our model because using Clorin in drinking water rationalizes the household's
decision to buy Clorin. Because the psychic cost of failing to rationalize the purchase decision is
greater the more costly was the purchase, the model predicts that the likelihood of use (conditional
on purchase) is rising in the transaction price, holding the offer price constant.
Figure 4 graphs the relationship between transaction prices and use at follow-up, holding con-
stant the offer price using fixed effects. The figure shows no consistent evidence that paying more
for Clorin increases use.
To test these hypotheses more formally, in table 4 we estimate regression models relating the
probability of Clorin use at follow-up to the transaction price, including offer price fixed effects
to control for differences in the composition of buyers at different prices. Because our analysis of
balance (in section 4) suggests the possibility that transaction prices are statistically related to
baseline use, we include a full set of baseline controls in all models.
In addition to testing for an effect of transaction prices on use, our data also allow us to relate
any effects we find to a crude measure of the household's psychological propensities. At the end of
our follow-up survey, we included a series of hypothetical choices designed to mirror the types of
questions frequently used to elicit sunk-cost effects in the existing literature:5 5
Suppose you bought a bottle of juice for 1,000 Kw. When you start to drink it, you
realize you don't really like the taste. Would you finish drinking it?
55We placed these questions at the end of the survey in case these questions revealed anything about the study's
hypotheses. Note that, in contrast to the most typical hypothetical-choice studies of sunk-cost effects, we employ
a within-subject, rather than between-subject design. We chose this approach because it allows us to more cleanly
classify households into "sunk-cost" and "non-sunk-cost" groups.
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Participants were able to answer yes or no, and could provide additional comments if they liked.
After this question, we asked two similar follow-up questions of all participants, one for the case
of a 5,000 Kw bottle of juice, and one for the case of a 500 Kw bottle.5 6 Consistent with existing
evidence, we find that households in our sample do display sunk-cost effects in their responses to
these questions, with over 20 percent of respondents reporting that they would finish the juice at
5,000 Kw but not at 1,000 Kw, or that they would finish it at 1,000 Kw but not 500 Kw. 57
Panel A of table 4 follows the model in testing for an effect of the transaction price on the
likelihood of Clorin use at follow-up (both self-reported and measured), holding the offer price
constant. Consistent with figure 4, there is no evidence of such an effect. Our point estimates (in
specifications 1A and 4A) indicate an effect of transaction price on use that is small in magnitude
and inconsistently signed. Our confidence intervals allow us to rule out positive effects on the
probability of use greater than 3.6 percentage points (self-reported use) or 1.9 percentage points
(measured use) per 100 Kw. These intervals rule out sunk-cost effects equal in size to the point
estimates of the screening effect that we report in table 3.55
In specifications (2A) and (5A) of table 4, we focus specifically on households that display
the sunk-cost effect in our hypothetical choice scenario, and again find statistically insignificant
point estimates with no consistent sign. The differences in coefficients between sunk-cost and non-
sunk-cost households are statistically insignificant and inconsistently signed, suggesting no clear
relationship between hypothetical choice behavior and the observed response to transaction prices.
Overall, then, our data do not provide evidence of sunk-cost effects as predicted by the model.
We also designed our randomization to test a secondary hypothesis, suggested to us by NGO
personnel, namely that paying something results in more drinking-water use than paying nothing.
In panel B of table 4, we estimate models paralleling those in panel A, using a dummy for whether
the household paid a positive transaction price as our key independent variable. As in panel A,
56 To isolate sunk-cost effects from informational effects of prices, the follow-up questions emphasized that the
juice in question was the same bottle of juice regardless of the price we specified. For example, the second question
asked "Now suppose you actually had paid 5,000 Kw for that bottle of juice...Would you finish drinking the bottle?"
Surveyors were instructed to emphasize the word that, thus stressing the fact that this question refers to the same
bottle as in the question about 1,000 Kw.
57 Twelve percent of respondents reported that they would finish drinking the juice if it cost 500 Kw, as against 14
percent who said they would finish it had it cost 1,000 Kw, and 32 percent who said they would finish drinking it at
5,000 Kw. The differences among these groups are all highly statistically significant in paired t-tests.
58 A formal test of the equality of the causal and screening effects, incorporating the statistical uncertainty in both
estimates, yields p-values of 0.233 (self-reported use) and 0.072 (measured use).
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we cannot rule out the null of no effect of the act of paying on drinking-water use. However, in
contrast to panel A, the point estimates in panel B are large and positive, and in general larger
among sunk-cost than non-sunk-cost households. Therefore, while our data show no evidence of an
effect of an act of paying, they are at least consistent with such an effect, suggesting the need for
further research. 59
7 Robustness and Interpretation
Below, we use several pieces of evidence from our study to test the validity of the maintained
assumptions of our model.
Effect of transaction przce on purchase decisions. It is crucial to the interpretation of our results
that households were not aware of their final transaction price when deciding whether to purchase
Clorin from us. We can test for such a lapse by asking whether transaction prices affected demand,
after controlling for the offer price. Estimates of a linear probability model of demand indicate
that, after controlling for offer price, a household's final transaction price had no statistical effect
on its propensity to purchase Clorin (results not shown). 60
Income effects of transaction prices. If paying more for Clorin reduced household wealth sig-
nificantly, this could in principle attenuate the sunk-cost effect (though not the screening effect).
As a simple test for this possibility, we have tested for sunk-cost effects among those in our sample
with above-median wealth (as proxied by durables ownership). Even among this group, there is no
evidence of a sunk-cost effect, providing further evidence that attenuation due to income effects is
unlikely to be a major confound. Relatedly, interaction regressions show no evidence that the effect
59 As a more direct test of the practitioner hypothesis that "when products are given away free, the recipient often
does not value them or even use them" (PSI, 2006), we have also split the sample according to respondents' self-
reported agreement with the statement that "I value something more if I paid for it." We find that the estimated
effect of paying a positive transaction price on Clorin use is far larger among those who report strong agreement with
the statement than those who do not, with the effect on self-reported use becoming statistically significant (p = 0.046)
in the sample of those reporting strong agreement (results not shown). In our second follow-up survey, we also find
some evidence of an effect of the act of paying on Clorin use, using a somewhat more precise measure of chlorination
(results not shown).
6"This lack of statistical significance is not due to a lack of power: an F-test definitively rejects the null hypothesis
of equal effects of offer and transaction prices (p < 0.001). We have also conducted this test separately for each of the
six marketers involved in our experiment. In no case is there a statistically significant negative effect of transaction
price on purchase probability. In one case, there is a marginally statistically significant positive effect (p = 0.095) of
transaction price on purchase probability. Such a finding is not surprising given that we execute six separate tests,
and the direction of the effect is not consistent with the idea that household demand responded to the transaction
price.
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of the transaction price differs with our proxy for household wealth. In addition to its relevance
for the issue of income effects, this test also provides some (admittedly crude) evidence against
the view that sunk-cost effects are present only when the amount at stake is large relative to the
household's income.
Informational effects of offer and transaction prices. If, despite our design precautions, higher
offer or transaction prices were taken to be evidence that Clorin is a better product, and favorable
beliefs induce more product use, then our estimates could be confounded. To test for such an effect,
we can take advantage of the presence in our follow-up survey of several measures of respondent
attitudes toward Clorin. In particular, the survey asks the respondent (on an agree/disagree scale)
whether water purification solution is easily available, whether it makes the water taste bad, and
whether it is an effective way to prevent diarrhea. None of these scales is statistically significantly
affected by either the offer or transaction price, and an index that averages all three is also unaffected
by our treatments. 6 1 Moreover, controlling for this index in our main specifications leaves our key
conclusions unchanged (see appendix B).
A related possibility is that households' beliefs about Clorin prices were impacted by our ex-
perimental treatment. To test for this confound, we asked Clorin buyers in the follow-up how much
they usually pay for a bottle of Clorin, and we asked those who reported not buying Clorin how
much they would expect to pay for a bottle. We find no effect of offer or transaction prices on
participants' responses to these questions. 62
Marginal cost fallacy. For the households in our survey, the marginal cost of using Clorin is
determined by the market replacement price, not by the transaction price. However, it may be that
households psychologically perceived the cost of using Clorin to be higher when their transaction
price was higher, which could attenuate sunk-cost effects and explain our failure to find an effect of
the amount paid. To assess this possibility, we included in our follow-up survey a question designed
to get at a household's propensity to behave in this way. In particular, we asked respondents to
6 1Among households that report never having used Clorin as of our baseline survey, who might be expected to
know the least about the product, there is no evidence of an effect of offer price on our aggregate quality index. We
do find some evidence that higher transaction prices (somewhat counterintuitively) worsen attitudes towards Clorin
on the sample of never-users, but this result is only marginally statistically significant (p = 0.089).
6 2 In the second follow-up survey, we asked all respondents how much they would expect to pay for a bottle of
Clorin in the future. We again find no statistically significant relationship between responses to this question and
the transaction price at which the household purchased Clorin.
evaluate the statement "When I buy something that is expensive, I try to use it sparingly," on an
agree/disagree scale. Comparing households that did and did not agree strongly with this statement
reveals no evidence that the effect of transaction price on use is higher for households that do not
agree with the statement (results not shown).
8 Conclusions
In this paper, we report evidence from a field experiment in Lusaka, Zambia, designed to test
the effect of prices on the use of Clorin, a socially marketed drinking water disinfectant. Our
experimental design permits us to separately test for two effects of prices: a screening effect (higher
prices change the mix of buyers), and a sunk-cost effect (higher prices induce greater use among
those who buy). We find strong evidence of screening effects: raising the price of Clorin attracts
buyers with a significantly greater propensity to use Clorin in their drinking water, indicating a
positive correlation between willingness-to-pay and the propensity to use Clorin in drinking water.
By contrast, we do not find evidence for sunk-cost effects: holding constant the distribution of
willingness-to-pay, raising the price at which a household transacts does not affect its propensity to
use Clorin in drinking water. Our results thus imply, at best, a limited role for sunk-cost effects in
the domain of health product use, while providing strong support for the hypothesis that households
have private information about their use propensities that is reflected in willingness-to-pay.
Our findings therefore cast doubt on justifications for health product pricing based on sunk-
cost effects, while suggesting a possible role for prices as an allocative tool. As we have stressed,
however, these implications must be taken with caution. They depend, in part, on the health (and
other) consequences of non-drinking-water uses of Clorin, which to our knowledge have not been
adequately explored in the medical literature. Moreover, while our study focuses on two important
channels through which pricing policy may influence the use of health products in developing
countries, we abstract from several others, most notably the informational role of prices in the
introduction of new goods, and the role of prices in permitting NGOs to access retail distribution
networks. Carefully evaluating the role of these channels remains an important area for future
research.
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A Appendix: Intertemporal Implications of the Model
In the model, realized transaction prices ipt, in period t' will not affect purchase or use behavior in
any period t t': sunk-cost effects are localized to the period in which the transaction occurs. The
model does, however, have implications for the relationship between offer prices pt' conditional
on purchase in period t' and purchase and use behavior in periods t : t'. In this appendix we
briefly summarize those implications. We also provide some empirical tests using data from our
baseline survey, reported in appendix table 4. The baseline period can be thought of as a reasonable
approximation to period t' - 1, in that any household owning Clorin as of the baseline survey would
have purchased it from a retailer (or health clinic)."6 It is worth noting, however, that we did not
design our study to test these intertemporal implications, so the evidence reported below should
be thought of as preliminary.
Begin by considering the relationship between purchase behavior in the experiment and purchase
behavior in non-experimental periods. The model predicts that households purchasing in period
t' are more likely to buy at other periods t 5 t', the greater is the offer price pit, in period t'. To
see this, observe that, for households that purchase in the experimental period t', we can write the
following for any non-experimental period t Z t':
Pr (b*t (R, v,) = 1 b,* (p,t,, v) = 1, , pt') = Pr (vi > v* (R) I v, 2 v* (Pit'))
with v* (R) > v* (pt'). Because v* () is increasing in pt,, it follows directly that, conditional on
purchase in period t', the probability of purchase in a period t $ t' is greater the greater is pt'.
Intuitively, the higher is a household's demonstrated willingness to pay in period t', the greater is
its likelihood of purchasing at the retail price in other periods. We present a test of this implication
in column (1) of appendix table 4. We measure purchase at baseline with an indicator for whether
our surveyor inventory indicates that the household had a non-empty Clorin bottle at the time of
the baseline survey. We find a marginally statistically significant positive relationship between offer
price and baseline purchase (conditional on purchase at the marketing stage), consistent with the
model.
Consider next the relationship between purchase behavior in the experiment and use behavior in
non-experimental periods. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the model predicts that, conditional on
purchase in the experiment and in a non-experimental period, the experimental offer price will be
unrelated to use in non-experimental periods. Formally, consider the expression for use conditional
on purchase in both the experimental period t' and some non-experimental period t = t':
Pr (d* (R, v, Est) = 1 b*t , (pzt,, v) = 1, R, pet,) = Pr (v, + Eit > -pR I v, > v* (R) A v, > v*' (pt'))
That is, the set of households purchasing at both time t and time t' are those for whom both
vi > v* (R) and v, > v* (pt'). However, because R > pt', v* (R) > v* (Pit'), so that the two
63It is also possible, in principle, to use data from our second follow-up survey to approximate purchase and use
behavior in period t' + 1. In practice, however, some households still had the Clorin they purchased from us as of the
second follow-up. (Removing those households from the data is problematic, because the fact that they did not exhaust
all their Clorin is endogenous to their use behavior ) Moreover, an analysis of survey attrition shows a marginally
statistically significant negative relationship between offer prices and the likelihood of contact in the second follow-up
survey (results not shown), suggesting further need for caution in interpreting experimental treatment effects from
the second follow-up survey. Nevertheless, we have conducted tests parallel to those in appendix table 4 using data
from our second follow-up. With the exception of the first implication (that offer price will be related to purchase
behavior at the second follow-up conditional on purchase at the marketing stage), the conclusions are identical.
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conditions collapse to a single one:
Pr (d*t (R, v,, Eit) = 1 1 b*t (it', v,) = 1, R, pit) = Pr (v, + ,t > -pR I v, > v* (R))
= Pr(d* (R, vi, E,t) = IR)
Therefore we predict no relationship between offer price at time t' and use behavior at time t $ t'.
Intuitively, this result comes about because anyone willing to pay R should also be willing to pay
Pit, < R, so that offer prices in the experiment convey no new information about the composition
of households purchasing in non-experimental periods. 64 Columns (2) and (3) of appendix table 4
present tests of this implication. Among those who had Clorin in their households as of the baseline
(our proxy for purchase at time t' - 1) and who purchased Clorin in the marketing stage (time t'),
there is no relationship between offer price and self-reported or measured use at baseline, consistent
with the model. The coefficients are small, negative, and statistically insignificant.
Finally, consider the reverse question of how purchase behavior in non-experimental periods
affects our predictions for use in the experimental period. Following a logic parallel to the preceding
argument, it is straightforward to show that, conditional on purchase in a non-experimental period,
there should be no relationship between offer price in the experimental period and use in the
experimental period, holding constant the transaction price. That is, the screening effect should
be absent for households that purchase in non-experimental periods. In equations, this is because:
Pr (di*t (At', v, Et) = 1 | Pt',!t', b*t (R, v,) = 1) = Pr (v, + Et > -PPt' I v, > v* (R) A v, > v* (Pt'))
= Pr (v, + Ezt > -PPit' I v, > v* (R)).
By contrast, households that did not purchase in non-experimental periods will still display the
screening effect, although with a different magnitude than the overall population:
Pr (dt, (It', vi, eit) = 1 I pi t', t,, b (R, v) = 0) = Pr (vi + eit > -PPit' I v* (Pt') < v, < v* (R)).
We test these implications in specifications reported in columns (4) through (7) of appendix table
4. Consistent with the model, among those who purchased at the marketing stage and had Clorin
at baseline, there is a statistically insignificant relationship between offer price and use at follow-up.
(We note, however, that due to small sample size our confidence intervals cannot rule out nontrivial
effects.) By contrast, among those who purchased at the marketing stage but did not have Clorin
in the home as of the baseline, there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between
offer price and use.
B Appendix: Additional Robustness Checks
Appendix table 5 checks the robustness of our key results to a number of alternative specifications.
For each alternative model, we show the effect of offer prices on purchase probabilities, the effect
of offer price on use among buyers, and the effect of transaction price (or a dummy for a positive
transaction price) on use among buyers. In specification (1), we reproduce the coefficients from our
main tables for comparison.
Specification (2) of appendix table 5 checks the robustness of our results to using a probit
64Our model assumes a constant willingness-to-pay over time. A model with time-varying shocks to c, that are
known in advance of purchase to the household could yield a positive relationship between use in non-experimental
periods and experimental offer price. However, given that the non-experimental periods we study are close in time
to the experimental period, constant willingness-to-pay over time may be a reasonable approximation.
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model of purchase and use, rather than a linear probability model. The table reports the estimated
marginal effects evaluated at the sample mean of the covariates. In all cases these estimates are
very similar to those we obtain in our main specification.
Specification (3) of appendix table 5 includes dummy variables for the six marketers we employed
to control for any marketer-specific effects on purchase or use. Because the assignment of marketers
is statistically unrelated to the price treatments, including these controls does not meaningfully
affect our results. As a further check on this issue, we have estimated models of demand and use
in which we interact our price treatments with marketer fixed effects (results not shown). In every
case, F-tests indicate that the marketer-price interactions are jointly statistically insignificant. Our
key results also survive (though with greater standard errors due to reduced sample size) when we
eliminate the data associated with each marketer, one marketer at a time (results not shown).
Finally, our results are robust to controlling for the date at which the household was reached by
our marketer (results not shown).
In specification (4) of appendix table 5, we check the robustness of our results to relaxing
the assumption that the effects of offer and transaction prices do not interact in determining the
probability of Clorin use. Specifically, we have re-estimated our key models of use, allowing the
effect of offer price to differ freely by transaction price, and allowing the effect of transaction price
to differ freely by offer price. By averaging the coefficients across these separate specifications, we
can obtain an estimate of the average effect of offer and transaction prices that does not restrict
the effect of one price to be independent of the other. The results are similar to those in the main
specification.
In specification (5) of appendix table 5, we control explicitly for an index of the respondent's
self-reported attitudes toward Clorin at follow-up (see section 7). Though this index could be
endogenous to our treatment conditions, including the index allows us to check whether any infor-
mational effects of prices might be confounding our estimates of the screening and sunk-cost effects.
Including this control does not meaningfully change any of our key coefficients.
Specification (6) of appendix table 5 presents a set of ordered probit models, using as a de-
pendent measure the amount of free chlorine in the household's drinking water as of the follow-up
survey. The direction and statistical significance of the ordered probit parameters are comparable
to those of the main specification. To permit a comparison of magnitudes, in square brackets we
report the implied marginal effect of a change in the key independent variable on the likelihood of
having at least some free chlorine. The implied marginal effects are quantitatively similar to those
in the main specification.
Specification (7) of appendix table 5 presents a set of ordered probit models, using as a depen-
dent measure an index of how recently the respondent reports putting Clorin in her household's
drinking water. 65 The estimates are similar to those of the main model in direction and statistical
significance. (A direct comparison of magnitudes is not possible because the dependent variable is
not in the same units as the coefficients in our main specification.)
6 5 In order of recency, the categories are: one week ago or more, between 48 hours and one week, between 24 and
48 hours, between 12 and 24 hours, between 6 and 12 hours, and within the last 6 hours.
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Figure 1 A bottle of Clorin
Figure 2 The effect of offer price on purchase of Clorin
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Offer price (Kw)
Notes: Figure shows share of households purchasing Clorin in door-to-door marketing intervention, at dif-
ferent offer prices (in Zambian Kwacha). Error bars reflect ±1 standard error.
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Figure 3 Usage rates of Clorin by offer price
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Notes: Figure shows coefficients from a regression of self-reported Clorin use at follow-up on dummies for
offer price, with fixed effects for transaction price, for those households that purchased Clorin in our door-
to-door marketing exercise. Coefficient on omitted category (offer price = 300 Kw) is normalized so that
predicted share at sample mean of offer price dummies is equal to the observed share using Clorin. Error
bars reflect +1 standard error.
133
Figure 4 Usage rates of Clorin by transaction price
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Notes: Figure shows coefficients from a regression of self-reported Clorin use at follow-up on dummies for
transaction price, with fixed effects for offer price, for those households that purchased Clorin in our door-to-
door marketing exercise. Coefficient on omitted category (transaction price = 0 Kw) is normalized so that
predicted share at sample mean of transaction price dummies is equal to the observed share using Clorin.
Cells with transaction price of 500, 600, and 700 Kw have been aggregated to improve precision. Error bars
reflect +1 standard error.
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Table 1 Distributwon of offer and transaction prices
Offer Price (Kw)
300 400 500 600 700 800 Total
Number of participants 226 227 227 227 227 126 1260
(percent of all participants) (17.94) (18.02) (18.02) (18.02) (18.02) (10.00) (100)
Transaction Price (Kw):
0 90 90 90 90 90 50 500
(39.82) (39.65) (39.65) (39.65) (39.65) (39.68) (39.68)
100 67 45 34 27 22 10 205
(29.65) (19.82) (14.98) (11.89) (9.69) (7.94) (16.27)
200 69 46 34 27 23 11 210
(30.53) (20.26) (14.98) (11.89) (10.13) (8.73) (16.67)
300 - 46 34 28 23 11 142
(20.26) (14.98) (12.33) (10.13) (8.73) (11.27)
400 - 35 27 23 11 96
(15.42) (11.89) (10.13) (8.73) (7.62)
500 28 23 11 62
(12.33) (10.13) (8.73) (4.92)
600 23 11 34
(10.13) (8.73) (2.7)
700 - 11 11
(8.73) (0.87)
Notes: The first section of the table shows the distribution of participants across offer prices, with percent of
total in parentheses. The remaining rows show the distribution of transaction prices conditional on a given
offer price, with conditional percentages in parentheses. For example, the cell listed under an offer price of
300 Kw and a transaction price of 200 Kw should be read to say that 69 households received an offer price
of 300 Kw and a transaction price of 200 Kw, and that these 69 households represent 30.53 percent of the
226 households receiving an offer price of 300 Kw.
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Table 2 Estzmates of the demand for Clormn
Dependent variable: Household purchased Clorin (dummy)
(1) (2) (3)
Sample All All Follow-up
Offer price -0.0664 -0.0653 -0.0708
(100 Kw) (0.0093) (0.0094) (0.0099)
Constant 0.9640 0.9578 0.9892
(0.0516) (0.0520) (0.0547)
Baseline controls? NO YES NO
Sample mean of dependent variable 0.6116 0.6111 0.6135
Number of observations 1004 990 890
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Estimates are from linear probability models. "Baseline controls"
includes baseline Clorin usage and water chlorination, general health behaviors and attitudes, household
demographics, and locality fixed effects, as in appendix table 2, standardized to have a sample mean of 0.
Fourteen households are missing data on one or more baseline controls due to questionnaire refusals. Column
(3) restricts the sample to respondents reached for the follow-up survey.
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Table 3 Evidence on screenng effects
Panel A: Screening on subsequent use of Clorin
(1A) (2A)
Dependent variable Water currently treated Drinking water contains
with Clorin? free chlorine?
(follow-up; self-reported) (follow-up; measured)
Offer price 0.0373 0.0321
(100 Kw) (0.0149) (0.0150)
Transaction price fixed effects? YES YES
Sample mean of dependent variable 0.5147 0.5332
Number of observations 546 542
Panel B: Screening conditional on baseline demographics
(1B) (2B)
Dependent variable Water currently treated Drinking water contains
with Clorin? free chlorine?
(follow-up; self-reported) (follow-up; measured)
Offer price 0.0327 0.0293
(100 Kw) (0.0150) (0.0149)
Transaction price fixed effects? YES YES
Baseline demographics? YES YES
Sample mean of dependent variable 0.5140 0.5366
Number of observations 537 533
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Estimates are from linear probability models with fixed effects for
transaction price, estimated on the sample of households that purchased Clorin in the door-to-door marketing
intervention and were reached for the follow-up survey. "Baseline demographics" includes measures of age,
schooling, marital status, pregnancy, household composition, wealth, and locality fixed effects, as in appendix
table 2. Nine households are missing data on one or more baseline demographics due to questionnaire refusals.
We lack data on measured chlorination for 4 households due to a lack of stored drinking water for testing.
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Table 4 Evzdence on sunk-cost effects
Panel A: Tests for sunk-cost effect
(lA) (2A) (3A) (4A) (5A) (6A)
Dependent variable Water currently treated Drinking water contains
with Clorin? free chlorine?
(follow-up; self-reported) (follow-up; measured)
Sample All Sunk-cost household? All Sunk-cost household?
Yes No Yes No
Transaction price 0.0097 0.0348 0.0042 -0.0071 -0.0106 -0.0079
(100 Kw) (0.0133) (0.0334) (0.0149) (0.0133) (0.0330) (0.0147)
Difference 0.0306 -0.0027
(sunk-cost vs. non-sunk-cost) (0.0366) (0.0361)
Offer price fixed effects? YES YES YES YES YES YES
Baseline controls? YES YES YES YES YES YES
Sample mean of dep. var. 0.5140 0.4336 0.5354 0.5366 0.4732 0.5534
No. of obs. 537 113 424 533 112 421
Panel B: Tests for effect of act of paying
(1B) (2B) (3B) (4B) (5B) (6B)
Dependent variable Water currently treated Drinking water contains
with Clorin? free chlorine?
(follow-up; self-reported) (follow-up; measured)
Sample All Sunk-cost household? All Sunk-cost household?
Yes No Yes No
Transaction price > 0 0.0565 0.1840 0.0372 0.0318 0.0816 0.0240
(0.0442) (0.1030) (0.0496) (0.0440) (0.1020) (0.0493)
Dzfference 0. 1468 0. 0576
(sunk-cost vs. non-sunk-cost) (0.1144) (0.1133)
Offer price fixed effects? YES YES YES YES YES YES
Baseline controls? YES YES YES YES YES YES
Sample mean of dep. var. 0.5140 0.4336 0.5354 0.5366 0.4732 0.5534
No. of obs. 537 113 424 533 112 421
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Estimates are from linear probability models with fixed effects for
offer price, estimated on the sample of households that purchased Clorin in the door-to-door marketing
intervention and were reached for the follow-up survey. "Baseline controls" includes baseline Clorin usage
and water chlorination, general health behaviors and attitudes, household demographics, and locality fixed
effects, as in appendix table 2. We lack data on measured chlorination for 4 households due to a lack of stored
drinking water for testing. Estimates for sunk-cost and non-sunk-cost households are from fully interacted
models; estimates of the differences between the coefficients for these samples are from interactions between
the relevant independent variable and a dummy for whether the household displays the sunk-cost effect in
hypothetical choices.
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Appendix Figure 1 Sample coupon from door-to-door marketing
Clorin Coupon
One Time Use Only
K600
Can only be redeeied with SFH mark eter
on day offered
Notes: Figure shows a sample discount coupon from door-to-door marketing experiment. Coupon shows the
final price at which the bottle transacted.
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Appendix Figure 2 Predicting use: willingness-to-pay vs. demographics
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Notes: Top (blue) line shows share reporting Clorin use among buyers at or above each percentile of
willingness-to-pay, with willingness-to-pay distribution based on estimated demand model from column (1)
of table 2. Bottom (pink) line shows share reporting Clorin use among buyers at or above each percentile of
predicted Clorin use, with predicted use determined through an OLS regression of self-reported use on base-
line demographic characteristics (age, schooling, marital status, pregnancy, household composition, wealth,
and locality fixed effects, as in appendix table 2). Share of use at lowest percentile is normalized to 0.
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Appendix Table 1 Demographic characteristics of the baseline sample
(1) (2) (3)
Source Baseline survey Baseline survey DHS
Sample All Ages 15-49 Ages 15-49
Age 32.8257 30.1593 27.1425
(0.3130) (0.2254) (0.2948)
Years of completed schooling 6.6418 7.0285 7.2379
(0.1013) (0.1013) (0.1209)
Married? 0.8000 0.8327 0.5642
(0.0113) (0.0111) (0.0170)
Currently pregnant? 0.1143 0.1254 0.0754
(0.0090) (0.0099) (0.0091)
Total number of living children 3.1867 2.9484 2.1932
(0.0630) (0.0614) (0.0791)
Number of children in household under age 5 0.9619 0.9875 1.1767
(0.0245) (0.0253) (0.0365)
Household owns a radio? 0.5540 0.5721 0.6266
(0.0140) (0.0148) (0.0166)
Household owns a television? 0.4992 0.5151 0.5501
(0.0141) (0.0149) (0.0171)
Household owns a refrigerator? 0.1905 0.1940 0.2686
(0.0111) (0.0118) (0.0152)
Household owns a bicycle? 0.1000 0.1077 0.1213
(0.0085) (0.0092) (0.0112)
Household owns a motorcycle? 0.0008 0.0009 0.0012
(0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0012)
Household owns a car? 0.0230 0.0258 0.0836
(0.0042) (0.0047) (0.0095)
Number of observations 1260 1124 849
Notes: Table shows means of variables, with standard errors in parentheses. Columns (1) and (2) use dat
from our baseline survey. Column (3) uses data on Lusaka residents from the 2001 Demographic and Healt
Survey (DHS) of Zambia. Actual number of observations in columns (1) and (2) varies slightly acros
variables due to questionnaire refusals.
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Appendix Table 2 Testing the balance of observables across treatment conditions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample All Marketing Purchased Clorin
Dependent variable Offer Offer Transaction Transaction
Price Price Price Price > 0
Water currently treated with Clorin?
(baseline; self-reported)
Drinking water contains free chlorine?
(baseline; measured)
Use of soap before handling food
(index)
Use of soap after using toilet
(index)
Attitude toward water purification
(index)
Age in years
Ever attended school?
Years of completed schooling
Currently married?
Currently pregnant?
Ever given birth to any children?
No. of children in household under age 5
No. of people in household
Share of durables owned
Locality fixed effects?
Fixed effects for offer price?
Fixed effects for transaction price?
0.1474
(0.1114)
0.0764
(0.0892)
0.0032
(0.1546)
-0.3067
(0.1593)
-0.0828
(0.2258)
0.0032
(0.0046)
-0.0986
(0.1830)
0.0097
(0.0189)
0.0870
(0.1160)
-0.0118
(0.1355)
-0.1571
(0.1806)
0.0474
(0.0536)
-0.0196
(0.0193)
0.1286
(0.2885)
YES
NO
YES
0.2040
(0.1250)
0.0150
(0.1003)
-0.0881
(0.1735)
-0.1992
(0.1782)
-0.3628
(0.2531)
0.0023
(0.0052)
-0.1235
(0.2050)
0.0187
(0.0215)
0.0381
(0.1327)
0.0768
(0.1550)
-0.1471
(0.2065)
0.0596
(0.0609)
-0.0106
(0.0214)
0.0603
(0.3265)
YES
NO
YES
-0.1171
(0.1747)
0.3300
(0.1412)
0.2281
(0.2519)
0.0863
(0.2564)
0.5490
(0.3564)
-0.0002
(0.0076)
0.2510
(0.2874)
-0.0352
(0.0305)
-0.1274
(0.1881)
-0.0400
(0.2222)
0.2126
(0.2913)
0.0904
(0.0918)
-0.0377
(0.0298)
0.2612
(0.4499)
YES
YES
NO
0.0668
(0.0525)
0.0643
(0.0425)
0.0860
(0.0757)
-0.0192
(0.0771)
0.0645
(0.1071)
-0.0010
(0.0023)
0.1501
(0.0864)
-0.0157
(0.0092)
0.0416
(0.0565)
-0.0037
(0.0668)
-0.0410
(0.0876)
0.0381
(0.0276)
-0.0042
(0.0090)
0.0100
(0.1352)
YES
YES
NO
F-test that all coefficients are 0 0.64 0.64 0.90 0.93
p-value of F-test 0.8719 0.8686 0.5802 0.5395
Number of observations 1244 990 605 605
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. "Marketing" refers to households reached for door-to-door marketing.
All variables measured as of baseline survey. Transaction price fixed effects excluded from F-test in columns
(1) and (2). Offer price fixed effects excluded from F-test in columns (3) and (4). Prices in units of 100 Kw.
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Appendix Table 3 Determinants of sample attrition
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample All Marketing Purchased Cloiin
Dependent variable Marketing Follow-up Follow-up Follow-up
Offer price (100 Kw)
Transaction price (100 Kw)
Transaction price > 0
Water currently treated with Clorin?
(baseline, self-reported)
Drinking water contains free chlorine?
(baseline; measured)
Use of soap before handling food
(index)
Use of soap after using toilet
(index)
Attitude toward water purification
(index)
Age in yeais
Ever attended school?
Years of completed schooling
Currently married?
Currently pregnant?
Ever given birth to any children ?
No of children in household under age 5
No. of people in household
Share of durables owned
Locality fixed effects?
Fixed effects for offer price?
Fixed effects for transaction price?
F-test that control coefficients are 0
p-value of F-test
Number of observations
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
0.0021
(0.0073)
-0.0031
(0.0068)
0.0074
(0.0302)
0.0269
(0.0242)
0.0355
(0.0420)
-0 0268
(0 0434)
0.0508
(0.0613)
0.0016
(0 0013)
-0.0063
(0.0498)
-0.0052
(0.0051)
0.0317
(0.0314)
-0.0085
(0.0369)
-0.0447
(0 0490)
0.0133
(0.0145)
0.0074
(0.0053)
0.1763
(0.0784)
YES
NO
NO
2.05
0.0060
1244
0.0022
(0.0069)
-0.0122
(0.0267)
0.0152
(0.0214)
-0.0131
(0.0371)
-0 0069
(0.0381)
0.0965
(0.0541)
0.0022
(0.0011)
-0.0224
(0.0438)
0.0028
(0.0046)
0.0214
(0.0283)
0.0215
(0.0331)
-0.0033
(0 0441)
0.0044
(0.0130)
0.0109
(0.0046)
0.0638
(0.0697)
YES
NO
YES
1.61
0.0512
990
0.0063
(0.0080)
-0.0092
(0.0338)
-0.0057
(0.0274)
0.0004
(0.0487)
-0.0231
(0.0496)
0 0838
(0 0690)
0.0034
(0.0015)
-0.0035
(0.0556)
0.0078
(0.0059)
0.0811
(0.0364)
-0.0410
(0.0430)
-0.0242
(0.0563)
-0.0105
(0.0178)
0.0121
(0.0058)
0.0020
(0.0870)
YES
YES
NO
1.50
0.0837
605
0.0325
(0.0267)
-0.0121
(0.0338)
-0.0057
(0.0273)
-0.0010
(0.0487)
-0.0220
(0 0495)
0.0852
(0.0689)
0.0035
(0.0015)
-0.0068
(0.0557)
0.0081
(0.0059)
0.0789
(0.0364)
-0.0412
(0.0429)
-0.0215
(0.0563)
-0 0112
(0.0178)
0 0120
(0.0058)
0.0033
(0.0869)
YES
YES
NO
1.50
0.0833
605
"Marketing" refers to households reached for door-to-door marketing.
"Purchased Clorin" refers to households that purchased Clorin during door-to-door marketing. All variables
measured as of baseline survey. Offer price and transaction price variables excluded from F-tests.
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Appendix Table 4 Intertemporal implhcations of the model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable Have Clorin Water currently treated Drinking water contains Water currently treated Drinking water contains
in household? with Clorin? free chlorine? with Clorin? free chlorine?
(baseline; inventory) (baseline; self-reported) (baseline; measured) (follow-up; self-reported) (follow-up; measured)
Sample: Clorin in All Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
home at baseline?
Offer price 0.0182 -0.0067 -0.0093 -0.0289 0.0512 -0.0046 0.0386
(100 Kw) (0.0104) (0.0245) (0.0265) (0.0288) (0.0169) (0.0294) (0.0171)
No. of obs. 614 133 133 117 429 117 425
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. See appendix A for details. Sample consists of households who purchased Clorin at marketing stage.
Appendix Table 5 Addztional robustness checks
Effect on Effect on use:
purchase:
Specification Offer price Use measure Offer price Transaction price
(100 Kw) (100 Kw) (100 Kw)
(1) Main tables -0.0664 Self-reported 0.0373 0.0097
(0.0093) (0.0149) (0.0133)
Measured 0.0321 -0.0071
(0.0150) (0.0133)
(2) Probit -0.0678 Self-reported 0.0377 0.0111
(0.0097) (0.0151) (0.0142)
Measured 0.0325 -0.0077
(0.0152) (0.0143)
(3) Marketer -0.0633 Self-reported 0.0351 0.0103
fixed (0.0092) (0.0151) (0.0135)
effects Measured 0.0301 -0.0099
(0.0150) (0.0132)
(4) Average Self-reported 0.0381 0.0129
treatment (0.0148) (0.0143)
effects Measured 0.0324 -0.0108
(0.0150) (0.0148)
(5) Controlling for -0.0706 Self-reported 0.0341 0.0144
quality (0.0098) (0.0144) (0.0130)
assessments Measured 0.0311 -0.0057
(0.0149) (0.0133)
(6) Ordered probit Underlying parameter 0.0701 -0.0171
on free chlorine (Standard error) (0.0336) (0.0314)
[Implied marginal effect] [0.0273] [-0.0064]
(7) Ordered probit Underlying parameter 0.0695 -0.0121
on recency (Standard error) (0.0319) (0.0294)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. See appendix B for details. Effect of offer price on purchase estimated
on sample of households reached during marketing. Effect of offer price on use estimated on sample of
households that purchased Clorin during door-to-door marketing intervention, in a specification that includes
transaction price fixed effects. Effect of transaction price (and positive transaction price) on use estimated on
sample of households that purchased Clorin during door-to-door marketing intervention, in a specification
that includes offer price fixed effects and baseline controls (baseline Clorin usage and water chlorination,
general health behaviors and attitudes, household demographics, and locality fixed effects, as in appendix
table 2).
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